A Risk-Driven Investment Model for Analysing Human Factors in Information Security by Mortazavi-Alavi, Reza & Mortazavi-Alavi, Reza
      
 
  
A Risk-Driven 
Investment Model 
for Analysing 
Human Factors in 
Information 
Security 
Reza Alavi 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON    
 
  
A Risk-Driven Investment 
Model for Analysing Human 
Factors in Information Security  
 
Reza Alavi 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
 
The University of East London 
School of Architecture, Computing and Engineering (ACE)  
 
Director of Study: Doctor Shareeful Islam 
Supervisor: Doctor Win See Lee 
2016
  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Conducting PhD research is quite challenging. This becomes even more 
demanding if you are in full-time employment whilst having other 
commitments such as family and even a second part-time job.  
 
I am very grateful to the University of East London for giving me an 
opportunity to conduct my PhD study. I would like to thank Dr. Shareeful 
Islam for assisting me during my studies in a challenging and competitive 
environment and supporting me in all aspects during the course of the 
research. This research could not have achieved its objectives without his 
precious and analytical insight and comments. 
 
I also want to thank Dr. Sin Wee Lee for co-supervising this thesis, 
Professor Haralambos Mouratidis for his support throughout the work on 
my dissertation and my colleagues David, Rob, Neil, Sean, Salma, Peter and 
Trevor for their support throughout my research. During my research 
work, I collaborated with colleagues and friends in various universities and 
financial organisations to whom I wish to express my sincere gratitude.  
 
Above all, I want to thank my wife and my son for supporting me in every 
step of my research and for giving me the greatest joy of my life. Finally, I 
would also like to thank all the staff at the University of East London, 
especially my ADI colleagues and the library for the wonderful times and 
support they gave me. I also would like to thank the admin team in the 
School of Computing and Graduate School for the fruitful help and advice 
they provided during the course of my research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
I maintain that the work in this thesis was conducted in conferment with 
the guidelines of the University of East London and is novel except those 
specified by detailed reference. The thesis has not been made available to 
any other educational organisation.  
Signed................................   Date.......................................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Information systems are of high importance in organisations because of the 
revolutionary industrial transformation undergone by digital and electronic 
platforms. A wide range of factors and issues forming the current business 
environments have created an unprecedented level of uncertainty and 
exposure to risks in all areas of strategic and operational activities in 
organisations including IT management and information security. 
Subsequently, securing these systems, which keep assets safe, serves 
organisational objectives. The Information Security System (ISS) is a 
process that organisations can adopt to achieve information security goals. 
It has gained the attention of academics, businesses, governments, security 
and IT professionals in recent years. Like any other system, the ISS is highly 
dependent on human factors as people are the primary concern of such 
systems and their roles should be taken into consideration. However, 
identifying reasoning and analysing human factors is a complex task. This 
is due to the fact that human factors are hugely subjective in nature and 
depend greatly on the specific organisational context. Every ISS 
development has unique demands both in terms of human factor 
specifications and organisational expectations. Developing an ISS often 
involves a notable proportion of risk due to the nature of technology and 
business demands; therefore, responding to these demands and 
technological challenges is critical. Furthermore, every business decision 
has inherent risk, and it is crucial to understand and make decisions based 
on the cost and potential value of that risk. Most research is solely 
concentrated upon the role of human factors in information security 
without addressing interrelated issues such as risk, cost and return of 
investment in security.  
 
The central focus and novelty of this research is to develop a risk-driven 
investment model within the security system framework. This model will 
support the analysis and reasoning of human factors in the information 
system development process. It contemplates risk, cost and the return of 
investment on security controls. The model will consider concepts from 
Requirements Engineering (RE), Security Tropos and organisational 
context. This model draws from the following theories and techniques: 
Socio-technical theory, Requirements Engineering (RE), SWOT analysis, 
Delphi Expert Panel technique and Force Field Analysis (FFA). The 
findings underline that the roles of human factors in ISSs are not being fully 
recognised or embedded in organisations and there is a lack of formalisation 
of main human factors in information security risk management processes. 
The study results should confirm that a diverse level of understanding of 
human factors impacts security systems. Security policies and guidelines do 
not reflect this reality. Moreover, information security has been perceived 
as being solely the domain of IT departments and not a collective 
responsibility, with the importance of the support of senior management 
ignored. A further key finding is the validation of all components of the 
Security Risk-Driven Model (RIDIM). Model components were found to 
be iterative and interdependent. The RIDIM model provides a significant 
opportunity to identify, assess and address these elements.  
 
 Some elements of ISSs offered in this research can be used to evaluate the 
role of human factors in enterprise information security; therefore, the 
research presents some aspects of computer science and information 
system features to introduce a solution for a business-oriented problem. 
The question of how to address the psychological dimensions of human 
factors related to information security would, however, be a rich topic of 
research on its own. The risk-driven investment model provides tangible 
methods and values of relevant variables that define the human factors, risk 
and return on investment that contribute to organisations’ information 
security systems. Such values and measures need to be interpreted in the 
context of organisational culture and the risk management model. Further 
research into the implementation of these measurements and evaluations 
for improving organisational risk management is required. 
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CHAPTER 1 
_______________________________ 
Introduction 
 
Contents 
1.1 Overview 
1.2 Research Motivation and Novelty 
1.3 Problem Domain 
1.4 Research Contributions 
1.5 Research Questions 
1.6 Research Objectives 
1.7 Research Methodology 
1.8 Research Outlines 
 
1.1. Overview  
It is quite unusual to admit that nowadays organisations get along without 
having an astute and decisive information system. Information systems 
support organisations to achieve strategic competitive advantages over 
other organisations and assist senior management in the decision-making 
process. In addition, they help organisations in timely implementation of 
projects and effective risk management. A reliable and coherent 
information system requires a solid security framework that ensures 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authenticity and Auditability of the 
critical information assets; therefore, managing security is essential for 
organisations doing business in a globally networked and competitive 
environment whilst seeking to achieve their objectives and goals and 
ensuring the continuity of business. Information Security Systems exist to 
setup a solid security framework and regulate the systematic way in which 
information technology can use relevant resources. They address all issues 
that relate to the initiation, implementation, maintenance and evaluation of 
a secure information system [1]. There have been several studies in the 
domain of human factors and information management systems, though 
very little research has addressed the role of main human factors in the ISS 
context and lifecycle or considered risks and security investment.  
 
Inadequate implementation of security seriously impacts upon 
organisations’ productivity and reputation [2] [3]. According to the 
Technical Report of Information Security Breaches (2015) by the UK 
Department for Business, Information & Skills, large organisations have 
faced a 75% increase in security incidents related to human factors [4]. Even 
using the latest security techniques and protocols, most systems still 
frequently encounter security breaches. Technological solutions dealing 
with issues arising from information security are very similar globally, 
including anti-virus software, firewalls and intrusion detection systems [5]. 
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Numerous technical advancements do not always produce a more secure 
environment [6] because security breaches do not always originate with 
technical problems; rather, they also depend on the humans who use the 
systems and behave within the system environment; therefore, human 
factors perform an important role in information security systems. The role 
of people has not only been highlighted by numerous academic studies but 
also by IS professionals and various IS regulations and standards. For 
example, a section of ISO27001, the main security standard, describes the 
role of people, including the importance of responsible management, 
commitment, training, awareness and competence and skills [7]. The main 
question is why all manner of regulations, standards and technical 
competencies have not addressed the issues related to human factors.  An 
understanding of human factors requires the development of an effective 
information security management system. 
 
This research intends to analyse main characteristics of human factors 
within the context of ISSs in organisations and address them within a 
unique risk-driven investment model. The uniqueness of this model derives 
from the organisational benefits gained by linking the risks due to incidental 
and human factors with the investment to ensure the economical allocation 
to address the most pressing risks factors. This approach is uniquely 
proposed for the consideration of human factors, risk and concerns of 
investment. 
 
1.2. Research Motivation and Novelty 
For many years, the study of human factors, a term that is used in this 
research prevalently, has been evolving as a unique and independent 
discipline. It focuses on the nature and characteristics of human 
interactions, viewed from the unified perspective of the science, 
engineering, design, technology and management of human compatible 
systems. It includes a variety of natural and artificial products, processes 
and living environments [8]; therefore, both human factors and the 
relationship between those factors and technology, information security 
systems in particular, are not a new phenomenon. Many studies on human 
factors and computer science, technology, information systems and 
information security have been published, though no research has been 
done to specifically address the role of human factors in ISSs in an 
organisational context, considering their unique specifications [9] [1]. The 
advancement of the implementation of Information Security System (ISS) 
procedures in organisations has not provided effective security. Inadequate 
ISSs seriously impact upon organisations’ productivity and reputation [2] 
[3] [10]. It is also argued that there is no universal, top-model framework to 
fulfil ISS goals [11]. However, the real challenges are from non-technical 
issues such as human and organisational factors, which need more attention 
to ensure the effectiveness of an ISS. Effectively and progressively, 
information systems are shifting from the technical realm to a socio-
technical ecosystem, where human factors play a more important role. 
Deloitte, in its 2006 global security report, argues that many security 
breaches are the result of human errors or negligence because of weak 
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operational practices [12]. It is also highlighted that human factors present 
the greatest single issue of concern in ISSs [13]; thus, there is a need for an 
adequate model and a comprehensive understanding of human factors and 
their impact on the effective implementation of information security 
systems. This task is challenging, because the domain is highly subjective 
by nature and it is difficult to quantify all the human factors into a 
measuring scale. For instance, it would be extremely difficult to judge and 
evaluate people’s attitudes towards information security. Consequently, the 
motivation of this research lies with the lack of adequate and appropriate 
models and methodologies in the current literature to support the analysis 
and reasoning of main characteristics of human factors within the context 
of ISSs in organisations, considering risks and security investment.  
 
The contribution of this research is a novel risk-driven investment model 
to support the analysis of human factors in the ISS development process. 
The model utilises concepts from goal-oriented requirements engineering, 
conceptual modelling, Secure Tropos language modelling and 
organisational context. The focus of the model is on non-technical 
elements that include direct and indirect human factors. Literature has 
illustrated that requirements engineering approaches are appropriate for the 
analysis and reasoning of non-technical issues related to information 
systems and therefore are appropriate for an analysis of human factors 
related to security. The researcher believes that having considered all 
available and current methodologies presented in the literature to support 
such an analysis effectively and sufficiently, this research has adopted the 
right approach and techniques.      
 
1.3.  Problem Domain  
Information Security falls back on a range of different disciplines: computer 
science, communication technology, criminology, law, business, 
mathematics, amongst others; therefore, like most things in life, success in 
all of these areas is achieved through understanding and managing the 
human factors.  
 
 
What is meant by ‘‘human factor’’?  
 
Human factor refers to the environmental, organisational, job factors 
and human and individual characteristics that influence human 
behaviour. However, it is widely defined as referring to the science 
of ergonomic design [14]. Ergonomics (or human factors) is the 
scientific field interested with the understanding of interactions 
amongst individuals and other elements of a system, and the 
declaration that applies theory, principles and methods to design in 
order to optimise human wellbeing and performance and general 
system functions. 
 
In information security, the human factors context defines the impact of 
people and the unforeseeable forces that cause many of best planned 
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technological systems to collapse. This can be as a result of carelessness, 
stress, apathy, error, lack of sufficient communication or inadequate 
support of management. In addition, human factors hinder information 
systems’ capabilities for securing information assets. Technology is key to 
security, increasingly so as businesses learn how to apply its influence to 
handle growing business and security needs. However, technology is 
designed, implemented, operated and evaluated by people and, therefore, 
human factors greatly determine whether information systems are used or 
misused. As we evolve from a predominantly process-driven business 
model to a more cursive and coherent information-driven model, the 
impact of human factors has become greater. Information security 
incidents are rising despite the use of technological advancements and the 
provision of training and awareness programs for users [12] [15]. Persistent 
security incidents indicate a lack of understanding of some of the issues 
concerning information security. Much existing research investigating these 
concerns exists, yet information security incidents are increasing [16]. 
Organisations seem attached to a general mind-set that technical aspects of 
information security have greater impacts on successful projects than non-
technical factors. This is in spite of abundant research identifying non-
technical factors as the main cause of information security incidents [17] 
[18]. Information security scholars have identified many non-technical 
factors, such as human factors, as responsible for security breaches and 
incidents [3] [17] [18] [19] [20]. Although current practices in ISSs have 
received approval from governments, corporations, standard bodies and 
regulators, the human factor domain still lacks maturity. Most studies have, 
however, concentrated on information systems rather than ISS. Although 
human factors are identified as key parameters in a successful ISS, a detailed 
analysis is required for an understanding of their impact.    
 
Human factors and influence create great challenges for information 
security systems. Because of human nature, people often make inconsistent, 
subjective and myopic decisions and assessments that pose a great risk to 
information assets. All kinds of human factors can deeply affect the way 
information security is managed. Though human factors need to be 
analysed and measured, their high subjectivity makes this extremely 
difficult; therefore, a detailed analysis of the main human factors and their 
unique specifications and requirements in ISSs is a critical concern. This 
research thus intends to analyse the main human factors involved in an ISS 
from an organisational perspective to provide a model to address risk and 
security investment. Information security incidents due to human factors 
have been shown to be a major issue within the ISS domain, hindering the 
business management agenda, and they will remain there until the 
consequences of human failure are addressed. This major issue in the 
domain of ISSs will become increasingly important with the ever growing 
social networking, use of mobile devices and cloud computing, with its 
potential for even greater security breaches, and ultimately cause more risk 
and damage to organisations [21]. An adequate model to address this 
concern will be presented in this research. 
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1.4.  Research Contributions  
This research contributes to current knowledge of information security by 
demonstrating the importance and critical role of human factors in the 
development of information security system processes. The main 
contribution will be the advancement of the theoretical and practical basis 
for ISSs in proposing an objective framework for developing, assessing and 
modelling a risk-investment security approach. Furthermore, it improves 
understanding of risk-investment constructs in the security incident stages 
in relation to maximising return on security investments. This research 
examines the role of human factors in ISS processes on the basis of risk 
and investment. The findings will emphasise the importance of human 
factors in today’s information security context and provide guidance on 
addressing risk to and return on security investments. This could perhaps 
serve to improve the financial performance and competitiveness of 
organisations and increase the effectiveness of their security policies and 
guidelines. It is expected that the outcomes of this research will have a 
positive impact on the ISS guidelines in organisations and therefore 
increase the effectiveness of security systems’ design and implementation. 
The outcomes of the research can be applicable in all organisations and 
assist in the decision-making process by providing new control measures in 
regard to security investment. 
It is expected that the main outcome of the study, the Information Security 
Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM), will be used by organisations to:  
 help them better articulate security policy processes, considering 
critical human factors and the consequences of their risks 
 provide adequate and appropriate training and awareness 
programs to address risks related to critical human factors 
 calculate the ROISI to obtain accurate risk identification and 
therefore an adequate investment for the introduction of new 
controls and mitigation processes.  
The specific benefit to organisations will be a bespoke formulation of the 
RIDIM Security Investment and Risk-based Model and risk-investment 
metrics.  
1.5. Research Questions   
The main research goal is to develop a risk-driven security investment 
model to support the analysis and reasoning of the main characteristics of 
human factors within the context of ISSs in organisations. With this goal in 
mind, the thesis attempts to address the following questions:  
 
1) What are the main characteristics of human factors within the 
ISS context? 
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2) How can we provide an analysis and reasoning of human 
factors, risks and security investment in the development 
process of an ISS?  
 
3) How can a Security Risk-Driven Model support the analysis 
of the effect of human factors in the ISS development process? 
 
This research uses a number of theories and methods to achieve the 
research objectives and evaluates their applicability. 
 
1.6.  Research Objectives  
The main objective of this research is to address critical human factors in 
ISS projects and their relation to risk and investment issues in such projects. 
The following goals are thus proposed to achieve the main objective: 
 
1. To evaluate and identify the main direct and indirect human factors 
in ISSs. 
2. To prioritise critical human factors.  
3. To determine the relationship between critical human factors, risk 
and security investment. 
4. To develop a model of risk-investment, considering critical human 
factors, risks and security investment, for use in the development 
of ISSs.     
 
 
 
1.7.  Research Methodology 
Both a positivistic and interpretivist research philosophy shapes the overall 
research design of the mixed methods approach. A detailed qualitative of 
the research objectives are presented that are formed by an interpretivist 
view. However, the research lies predominantly in the positivistic field, 
where the empirical data converged and therefore both qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used. The semi-structured interviews, structured 
questionnaire, detailed interviews and Delphi expert panel and use of real 
life security incidents were used as case studies to ensure the reliability and 
validity of the results. The research methodology also used a literature 
review, identification of suitable methods and case study approach.  
 
1.8.  Research Outlines 
The first chapter delivers the inspiration for and the novelty of this research 
by outlining the research domain, problem relevance and research 
contribution. Following Chapter 1, the thesis is categorised into the 
following chapters:  
 
Chapter 2: Related Work and Related Theories: A review of 
the literature, related work, relevant theories and current status of security 
practices related to ISSs in organisations is presented. The chapter begins 
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by outlining the basics of information security attributes. It then continues 
by reviewing existing practices and current research into the role of human 
factors in ISSs. The chapter the defines and reviews Social Engineering 
Attacks (SEAs), the main source of incidents related to human factors. It 
then defines Information Security Risks and Return On Information 
Security Investment (ROISI). A definition of Information Security 
Dashboard, which provides a method by which businesses can address 
information security issues and concepts, is provided. It the continues with 
the relevant theories and methods, including Socio-technical theory, 
SWOT, Delphi Expert Panel and Force Field methodologies, as well as 
Requirements Engineering (RE) and Secure-Tropos methodology. The 
researcher performed a literature review to understand human factors and 
their impact on information security management systems [22]. The 
literature search process focused on the studies that considered human-
related issues and linked them with information security, focusing on an 
organisational context. In particular, the human factors that directly and 
indirectly impact an organisation were emphasised. The research identifies 
relevant literature from major research databases such as IEEE Xplore, 
SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, Elesevier, ACM Digital Library and Google 
scholar. The study considered only peer reviewed papers and counted the 
citations of individual papers to assess their quality. The extracted data were 
combined and analysed based on a security incident. Finally, the chapter 
summarises the existing state of the art of ISSs and outlines the main thesis 
contribution by revisiting research questions.  
 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology: The research 
methodology and research methodology process is 
outlined. The research used a mixed method, combining 
both quantitative and qualitative techniques. It was 
constructed on unstructured but detailed interviews and 
a structured survey study, using Delphi expert panel 
method. The methodology of the research comprises four 
stages: Investigation, Prioritisation, Gap Analysis, and 
Control and Evaluation (IPGACE). This is followed by 
an outline of the research goals and a discussion.  
 
Chapter 4: Overview of Human Factors: Critical human factors 
are identified using the research methodology techniques introduced in 
Chapter 3. Consequently, this chapter uses current literature, unstructured 
interviews, SWOT analysis and a survey study to identify main human 
factors, which it then characterises into two main categories; direct and 
indirect human factors. The direct human factors are exactly related to 
people and their characters and feelings. The indirect factors take into 
account the organisational contexts and forces that affect people. Two real 
incidents were used as case studies to analyse and prioritise these factors.   
 
Chapter 5: Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM): The 
Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM) is introduced, the main 
 8       
 
contribution of this research. The first part of the chapter offers a detailed 
explanation of the basic concepts of the model, considering the actors, 
goals, risks, security incidents, vulnerabilities, security investment, plan and 
protect mechanism and configuration of the meta-model. Then it outlines 
the process model in a real world scenario in three activities and tasks 
associated in RIDIM. The chapter continues to incorporate the outcome 
of the activities with the outcome of ROISI to integrate the principles of 
RIDIM into requirements engineering at an abstract level.  
 
Chapter 6: Evaluations: The proposed security investment and risk-
based model is evaluated. The research considers SEAs as security incidents 
and describes how RIDIM can assist in controlling such incidents. The case 
study implements RIDIM in a real world example and takes into account 
the security budget of a large organisation. Finally, the chapter concludes 
by suggesting adequate budget requirements for a protection mechanism 
against SEAs.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussions: Conclusions on the 
overall thesis contribution are presented. The research results are 
summarised. In addition, this section includes a discussion of the limitations 
of the RIDIM as well as some suggestions for the direction of future work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
_______________________________ 
Related Works and Relevant Theories 
 
Contents 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Basics about Information Security Attributes 
2.3 Human Factors 
2.4 Social Engineering Attacks 
2.5 Information Security Risks 
2.6 Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI) 
2.7 Information Security Business Dashboard 
2.8 Relevant Theories and Methods 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter offers background information and reviews related works 
which are relevant for this research. It introduces the concepts of 
information security, human factors, business and organisational oriented 
issues such as the information security dashboard and return on 
investment, which is one concept used for modelling human factors. This 
chapter also discusses the theories and existing state-of-the-art works 
around Requirements Engineering (RE), Socio-technical theory, SWOT 
analysis methodology, Force Field Analysis (FFA), the Delphi Expert Panel 
Survey method and Social Engineering Attacks (SEAs), all relevant for this 
research as shown in Figure 2.1. A literature review is a method of 
identifying, interpreting and evaluating all available research sources 
relevant for a specific research question or topic area [23] [24].  We follow 
a list of keywords, including Information Security, Information Security 
Management System, Human Factors, Return of Security Investment, Risks and 
Requirements Engineering for this review through widely familiar database 
sources such as ACM, IEEEXplore, and Google Scholar.  
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Related work 
and relevant 
theory
Related work 
Relevant 
theories and 
methods 
 Information security attributes
 Human factors 
 Social engineering attacks 
 Information security risks 
 Return of security investment 
 Information security business 
dashboard 
 Socio-technical theory
 SWOT 
 Delphi survey method
 Force field analysis 
 Requirements engineering 
 Secure tropos modelling 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Overview of related works and relevant theories 
 
2.2 Basics about Information Security Attributes 
Information security attributes provide a foundation for information 
security and are designed for modelling policies within this field [25]. They 
are: Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality, Accountability, and Auditability 
(AICAA). Although they are considered essential to information security 
systems, they are in fact largely dependent on the specific requirements of 
the organisation’s security goals in the context of the business’s nature and 
certain threats to particular information assets. An overview of these 
attributes is given below. 
 
2.2.1 Availability  
 
Availability refers to the timely and uninterrupted access to information 
systems and services given to authorised actors. Availability in a security 
mechanism provides extensive assurance of the accessibility of resources 
and data to authorised users. For example, availability offers effective and 
constant access to data in the case of Distribution Denial-of-Service 
(DDoS) attacks. In addition, availability entails supporting infrastructure 
such as network services and access control mechanisms, which enables 
authorised users to acquire authorised access [26]. Having a control 
mechanism established maintains availability, safeguarding authorised 
access and ensuring an adequate level of performance and conformity to 
deal with unforeseen interruptions and deliver redundancy, prevent data 
destruction and loss and maintain a reliable backup. Threats to availability 
include failure and errors in software and electrical equipment, spillages of 
chemicals and liquids as well as natural factors such as high temperature, air 
system faults, flooding and so on. Some forms of attack focus on disrupting 
availability, including DDoS attacks, data destruction and communication 
interruptions. Human factors present another threat to availability such as 
through the unauthorised alteration of sensitive information as a result of 
error, oversight, tiredness, incompetency, stress and so on. Availability 
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breaches can arise because of the actions of users, an inaccuracy in security 
policy or an incorrect implementation of security control.  
 
2.2.2 Integrity  
 
Integrity is the second principle of the AICAA. Upholding integrity, entities 
must preserve their authenticity and be intentionally modified only by 
authorised subjects. Security mechanisms provide integrity by offering 
strong assurance that all resources and data are unaltered from their original 
form whilst they are stored, transferred or processed. This ensures that 
information systems and their components are not compromised and their 
integrity maintained [27]. The following actions are required to achieve 
integrity; authorised modifications, the consistency of internal and external 
data to ensure its correctness and validation in a verifiable manner and in 
an interoperable format.  Viruses, SEAs, APTs, phishing, logic bombs, 
unauthorised access, errors in coding and applications, malicious 
modification, intentional replacement and system back doors are just some 
examples of the many types of breach that can violate integrity. As with 
confidentiality, integrity incidents are not limited to deliberate attacks. Many 
instances of unauthorised alteration of sensitive information are because of 
human factors such as error, lack of communication, inadequate training, 
oversight, ineptitude and stress. Several countermeasures can safeguard 
integrity against possible threats. These include strict access control, 
rigorous authentication procedures such as multi-authentication methods, 
intrusion detection systems, encryption, hash total verifications, interface 
restrictions and extensive and adequate awareness training. Integrity is 
reliant on confidentiality and without confidentiality integrity cannot be 
preserved.  
 
2.2.3 Confidentiality  
 
The third component of AICAA is confidentiality. Security mechanisms 
offer confidentiality to both soft and hard assets and provide them with a 
high level of assurance, because such mechanisms are limited to authorised 
access. Unapproved disclosure of assets might occur under presence of 
threats to violate the confidentiality rule [28]. Data must be protected from 
unauthorised access, use or disclosure in storage, during processing and in 
transit in order for confidentiality to be maintained. For this purpose, a 
detailed and distinctive security mechanism is required for each single 
official set of data resources. Attacks such as capturing network traffic, 
stealing password files, port scanning, shoulder surfing, eavesdropping and 
sniffing are used to violate confidentiality, though SEA incidents are the 
most common and successful types of attacks. SEAs, discussed later, take 
advantage of human weakness and ineptitude to breach confidentiality. 
Incidents that lead to confidentiality breaches can also be due to inadequate 
encryption of a transmission, failing to fully authenticate a remote system 
before relocating data, leaving access points unsecured and accessing 
malicious code that opens a back door. These violations of confidentiality 
can stem from actions of an end user or a system administrator, inaccuracy 
in a security policy or a misconfigured security control. Encryption, strict 
 12       
 
access control, thorough authentication processes, data classification, 
extensive training and awareness programs and network traffic padding can 
be used as countermeasures to safeguard confidentiality against possible 
threats. It is important to mention that without integrity, confidentiality 
cannot be upheld as they depend on each other extensively. Sensitivity, 
discretion, criticality, disguise, secrecy, privacy, solitude and isolation are 
other perceptions, conditions and characteristics of confidentiality. 
However, as organisations must act pragmatically towards security and 
assurance, the preservation of confidentiality must adhere to business 
requirements, need, goals and objectives. Confidentiality should enable the 
achievement of business objectives. Confidentiality itself is not the 
objective.    
 
2.2.4 Accountability  
 
Accountability is an indispensable part of information security. 
Accountability requires that each individual working with an information 
system have precise responsibilities for information assurance. In practice, 
the person who is in charge of information assurance is responsible for the 
overall information security plan and the measurement of it. Prohibiting 
employees from installing unauthorised software on an information system 
owned by an organisation would be an example of this. Each individual 
must be held responsible for the information assets that they own. The 
practice will improve overall security and trustworthiness in organisations. 
In order for accountability to be measured, there must be a process in which 
the accountability properties in various stakeholders and entities are defined 
whilst clear metrics are introduced by the Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO). The ISO27001 standards state that clear rules for 
information security, involving a process for assigning and accepting 
accountability for the appropriate safeguarding of information assets, must 
be adhered to [1]. This provides an ability to hold individuals, entities and 
stakeholders responsible for their actions in user transactions and for their 
use of information.  
 
2.2.5 Auditability  
 
Auditability is a crucial part of information security and assurance. Various 
level of controls and auditability in organisations are required to deal with 
the concerns of regulation and compliance [29]. In information security, 
compliance and regulatory requirements are complex and enable greater 
security control and auditability. Data security’s characteristic attribute is 
that it guarantees the completeness, accuracy and consistency of 
information. The data auditability goal requires the authentication of 
information for reporting and adequate evidence. The trustability of 
information systems works alongside the auditability of such systems, 
concerning various stakeholders in enterprise security systems that include 
human factors. As information systems’ activities move ever closure to 
cloud computing, cloud virtualisation management becomes even more 
critical for organisations. Consequently, attestation and clarification have 
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become integral components in the security management of virtualisation 
and cloud-based information systems. As a result, it is crucial that 
auditability, which relies heavily relies on attestation and clarification, is 
followed. The following concepts, which are part of the business domain, 
are discussed in order to understand the risk-driven investment model.   
 
2.3 Human factors  
 
Conventional patterns of how ISSs are run are rapidly evolving. Evolving 
computing technology provides many benefits, such as accessibility and the 
availability of resources for organisations [1]. But the economic advantage 
and cost impacts are far more attractive to organisations than anything else. 
This convenience and attractiveness, however, comes with new security 
challenges and risks that require investment to be managed and mitigated. 
Human factors further complicate these challenges and the way they are 
addressed. Social Engineering Attacks (SEAs) are very commonly used by 
attackers to access classified data. Human factors in information security 
certainly are an important concern for an organisation’s critical business 
operations. Therefore, it is imperative for organisations to address all 
concerns, including risks and investment in security. Information Security 
Systems can be used to address issues related to the establishment, 
evaluation and maintenance of a secure information system. Inadequate 
implementation of security causes serious impacts on organisations’ 
productivity and reputation [18]. According to the Verizon Report of Data 
Breach Investigation Report (2016), human factors are responsible for most 
successful attacks. Even using the latest security techniques and protocols, 
most information systems still face numerous security breaches; therefore, 
conventional and solely technical approaches cannot address this very 
pressing issue.   
 
Human factors can prove difficult to contain whilst interrelating and 
working in an IT environment and must be considered to protect the 
security of such an environment [32]. Human factors have various 
dimensions which are uniquely intertwined with organisational culture and 
individual perceptions and characteristics. Consequently, providing a global 
solution to information security is a big challenge in the organisational 
context; therefore, this research recognises human factors, which directly 
and indirectly affect information security, as one of the major components 
responsible for inadequate information security and risk to organisational 
assets. As human factors are at the heart of the vast majority of security 
breaches, resulting from issues such as error, inadequate skills or apathy, a 
consistent effort is required to address them. This research aims to provide 
a model to address such issues.  
 
 
2.4 Social Engineering Attacks 
 
A Social Engineering Attack (SEA) is the act of manipulating a person to 
take an action that may or may not be in the target’s best interest, with the 
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perpetrator obtaining information, gaining access or getting the target to 
take a certain action [36]. Responding to the threats of SEAs using 
technological resources and tools would not be enough to deal with the 
associated risks because people are at the centre of such attacks and they 
play a vital role in it. Organisations may use various tools to detect and 
minimise attacks. For example, they may use the Basic Analysis and Security 
Engine, known as BASE, which is a PHP-based analysis mechanism, in 
order to examine and process a database of security events generated by 
different Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), firewalls and network 
monitoring instruments. It is quite powerful and contains features such as 
a query-builder and search interface for alerting the user when certain 
patterns are detected, a packet decoder and charts and statistics based on 
time, sensor, signature, protocol, IP address, and others. BASE, however, 
has difficulty preventing and responding to human actions and behaviour 
in socially engineered incidences. This is because SEAs result mainly in the 
exploitation of human factors, and people are at the centre of such 
incidents. There are specific factors, identified in a previous study, that play 
important roles in such attacks [18]. These include a lack of awareness, 
inadequate communication skills, a lack of supervision and insufficient 
involvement of management.  
 
2.4.1 Reasons behind Social Engineering Attacks 
 
Human factors remain essential to any SEAs because no matter how many 
training programs or control mechanisms are deployed, people are the 
weakest link in a security system [37]. SEAs can cause a great deal of 
disruption to everyday business activities and create financial, social and 
technical mayhem, the impacts of which can extend beyond geographical 
borders and organisational boundaries; therefore, dealing with SEAs would 
be in the best interest of any organisation. According to the Verizon 
Enterprise Solutions report [38], human factors are the main sources of 
SEAs, confirmed by a number of academic sources [8] [39]. People can be 
easily socially engineered, which leads to the compromise of information 
systems in organisations. Even when attackers use complex and 
sophisticated technical hacking methods, they invariably use people as a 
main tool in delivering their malicious software. For example, they use e-
mail attachments, which can easily mislead people and deliver the payload 
of a malicious program, in order to gain access to a system. This type of 
attack is just one example out of hundreds and has been successful with big 
organisations and central governments. Janczewski and Fu identified five 
main causes of SEAs: people, lack of security awareness, psychological 
weaknesses, technology and defence and attack methods [40].  
 
2.4.2 Social Engineering Attack Taxonomy 
 
Providing a strong security posture is crucial for business continuity. With 
the current major threats of cyber-attacks and virtual terrorism, security 
must be given adequate consideration. If it is not, everyday organisational 
activities will be grounded with real possibilities of loss, punitive financial 
fines and damaged reputations. SEAs undermine organisations’ efforts to 
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deal with security in an effective way. There are several malicious practices 
such as the Advanced Persistent Attack that create security breaches in 
organisations [41]. Janczewski and Fu (2010) further categorised SEAs into 
“Human-Based” and “Technology-Based” attacks [40]. The role of people 
and certain human factors contribute greatly to SEAs. The attackers crack 
the security of an information system by exploiting human weaknesses. 
SEAs increase the risk of incurring financial loss, legal fees and reputational 
loss for organisations. SEAs pose a challenging task for organisations to 
deal with because they are human-oriented activities and human factors are 
difficult to deal with. There is a clear link between the main human factors 
and SEAs (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Social Engineering Attack Taxonomy 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts the taxonomy of SEAs, in which an attacker socially 
engineers people inside an organisation with adequate and effective 
planning and chooses a malicious attack type that suits the person and the 
organisation. The figure shows various SEA techniques, each impacting in 
various ways upon organisations, such as through disclosure or corruption 
of data. This fulfils the attacker’s goals and objectives, which range from 
financial gain to challenging authority.      
 
There have been a number of works that focus on analysing SEA attacks. 
Janczewski & Fu (2010) provided a conceptual model in order to 
understand the impact of SEAs on individuals and businesses and present 
a defensive approach to mitigate these risks [40]. The study focused on IT 
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departments and took a more abstract view of SEAs without considering 
concepts related to critical human factors and their relationships with 
security investment. Greitzer et al. (2014) looked at the insider threat that 
derives from SEAs [42]. The study considered some related human factors 
but concentrated mainly on unintentional insider threats whilst observing 
psychological and social characteristics of people. Karpati et al. (2012) used 
a comparison study between Mal-Activity diagram and Misuse Cases and 
presented two modelling techniques [43]. This study attempted to provide 
a conceptual comparison in order to determine the advantages and 
efficiency of each approach. Although the work concentrated on SEAs and 
provided a concrete discussion on the validity of the study, it did not 
embrace security investment and actors such as humans and security 
systems. Each approach has its unique advantages and efficiencies. Whilst 
Misuse Cases are used mainly for threat modelling and security 
requirements elicitation, the Mal-Activity diagrams can be used to 
complement Misuse Cases which includes adverse events together with 
authentic and rightful activities in the ISSs. Some other studies concentrate 
on specific attacks such as phishing, Jagatic [44] or advanced persistent 
attacks [45].  
 
All the aforementioned works contribute towards investigating SEA-related 
security incidents. However, none of these works explicitly focus on critical 
human factors, which are one of the main reasons for SEAs. In particular, 
SEAs require a systematic approach to analyse the complex human factors 
and address any issues relating to them. Security markets are saturated with 
technical solutions promising much in the way of security efficiency whilst 
brushing aside human elements, despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary; therefore, it is important to analyse human factors whilst 
considering security investment so that an organisation can make the right 
decision on its information security.      
 
2.5 Information Security Risks  
 
Information security risk refers to an element or effect that has a potentially 
damaging consequence on the availability, integrity, confidentiality, 
accountability and auditability (AICAA) of a critical organisation asset. 
Generally, risk is defined as combination of the probability of an event and 
the severity of its consequence. The event can be certain or uncertain and 
can be influenced by a single occurrence or a series of occurrences. Security 
risk management is a process that integrates methods and artefacts for 
identifying, analysing, controlling and continuously monitoring risks in 
order protect the asset from any potential vulnerabilities and threats. Risk 
management is considered an integral part of all organisational processes, 
including strategic planning and all project and change management 
processes. It does not only support security experts in the handling of 
security vulnerabilities, but it also provides a framework that allows for an 
evaluation of the return on a security investment. There are standards such 
as ISO 31000:2009 that provide a process, framework and a number of 
principles for effective risk management practice [46].  
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There are several works in the literature that emphasise early risk 
management practice in information system development. For instance, the 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) reference model 
includes three different concepts relating to the assessment and 
management of risk [47]. Asset-related concepts describe what assets are 
important to protect and what criteria guarantee asset security. Risk-related 
concepts present how the risk itself is defined and what major principles 
should be taken into account when defining the possible risks. Risk 
treatment-related concepts describe what decisions, requirements and 
controls should be defined and implemented in order to mitigate possible 
risks. ISSRM integrates with the misuse case model in [47] to enhance the 
analysis of security risks using both textual and graphical presentation. 
Another technique is OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and 
Vulnerability Evaluation), which is a free methodology developed by the 
Carnegie Mellon University SEI (Software Engineering Institute) [132] and 
is used and implemented by some organisations. Organisations aim to 
create an information security risk mitigation plan that is strategically bound 
to organisation-wide risk treatment. This is in line with the 
recommendations of Phase 3 of the OCTAVE process, “Developing 
Security Strategy”, which recommends employing a common evaluation 
basis. OCTAVE risk assessment techniques seek to establish a defence 
strategy for the critical assets of the entire auditee organisation without 
consideration of critical human factors and cost; therefore, the OCTAVE 
process, specifically Phase 2, “Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities”, does 
not perform any further than automated vulnerability scanning with no 
consideration of risk, human factors and investment.  
 
Considering the research objectives with regard to critical human factors 
and the return of the investment in security, the analysis of security risks 
should embrace these two factors. This is important because from a 
financial perspective information security is related to reducing loss, rather 
than generating profit. However, the loss related to the intangible assets, 
and critical human factors are difficult to quantify. Therefore, information 
security risk assessments are a practical way of improving information 
security whilst evaluating likelihoods and potential impacts of all security 
incidents, whether they are active or passive. Human and organisational 
factors have always formed the position of information security risk 
assessment activities.  
 
There are a number of international standards related to IS and its concepts, 
but two in particular are highly relevant to this research. Table 2.1 provides 
a comparison between concepts used in this research and two main related 
international standards, ISO31000 and ISO27001.  
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 Concepts ISO31000 ISO27001 Thesis 
Human Factors    
Risk     
Investment     
Cost-Benefit    
Main Human Factors Partly Partly  
Critical Human Factors    
Security Incidents Partly Partly  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison between concepts in standards in this thesis  
 
 
2.6 Return on Information Security Investment 
(ROISI) 
 
The process of securing information has become more critical than ever. 
When security is mission-critical and tied to revenue chains and compliance, 
then it has significant bottom-line impact. Security cannot tolerate any 
performance delays in protection mechanisms and requires extra attention 
to ensure its success and at the lowest possible cost. Cost and urgency in 
organisations’ procurement processes thus become a priority, especially 
dealing with security requirements. Nevertheless, the way security is 
designed and implemented varies from one organisation to another and 
depends upon the nature of the business, organisational culture and how 
the business risk management approach is adopted. Understanding the 
value of information assets is a principle challenge in organisational 
contexts. The value of an information asset is a measure of the extent to 
which it drives business value. Considering risk assessment objectively, 
there are four ways to address risks to information assets in an organisation; 
risk can be accepted, managed, transferred or avoided. Losing a customer 
database would be an organisational catastrophe, which inspires 
consideration of risk management and investment in security. The value 
placed on information can be understood and be seen to be based upon 
several perspectives, including revenue generation, risk and privacy.  
 
Providing an appropriate evaluation of different security solutions and 
assessing costs and benefits of technological tools without having tangible 
data is thus a concern for organisations. The benefits of different 
information security solutions vary, depending on the possibility of attack. 
Risk evaluation and analysis deals with the likelihood of an attack occurring 
and the efficacy of a given security solution in mitigating the damage caused 
by the attack. Most researchers have concentrated on the success of security 
systems without consideration of the cost, which impacts upon the overall 
Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI). However, both the 
security concepts within ISS processes and the cost concepts in the ROISI 
process have the same goal: the protection of information assets to prevent 
extra cost as a result of financial and reputational loss. Adopting a 
combined framework would enable us to address both security and 
investment concepts. This work is novel in that it combines concepts from 
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security, risk and investment fields to provide evidence for the optimal 
defence mechanism against threats from security incidents and their 
resultant risks and to assist in the calculation of the return on security 
investments, considering human factors. Available tools and methods allow 
organisations to calculate and analyse the financial impact of a specific 
security control, which cannot be used to analyse the cost-benefits of other 
factors such as human factors. Information security management systems 
are now increasingly based on economic principles such as cost-benefit 
analysis [48]. This is part of the ‘information security financial metrics 
approach’ that has been developed mainly in the last 10 years or so. 
Balancing information security costs and benefits is essential for 
organisations. However, organisations will invest in information security to 
a greater extent if the cost of investment is less than the cost of potential 
risk [49]. There are important variables in this measurement that are 
required to be as precise as possible. Accurate information on the likelihood 
of IS incidents and their impacts must be acquired in order to assist in the 
quantification of ROISI. It is, however, important to remember that there 
is a significant difference between quantifying and measuring ROI on ISS 
and new machinery systems and controls [50]. 
 
2.7 Information Security Business Dashboard 
 
Information security management and business decision-making are 
intimately interconnected with risk management. Executive boards require 
an understanding and monitoring of the risks that have the potential to 
obstruct their organisation’s ability to achieve its goals. These risks are 
characterised by Key Risk Indicators (KIRs), which stem directly from the 
organisation’s long-term strategy [25]. The Business Intelligence 
Dashboard (BID) guides organisations towards a suitable information 
security posture whilst providing answers to key questions often raised by 
executives. Providing a meaningful BID for organisations and their senior 
executives helps them to receive some extended analytical insights on 
security metrics and Key Security Performance Indicators (KSPIs), a non-
technical method that can be grasped by non-technical senior executives. 
BID offers the following benefits for information security in organisations: 
 
 Improved business decisions through the use of images and graphs. 
 Comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of an 
information security system. 
 Clear and easily understood by non-technical senior management 
viewers, providing different users with different views. 
 Enables users to access available information as required. 
 Accumulates and analyses data from across the information security 
and business ecosystem to achieve new insights from dimensions, metrics 
and business contexts that were previously absent. 
 Presents implications of such security metrics. 
 
The above benefits help organisations to more accurately determine  the 
amount of investment required for their information security and, more 
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importantly, assist them in balancing the actual investment with the return 
on that investment.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. BID Sample: http://www.coresecurity.com/core-insight-dashboards 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a BID sample within the CoreSecurity. Business 
Intelligence Dashboard (BID), one of the business domain concepts used 
in this research to provide some practical and meaningful insights into 
information security. BIDs are of particular interest in this research as they 
involve several core concepts of information security that are relevant to 
measures and metrics for core organisational goals. These areas are: 
 
 Risks   
 Security Incidents 
 Critical human factors such as awareness  
 Threat levels 
 Key information security projects such as Cost and ROISI 
 Compliance, conformance and performance 
 
BIDs are based upon and defined by the type of security incidents they aim 
to defend against, although examining BIDs alone does not provide a 
comprehensive picture of all issues related to SIs, particularly insight into 
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critical human factors and their relation to risk and investment concepts; 
although extremely useful, BIDs are thus unable to respond effectively to 
all SI challenges.  
 
2.8 Relevant Theories and Methods 
 
This section presents the relevant theories and methods that have been 
used in this research. In particular, socio-technical theory has been 
employed to deal with human factors and the SWOT, Delphi survey and 
force field methods to analyse security incidents. This research also draws 
from requirements engineering concepts to develop a risk-driven 
investment model that considers human factors. 
 
2.8.1 Socio-Technical Theory 
 
A socio-technical system is founded and defined upon two categories: the 
technical and the social. Both groups are considered to be equally important 
to information security [51]. The risk-investment approach towards an ISS 
is viewed as a socio-technical one because both technological and social 
considerations are essential to its success. A number of studies have found 
that organisations experience information security incidents or cyber 
security risks predominantly due to human factors [52] [53]. These studies 
have provided various approaches and models, responding to the ever-
increasing demand for an understanding of human factors [54]. They have 
drawn from variety of theories across various fields such as psychology, 
including occupational psychology [55], sociology, including socio-
technical theory [56], and criminology, particularly deterrence theory [57] 
[58], amongst others. Each has attempted to provide an explanation of the 
role of human factors in information security risks and incidents. All of 
these techniques are beneficial to the identification and modelling of human 
factors, though few have presented a model in which, explaining how 
people roles resulted from forces behind direct and indirect human factors 
and how organisations could effectively address the driving and resisting 
forces to change undesired situation to an ideal situation.  
 
This integration and co-ordination of an ISS has both social and technical 
views, creating a socio-technical nature in those forces involved [59]. This 
is a challenge due to the fact that human factors are a subjective matter and 
require socio-technical systems theory and practice to be dealt with 
comprehensively. However, it is evident that ISSs comprise a blend of 
people who work within a technological process [60]. This marriage of 
people and process is quite similar to that presented by the Tavistock 
Institute for the British coal mining industry, where new machines were 
supposed be to run by people who were required to learn new technical 
skills [61]. This combination of technology and humans is complex and 
delicate. The complexity arises from the number of systems and skills  
involved and the delicacy from the dynamic relationship among these 
systems within the organisation [62]. Many researchers therefore believe 
that an ISS serves a deep and interdependent socio-technical function [60] 
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[63] [64], although they have different views on the more influential factors. 
Denning (1999) believes technological solutions weigh more than social 
and human elements when it comes to information security, whilst Desman 
(2002) states that information security is mainly a social matter, not a 
technological issue [63] [64], despite his acceptance of the presence of 
technological deterrents and solutions. Having examined much of the 
research carried out in the field of information security, it can be concluded 
that the social and technical factors must work synergistically to fulfil 
security objectives. The key concern is how to design, implement and 
evaluate an ISS that works well for all stakeholders and that the two 
sections, technical and social, yield constructive outcomes for a joint 
security optimisation. The socio-technical view of information security is 
also reflected in other areas of security such as trust modelling. Pavlidis et 
al. (2011) consider the trust relationship between the user and the socio-
technical system in the design of security software, indicating recognition 
and consideration of information security as a socio-technical problem [65]. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2009) present a socio-technical vision of information 
security, which is recognised as one of the top priorities of managers, but 
argue that technological-based solutions alone are not sufficient to deal with 
ever changing security risks and threats [66], though they do concede that 
technological solutions are nevertheless important [66]. They further argue 
that insider threats are real and important and present them as having a 
socio-technical dimension. Consequently,  socio-organisational solutions 
are offered along with technology-based solutions that can efficiently 
reduce the risks. Some researchers have gone even further, arguing that 
extreme threats such as SEAs have absolutely no technological solutions 
[67]. 
 
2.8.2 SWOT Methodology  
 
SWOT helps us to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats in an organisational context with respect to human factors. It is 
generally used to generate alternative strategic plans by identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of an organisation with respect to the 
opportunities and threats that exist within the environment [68]. The 
outcome of a SWOT approach assists in confirming whether a system has 
achieved or failed its objectives. Although the SWOT framework has been 
used only in planning, it is also a powerful precision tool that presents an 
in-depth analysis of the situation [69]. Due to technological advancements, 
organisations are required to continuously reconfigure their IS controls: 
human factors may also require appropriate adjustment. SWOT provides 
an enhanced evaluation when assessing organisations who are required to 
deal with security reconfiguration and, ultimately, helps to clarify what is 
required of personnel in order to achieve best practice. SWOT supports 
identifying an approach to maximise the efficiency of ISSs in relation to 
human factors. This approach would thoroughly analyse the complex issues 
around human roles in an ISS and is in line with the goal of this research. 
Figure 2.4 depicts a brief overview of SWOT. Here weaknesses can be 
converted to strengths and create opportunities. Reducing threats to a 
system or organisation and creating new opportunities is essential in 
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achieving the objectives of a system. If threats emerge, then a system’s 
vulnerability can rise and weaknesses can be exploited.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 SWOT Overview 
2.8.3 Delphi Survey Method 
The Delphi Expert Panel Technique (survey study) is seen as a popular and 
established tool in the field of information security [70] [71] [72]. The 
Delphi method was developed in 1950’s with the purpose of creating a 
stable and consistent method for attaining the consensus of a group of 
experts [70]. This research chose to use the Delphi technique because it 
helps to clarify the variables under investigation [73]. It is also noted that 
the Delphi method can facilitate multi-phase constant surveys whilst 
providing organised feedback loops [31]. The phases were incorporated in 
three stages:  
1. Brainstorming sessions to identify human factors. 
2. Narrowing down main human factors.  
3. Prioritising and ranking human factors.  
 
The Delphi technique is not without its weaknesses. Certain limitations and 
problems around the reliability, validity and credibility of the Delphi 
method have been highlighted [133], and these restraints have socio-
technical and ethical impacts. A consensus approach may lead to a weak 
form of the best opinion, with the result representing the smallest common 
factor [134]. Also, because of the constant and comparative nature of the 
technique, the Delphi method is time-consuming. In addition, there are 
problems with the methodology arising from the panel size and sampling 
techniques that may lead to participants shifting from their original ideas 
during the study period. 
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2.8.4 Force Field Analysis  
 
Conflicts must be minimised in any process of system change within 
organisations. Adequate communication within the organisation to convey 
dialogue between all stakeholders enhances the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the proposed changes in system. The Force Field Analysis (FFA) 
technique, whose principles can be found in Physics, was introduced by 
Kurt Lewin [74] [75]. It can be utilised as a tool, assisting organisational 
change by reducing tension and strengthening communication. FFA 
employs the idea that the equilibrium state of a system is maintained by two 
sets of conflicting forces. Building on Lewin’s Force Field Analysis (FFA), 
there are two forces in organisations that work against each other. One 
group of forces pushes for stability and to maintain the status quo, resisting 
against any changes. The other group drives and pushes the system towards 
change. When these forces are equally balanced, a ‘quasi-stationary 
equilibrium’ arises that maintains the status quo [76]. In order that 
organisations go ahead with changes they require, they must reinforce 
driving forces and diminish resisting forces. The steadiness of human 
behaviour, based on "quasi-stationary equilibrium", is also perpetuated by 
the battle between driving and resisting forces [76]. For any changes to 
occur, either with humans or in organisations, the alteration of this force 
field is necessary. This is a very complex psychological process because 
there is always an instantaneous resisting force against any driving force for 
change, which preserves equilibrium [76].  
 
FFA has been widely used for management changes in organisations [77]. 
Lewin’s analysis model assesses the impact of all elements and forces that 
influence change. Driving forces are forces that coerce for and elevate 
change. Senior management support is a key example of driving forces [18]. 
In contrast, restraining forces are forces that serve to hold back the driving 
forces and prevent a change from happening by creating obstacles and risks. 
Concerns over individual errors could be an obstacle to the implementation 
of improved ISSs. Strengthening driving forces whilst eliminating 
restraining forces ensures the success of ISS goals, i.e. preventing risks. 
Driving forces usually exist in the system but restraining forces are harder 
to identify and establish because they are commonly personal psychological 
vindications that are rooted in organisations.  
 
2.8.5 Requirements Engineering (RE)  
 
The current reasoning in the field of RE is that requirements demand to be 
articulated in the framework of real-world knowledge [78]. Research in this 
area focuses on conceptual techniques and tools for distinctively capturing 
and representing in a structured way domain knowledge, which can 
eventually be used to drive the system development phases. The literature 
shows that security regulations and standards cannot facilitate a 
comprehensive information security solution in the organisational context 
[79]. However, the information security requirements engineering approach 
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can provide a comprehensive and structured elicitation and understanding 
of information security requirements [79]. This would enable an analysis 
and elicitation of risk, investment and return on investment concepts in the 
development of the RIDIM model. This approach explicitly models the 
relations between goals and the risk factors that obstruct these goals. Risks 
are then assessed and suitable control actions are selected to mitigate them 
so that the project can attain its goals. Further, the mitigation mechanism 
then enables organisations to invest adequately in security whilst the return 
of that investment can be calculated in a clearer and simpler way and be 
understood by senior managers and non-technical executives. Goals are the 
objectives, expectations and constraints of a specific system context and its 
surrounding environment as prescriptive statements of intent whose 
satisfaction contributes to the overall project success. The model supports 
different levels of abstraction from goal to obstacle and finally to treatment. 
A goal model of requirements engineering includes the following steps: 
 
 Defining the relationships between an ISS and human factors in an 
organisational context (environment) based upon what the system is 
supposed to do and why. The understanding of this relationship 
provides reasons to justify the necessity of the ISS in the 
organisational context as the nature and requirements of 
organisations and businesses are rapidly changing. 
 
 Elucidating ISS requirements that include the goal specifications to 
explain why and how the ISS can achieve its goals. 
 
 Using sub-goals to obtain more clarification on and analyse ISS 
goals. 
 
 Managing conflicts between various stakeholders of an ISS, 
including human factors, by identifying and assisting in the 
reconciliation of the trade-offs between cost, flexibility and the goals 
of the effective ISS. This is because the main goal can be in conflict 
with overall organisational objectives, such as cost reduction, that play 
an important role in businesses. 
 
 Quantifying the fluffiness of ISS requirements by ensuring that they 
achieve ISS goals in the proposed model. 
 
Risks associated with human factors in the process of developing an ISS 
should be considered at all stages within the RE phases. This is simply 
because human factors are the main cause of information security breaches, 
which obstruct the goals of the system and impacts upon its effectiveness. 
Fulfilling the elicitation and analysis of information security requirements 
can be started at the stage where stakeholders (human factors and 
organisational forces) are identified. A consideration of system 
requirements and their specifications such as risk and investment can then 
be analysed. This would assist the model in identifying the functional 
security goals that have been refined into security requirements. 
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Stakeholders also concern about the security incidents and their types such 
as Social Engineering Attacks (SEAs) which in this research are being 
considered.  
 
2.8.6 Secure-Tropos Modelling 
 
Secure-Tropos modelling is an extension of the Tropos methodology that 
deals with relationships among the actors within social and organisational 
settings [80] [81]. It introduces security-related concepts (e.g. security 
constraints, secure dependency, secure goals) within the Tropos 
methodology to enable developers to consider security issues throughout 
the development lifecycle. A security constraint is defined in the Secure-
Tropos framework as a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy 
or integrity, that influences the analysis and design of the software system 
under development by restricting the system or by refining some of the 
system’s objectives. These constraints represent the initial high level 
security requirements reported and elicited from a number of sources 
including the stakeholders and users of the system as well as domain and 
security experts. In the actor model, Secure-Tropos introduces secure 
dependencies whereby actors must fulfil the constraints to attain their goals. 
Secure-Tropos uses the term ‘secure entity’ to describe any goals, tasks and 
resources related to the security of the system. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed and summarised the investigation into the related 
works and relevant methodologies applicable to this research. Analysing 
human factors is a challenging task because human factors are a subjective 
matter demanding the use of socio-technical systems theory and practice to 
tackle; therefore, we use socio-technical theory to analyse human factors.  
Existing works in information security do not comprehensively focus on 
human factors and their impact on potential risks and the mitigation of such 
risks. Furthermore, these works also do not consider the return on security 
investment that is rooted in human factors. This research intends to 
develop a model that can explain how human factors and a risk-investment 
approach can be shaped to better respond to information security incidents 
and risks. Risk-driven investment modelling in requirements engineering 
contributes to the identification and analysis of the human factors and other 
organisational issues relevant to the design and implementation of ISSs. 
This model maps direct human factors to risk-investment issues and 
consequently enables one to draw a conclusion about how security threats 
can be mitigated or avoided altogether , using security incidents and SEAs. 
This research also employs the SWOT and force field theories to evaluate 
the proposed approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
_______________________________ 
Research Methodology 
 
Contents 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Research Methodology Process 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A research methodology is a structured approach to solving a problem [82]. 
It involves examining how research is to be conducted and the process of 
describing, explaining and predicting hypotheses. Considering this 
definition, this research follows a number of theories and methods, outlined 
in Chapter 2, to achieve its goals. The theoretical approach of this research 
is based upon socio-technical theory and Requirements Engineering (RE), 
where human factors, security requirements elicitation and analysis are 
considered. Concepts from risk management, return on security 
investment, goal modelling and security incidents are used in developing 
our model. We also follow the SWOT and Force field analysis theories for 
evaluating the proposed approach and information security incidents. 
Finally, the Delphi survey method will help gain an understanding of the 
critical human factors with more reliability and expert consideration. Each 
of these theories and methods are explained in each phase of this research 
in various components (Figure 3.1). This figure illustrates an overview of 
the research methodology components adopted by this research.  
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Figure 3.1: Research Methodology Components 
The figure shows the four phases of the research methodology: 
 
 Investigation 
 Prioritisation 
 Gap Analysis 
 Control & Evaluation 
 
The figure explains how each phase uses certain tools and techniques to 
fulfil its objectives.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology Process 
In order to present a comprehensive research methodology that considers 
all aspects of the research concepts, a systematic analysis process that 
consists of four sequential phases has been adopted. These phases enable 
us to clearly identify the problem and aims of the research and apply 
relevant quantitative and qualitative research methods and techniques. By 
utilising a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, a more 
enhanced understanding of the research problems can be obtained than 
from a single approach alone [82].  
 
The research methodology process consists of the following phases:  
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 Phase 1: Investigation phase to identify human factors using a 
literature review, interviews, socio-technical theory and SWOT 
analysis. The investigation extends the problem domain relating to 
human factors, the organisational context of information security 
risk, risk analysis and security investment and reviews the existing 
state-of-the-art ISSs through an exhaustive literature search. This 
allows the research to peer into the characteristics of main human 
factors in great detail with a consideration of organisational culture 
and its effect on security culture and the contexts. Consideration of 
organisational context and institutional forces side-by-side with 
human factors, information security risks and investment provides 
a rich understanding of the impacts of main human factors in the 
process of ISS design, implementation and evaluation. Human 
factors in an organisational context play an important role in 
creating an effective security system through collaboration and 
teamwork, and the investigation phase allows a concrete and 
adequate understanding of all concepts in this process.     
 
 Phase 2: Prioritisation phase to prioritise main human factors using a 
survey study, specifically the Delphi expert panel technique. This 
phase uses the empirical investigation for the purpose of 
prioritisation. There are three stages in the Delphi process that will 
be explained later in Chapter 6. The Delphi technique provides a 
group decision to ensure that each member gives an honest opinion 
of what they think the importance of a particular human factor will 
be; therefore, the process avoids pressurising people to go along 
with others’ thoughts and allows them to join in the process in an 
objective, impartial and anonymous way. This method is used to 
obtain an agreement on ranking the main human factors without 
people having to agree verbally.  
 
 Phase 3: Gap analysis phase to understand the current and ideal situation 
of an ISS concerning human factors using Force Field Analysis and 
Requirements Engineering. Gap analysis combines the strengths of 
both FFA and RE. Gap analysis considers the available and current 
controls against the root causes of incidents to fill the security 
control gap and, in a sense, works as an auditing process. Gap 
analysis also provides an accurate, objective and complete picture 
of what is missing in the process of securing a system. In addition, 
gap analysis enables the study to determine how the current 
controls shape the security system architecture with regard to 
human factors, risk and security investment. Human factors and 
investment affect risk in an organisation, and gap analysis can bring 
a significant understanding of the way an information security 
system is designed and implemented. In addition, gap analysis helps 
in finding a solution by forming a model, which this research 
intends to introduce. Understanding the current situation and an 
ideal situation builds a clear view of what the model should look 
like to fill the gap between current and ideal security systems and 
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address the main concerns of the study.      
 
Phase 4: Control and evaluation phase to develop a novel risk-investment model 
to support the analysis and reasoning of human factors in the information system 
development process using Requirements Engineering, Secure-Tropos 
modelling, risk analysis, security incident patterns and Return On 
Information Security Investment (ROISI). This study chose an empirical 
method to evaluate the main contribution of the research. The use of a case 
study helped the evaluation process of the RIDIM model. Information 
security systems are multidimensional and vary from one organisation to 
another, being greatly impacted by human factors; therefore, the nature of 
risk is diverse and validating a specific method from a complex set of 
activities is challenging. Consequently, there are challenges involved in 
conducting an empirical study in the information security field. Information 
security projects, like many other projects embarked upon within 
organisations, have their own constraints and limitations, such as human 
resources, time, budgets and quality control. It is not always possible to 
address such concerns with a comprehensive model. Adding to this, each 
organisation has its own culture and approach to project management, 
whether it be an IS project or any other. The control and evaluation of such 
projects thus becomes even more challenging. However, using a 
combination of methods does help to satisfy control and evaluation 
requirements to an acceptable level. For the purpose of this research, ISS 
projects come with a substantial amount of risk from various dimensions 
and addressing all of them is very hard. The nature of risks originating from 
human factors are subjective and providing a quantitative value proved 
difficult. This becomes even more challenging when investment and return 
on security investments are tangled with human factors.  
These phases lead to four steps, as follows:   
 
Step 1: Establishing the problem domain in which the main human 
factors and their characteristics are being identified. This step 
comprises a literature review, interviews and SWOT analysis on the 
theoretical basis of socio-technical theory. In order to address risk and 
investment issues in ISSs in relation to human factors, it is imperative 
that main human factors and their chrematistics be recognised: this is 
the fundamental problem which this research aims to address. It is 
extremely problematic, given the subjective nature of human factors, to 
determine whether an effective level of risk and investment 
identification and analysis in an organisational context promotes the 
discovery of main human factors. Understanding and identifying 
human factors, however, requires a holistic approach that considers all 
socio-technical aspects. Human factors are not just simple issues, e.g. 
insider threats or end users. A detailed examination of the roles and 
responsibilities of end users, middle and senior managers in the 
organisational context is required. In addition, the culture and the 
nature of the business play an important role in this process.    
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 Step 2: Ranking human factors, whereby the critical human 
factors and their characteristics are established. This step involves 
the Delphi expert panel and survey study. The main human factors 
are prioritised to ensure that only the critical factors are determined. 
The main human factors in themselves are very difficult to analyse 
and quantify on the basis of risk and investment in ISSs; therefore, 
they need to be prioritised and ranked for the identification of the 
critical human factors. The prioritisation assists us in the modelling 
and evaluation process, making it more concise and effective. This 
can be achieved by identifying which factors will have the most 
substantial impact, which are the most important and which are the 
most relevant. The impact, importance and relevance of an ISS 
must be considered to ensure that the outcome model is the most 
suitable one for addressing human factors.  
 
 Step 3: Understanding the situation, in which the various 
concepts involved in the process are defined. This step includes the 
Force Field Analysis (FFA) and Requirements Engineering process. 
This step is absolutely necessary for the gap analysis. Without a clear 
understanding of the current situation and where organisations are 
in an ISS, providing a solution that can be tested against it would 
make no sense. This step allows the gap analysis to find the 
deficiencies in ISSs created by critical human factors and address 
them. Understanding the current situation will enhance the maturity 
of the proposed model. In the security industry, an understanding 
of the current situation is used in gap analysis to compare and weigh 
with information security standards such as ISO27001. However, 
as we have argued previously, such standards cannot provide a 
detailed, optimal solution for dealing with critical human factors in 
a risk and investment-based environment, and ultimately the 
proposed solution will lack maturity. This level of maturity is 
required to address very subjective and critical human factors in the 
ISS process.     
 
 Step 4: Modelling human factors, whereby the various activities 
defining a number of concepts lead to the formation of the RIDIM 
model to allow the modelling of critical human factors, risks and 
security investment. For research to reach to this point, the key 
concepts of the study focused on defining and exploring critical 
human factors and risk and security investment concepts based on 
a holistic theoretical framework composed of key parts of ISSs. The 
central foundation of this step is to model how critical human 
factors impact upon each area of information security risk 
management, security investment and ROISI. Critical human 
factors within the RIDIM model pose the central risk to security 
investment and entire ISS.   
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Figure 3.2: Overview of research methodology. 
Figure 3.2 shows the underlying methodology process, which consists of 
three different layers. Layer 1 includes the 4 phases of Investigation, 
Prioritisation, Gap Analysis and Control & Evaluation, named IPGACE 
and described above. Layer 2 describes the theories, methods, tools and 
resources used during the course of this research. They include a literature 
review, interviews, the SWOT analysis tool, socio-technical theory, a survey 
study, the Delphi expert panel, Force Field Analysis, Requirements 
Engineering, Secure-Tropos modelling, risk analysis tools, security incident 
patterns and return on investment in information security. Layer 3 
examines the efficacy of the tools and techniques employed by this 
research.     
 
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
In this research, qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques were 
applied together. In order to understand, organise and contextualise, 
 33       
 
interpretations of qualitative data derived from interviews and surveys was 
used in the content analysis. For the purpose of analysing data from the 
surveys, inferential and descriptive statistical methods were employed. The 
research used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software 
package to analyse the data. Despite the fact that SPSS does not support 
structural equation modelling and does not allow simultaneous estimation 
of regression parameters and the mapping of associations between 
independent variables, it is nonetheless very useful for thoroughly exploring 
data [24]. The results of the SPSS technique strengthened the analysis of 
main and critical human factors.   
3.4 Sampling  
Quantitative and qualitative data from large financial organisations, 
including insurance companies, retail and investment banks, has been 
collected based on predefined criteria to serve the purpose of the research 
goals and objectives. This approach provided a sound judgement for an 
inform sampling from the case study organisations. The research objectives 
required a flexible approach for gathering the samples, which was made 
possible by the use of a case study and multiple data collection methods. In 
order to conduct a Delphi study with greater reliability, the number of 
participants was increased significantly to ensure that their number was 
sufficient.  
3.5 Validity, Reliability, Repeatability  
The validity of the research findings is related to the extent to which the 
data can be generalised and how relevant and applicable it is in other 
frameworks [24]. The more objectively and consistently data analysis is 
carried out, the greater the validity expected. This relies clearly on the choice 
of the methodology, which handles greater reliability when retained 
systematically and accurately. In addition, it is crucial that the data analysis 
and research findings are logical and distinct, and that they are presented 
accurately with a rational relationship to all concepts. This quality of the 
outcome of data analysis ensures not only reliability but also repeatability 
[135]. In other words, given a similar setting with homogenous team 
members, the outcome and research findings would be expected to be quite 
alike. This research believes that using a mixed methodology has secured 
validity, reliability, objectivity and credibility whilst also ensuring 
repeatability.  
3.6 Ethical Considerations  
In any research project, the ethical requirements and principles must be 
considered and dealt with sensitively. They are fundamental for 
safeguarding both participants and researchers and have been designed to 
ensure the wellbeing of both, in addition to protecting their privacy [24]. 
Furthermore, there are many regulations and legal requirements that 
research bodies must follow. This study was conducted with thorough 
deliberation on how the research findings may impact participants and their 
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respective organisations, whilst at the same time bringing many advantages 
to similar organisations. The analysis and understanding of the role of 
human factors and their impacts in the organisational context within a risk-
based and security investment approach provides a significant contribution 
to knowledge about the safety and protection of organisational assets from 
human-activity-related risks. One of the primary and most important 
underlying ethical principles is privacy and confidentially which, during the 
process of this research, was considered and complied with [135]. 
This research was carried out in adherence with the ethical research policies 
of the University of East London. A letter of consent and researcher’s 
introductory letter was provided to the participants with an explanation of 
how data will be used and treated in this research. Participants were assured 
that their personal and organisational identities and any data they provided 
would be safeguarded during the research with regard to privacy, 
particularly whilst being transferred or kept in storage. All data was 
encrypted using AES 256 encryption methods. The participants were also 
assured that all data would be erased at the end of the research.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology used in 
this research. There are various uncertainties throughout the development 
of an ISS project. These ambiguities include a diverse range of non-
technical factors, such as people, organisational context and investment 
requirements; all introduce risk, which requires attention and mitigation. 
For this purpose, the study presents a vigorous research plan whereby 
several different techniques to collect both quantitative and qualitative data 
are utilised with a view to answering the research questions. The research 
follows several techniques, including a literature review, SWOT, force field 
analysis and an empirical investigation, for this purpose. Furthermore, the 
research also follows concepts from existing well-known methods such as 
Secure-Tropos. The validity, credibility and reliability of the research 
findings were reinforced by the introduction and employment of these 
mixed methods.  
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An Overview of Human Factors 
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4.1 Introduction  
Technical advancements do not always produce a more secure 
environment. All kinds of human factors can deeply affect the management 
of security in an organisational context; therefore, security is not solely a 
technical problem; rather, we need to understand human factors to achieve 
effective information security system practice. For this purpose, the study 
identifies critical direct and indirect human factors that impact upon ISSs. 
These factors were analysed through the study of two security incidents in 
UK financial organisations using the SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats) technique discussed in the preceding chapter.  
 
Typically, human work within an organisation falls into four categories: 
individual, team, management and customer/interested party [83] [31]. 
Human factors within these categories can become uncontrollable forces. 
Because people have different perceptions of security, their reactions to 
information security procedures are diverse. Each individual has concerns, 
values, culture, skills, knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of his or her own. 
These factors are highly subjective and extremely hard to measure and 
calculate in ISS processes. These human forces interact with technological 
elements in an interconnected world of so-called “secure information 
systems” [32]. People have their own unique culture, attitudes, skills, 
knowledge, understandings, behaviour and interests that depend upon the 
role that they play within the organisation. Individuals’ interaction with 
computers and decisions made with regard to information security are 
certainly very dynamic and complex issues. Human factors are the greatest 
single issue of concern in IS [33]. We therefore need a comprehensive 
understanding of human factors and their impacts for an effective 
implementation of ISSs. This task is challenging, as the domain is highly 
subjective by nature and it is difficult to quantify all the factors into a 
measuring scale. There are many areas in which judgement becomes 
extremely difficult and hugely subjective because the study is about people 
and their reactions to IS and, therefore, it is highly personal. For instance, 
it would be extremely difficult to judge and evaluate people’s apathy and 
their attitudes towards ISSs.  
This research categorises the critical human factors as direct and indirect. 
The direct factors are greatly dependent upon an individual’s perception, 
 36       
 
behaviour and knowledge of IS, whereas the indirect factors are affected by 
an individual’s understanding, predominantly by forces beyond their power 
such as organisational culture, guidelines and policies. The identified factors 
have been analysed using two real security incidents in UK financial 
organisations. This study used the SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats) analysis tool for this purpose. The study’s 
observation is that technology is not responsible for these security 
incidents: humans are. This research discovered certain elements that were 
involved in these incidents, such as errors, inadequate awareness of 
programmers and lack of communication between senior management and 
employees. This study concludes that individual security awareness, 
communication with the security team and adequate and sufficient budget 
planning are essential accompaniments to technical solutions in effective 
information security practice. As mentioned above, it would, for the 
purposes of this study, be highly arduous to quantify the result. However, 
using a business tool would assist in acquiring a trade-off balance between 
human and technology factors. People are at the centre of any technological 
design and use of a product. An ISS, like any technologically designed 
system, requires consideration of a user-cantered design approach [84] to 
avert the risk of individuals behaving irrationally with these system designs. 
The role of humans has never been disputed. People (users) can be an asset 
or a threat.  
 
Organisations must therefore address human elements in order to deal with 
IS incidents, as highlighted by researchers in the aftermath of a number of 
human-related security incidents [34] [18]. Organisation policies, standards, 
procedures and codes of conduct are designed for people to follow. People 
are the executers of policies; this involvement of people has a significant 
impact on any proposed ISS. The human factor is one of the major forces 
behind the effective success or failure of a security system [8] [31] [32]. 
Sarker stated in “Assessing insider threats to information security using 
technical, behavioural and organisational measures” that technical solutions 
alone do not suffice because insider threats are fundamentally a people issue 
[35]. The evidence clearly shows that the human factors in ISSs have been 
undermined and underdeveloped.  
 
4.2 Direct and Indirect Human Factors  
Figure 4.1 depicts two main categories of human factors: the direct and 
indirect factors and their sub-factors. These factors have been identified 
through systematic literature review, survey study and interview sessions 
from samples taken in five organisations. In this study, direct factors are 
those that mostly depend on certain individual characteristics and have a 
significant impact on ISSs. Indirect factors greatly depend on external 
factors such as organisational issues (i.e., inadequate budgets or budget 
management and security policy enforcement). They also influence direct 
factors and ultimately the ISS.  This section provides a brief overview of 
each of these factors. 
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Figure 4.1. Human factors in information security systems. 
 
4.2.1 Direct Factors 
Direct factors are based on individuals who have a direct impact on the 
overall ISS within an organisation. These individuals are involved in the 
organisation’s efforts to meet its goals and objectives. For instance, error, 
apathy, stress, awareness and experience have a direct relationship with 
character and personality. They are also social entities within the ISS and 
cannot be measured using a technical approach. A socio-technical approach 
enables these entities to be defined in an ISS and is constructed upon social 
and technical sub-systems alike [51]. As stated previously, these factors 
impact the ISS by affecting individuals directly. Direct factors are mostly 
dependent on individuals’ characteristics. Indirect forces, such as security 
policy enforcement and management support, mainly exist in the 
organisational context and therefore do not have any effect on people’s 
actions.  
 
Errors 
Error can be defined as a divergence in a system that works accurately [85]. 
IS incidents often happen when a security measure has been used that is 
adequate but blind to human behaviour [14] [86]. For example, password 
validation policies commission people to choose a complex password. Such 
a password would likely be a combination of letters with at least one letter 
capitalised and digits that some users may find difficult to remember. As a 
result, people write down their passwords in unsecure places such as their 
notebooks, which can be seen by others. Personal roles in IS policies should 
thus be given great attention. Human errors can be deliberate or careless. 
However, some authors such as Kraemer and Carayon believe that human 
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errors are careless accidental incidents exacerbated by poor ISSs [14]. Their 
investigation concludes that indirect forces, such as communication and 
security culture, are the sources of human error. Consequently, ISSs with 
an extremely high technical backbone can be stumped by human error. In 
other words, many technical measures can be defeated by errors made by 
people. Security policies are designed to restrain behaviour in order to 
eliminate errors. However, behaviour is significantly hard to define, 
measure and control in any organisation.  
 
Information Security Awareness 
Awareness programs ensure that people in organisations understand their 
responsibilities and are a focal point in ISSs. For instance, users should 
report any suspicious email they receive. Information Security Awareness 
(ISA) terminology concerns people’s understanding and consciousness of 
an ISS through security policy. The security policy can be misinterpreted 
and misunderstood and, therefore, the awareness program is as important 
as any other IS procedure. The NIST report concluded that the importance 
of factors such as a clear definition of roles and responsibilities has been 
ignored, and these factors are required to be perceived by employees in 
addition to awareness programs [87]. It has been widely accepted that 
awareness programs have a positive impact on the effectiveness of ISSs [14] 
[37]. Organisations are extremely apprehensive about their employees’ 
ability to follow and implement information security rules and regulations, 
such as in a security policy [39] [88]. However, a number of studies have 
criticised current IS awareness approaches for the absence of solid 
guidelines and adequate theoretical reasoning [39] [89] [90]; therefore, it is 
clear that there is a gap in the research on developing more effective and 
adequate ISA programs.  
 
Skills 
Skills facilitate the function of a role and play an important part in effective 
human performance. Education and training are crucial in developing skills 
and demonstrating a commitment to preserve professionalism and 
competency. Skills are one of the main forces in dealing with IS issues such 
as incident response [91]. The absence of adequate and appropriately skilled 
staff contributes to a weak performance of IS policy [14]. In dealing with 
all aspects of an ISS, skill competency plays a major role [34]. Employees 
are required to possess adequate skills to deal with the requirements of 
information security policy. For instance, if people do not know how to 
deal with suspicious emails, they might open them. It is also important that 
people’s skills are not overestimated or underestimated [32]. Organisations 
must not focus solely on people with complete technological competency. 
Training programs, which equip employees with adequate skills to confront 
IS challenges and meet organisational objectives, should be selected from 
mixed and varied factors of business [92]. This becomes more important 
when business behaviour is changing rapidly due to new technological 
advances [93]. Organisations are required to be flexible enough to absorb 
rapid change in the business environment.  
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Experience 
Subjective experience contributes to human knowledge [94]. Scholars have 
different views on the factor of experience with respect to the ISS concept. 
Some argue that people’s understanding of IS concepts and procedures 
relies upon a few human factors, including their experiences [32] [95], whilst 
some go further and claim that a successful implementation of an ISS 
depends greatly on people’s knowledge and experience [32]. These scholars 
believe that experience is necessary for an information security team. They 
argue that inexperienced employees and a lack of training is a threat to 
information assets. However, adequate security behaviour is more related 
to people, management and social skills than security experience [92]. 
Although there is disagreement on the level of influence the factor of 
experience has, both sides would not deny its important role. For example, 
a new access control applies a limitation on shared information in order to 
preserve corporate secrets. Employees may find this requirement extremely 
challenging and contradictory to old practices; therefore, their experience 
of the free movement of information is undermined by the new policy. 
 
Apathy 
Apathy in an organisational context can be seen as the unwillingness of 
employees to contribute to the achievement of the organisation’s goals and 
objectives in situations where they should demonstrate pro-social 
behaviour [96]. Apathy creates significant issues in organisations due to a 
lack of willingness to implement organisational procedures. Apathy towards 
ISS procedures and rules drives uncertainty in the security policies because 
people are not willing to follow them. It creates an environment in which 
employees believe they have no responsibilities [97]. Whereas a positive 
attitude, motivation and optimal working conditions contribute to better 
performance, apathy and unresponsiveness produce undesirable functions 
[98]. Siponen argues that positive attitude serves the effectiveness of a 
security system; however, it is extremely difficult to measure attitude and 
motivation [89]. Thomson argues that miscommunication between 
employees and senior management contributes to misunderstanding that 
leads to employee apathy [96]. This report also notes that in organisations 
where a coercive environment exists, employees feel frustrated and 
dissatisfied [5] [99]. A coercive environment has been defined as an 
organisation where everything is dictated and no consultation with 
employees is made with regard to corporate goals and objectives [99]. In 
such an environment, people are not motivated to work toward 
organisational objectives, such as ISS goals. For example, if senior 
management changes backup procedures without consideration of human 
and organisational limitations, a coercive environment will form in which 
employees will lack enthusiasm for following security policy; ultimately, the 
performance of the team suffers and the effectiveness of any proposed ISS 
will be undermined.  
 
Incentive and Disincentive Policy 
Incentive and disincentive policies in organisations reward good behaviour 
and punish bad attitude. There are certain connections between people’s 
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attitudes and incentive and disincentive policies; even a little persuasion 
invariably increases motivation. Kabay argued that even a simple comment 
on IS policy made by an employee should be considered seriously, 
considering how it can ultimately affect the entire ISS in an organisation 
[97]. Incentives and disincentives are important factors in an organisation, 
but they have not been considered in previous studies of ISSs. These factors 
have an impact on people’s motivation to go along with IS policies [96]. 
Organisations sometimes focus on punishment when instead they should 
divert their attention towards training and reward policy. For example, 
organisations should reward employees who report IS incidents or 
suspicious behaviour and provide training instead of punishing people who 
open up their personal emails at work. Incentives promote a positive 
attitude and encourage employees to act in a pro-social manner, whilst 
punishments alienate people. Employees may then still follow the IS policy 
even if they do not approve of it, because they have been rewarded for 
demonstrating the desired behaviour [5] [99]. 
 
Ignorance and Negligence 
Employees in organisations, sometimes unintentionally, do not pay enough 
attention to security policy. One example of user negligence and ignorance 
is when software piracy occurs because employees have little knowledge of 
software installation for various reasons such as a lack of training. The 
number of IS accidents attributed to people is high: accidental breaches 
form the majority of incidents [100]. The impact on an ISS as a result of 
ignorance or negligence requires decisive action and must be addressed by 
IS professionals. Organisations pay far more attention to reinforcing 
technical facilities to overcome this issue, but ignorance and negligence are 
human issues and must therefore be confronted differently. It is also very 
difficult to audit people’s behaviour. Some authors addressed this problem 
by proposing the use of deterrence theory, in which the threat of sanction 
is recommended [6] [101] [102] [103]. Vance argues, however, that 
employee negligence and/or ignorance of IS policies is not always corrected 
by fear or threat [11].  
 
Stress 
Individuals’ stress in corporations can be caused by heavy workloads and 
tight project deadlines. People react maladaptively to stress and work 
overload despite any training programs they may receive. Stress leads to 
human error. Those under stress may have a tendency to bypass IS policies. 
Stress and fatigue have a direct relationship to IS vulnerabilities [77]. 
Unbalanced and excessive workloads create stress and extra pressure for 
employees; such a load greatly undermines people’s morale and 
organisational ethics [97]. Assigning heavy workloads creates extra and 
unwanted pressure on people and can lead to a downturn in an 
organisation’s moral behaviour. This moral and ethical breakdown prompts 
IS incidents because people do not feel valued [97]. Organisations must 
ensure that their employees are protected from both internal and external 
pressures. 
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4.2.2 Indirect Factors 
Indirect factors have a certain influence on direct factors, as well as 
impacting upon ISSs. However, these factors affect people through 
elements that are largely controlled by organisations and which individuals 
have no jurisdictional power over; therefore, these factors are collective 
matters managed by organisations. We consider five indirect factors: 
budget, culture, communication, security policy enforcement and 
management support.  
 
Budget 
Running an organisation costs money; therefore, the existence of an 
organisations depends on adequate budget planning. Information security 
experts widely believe that budgets have a significant impact on the 
efficiency of ISSs [76] [104]. To ensure that an ISS fulfils its objectives 
effectively, organisations must have an effective cost strategy, which should 
be adopted for addressing the technical and personal requirements of the 
ISS. For instance, organisations will not be able to deal with ISS goals 
sufficiently if an access control mechanism has not been implemented or if 
employees have not been receiving adequate training. Although 
organisations are required to invest in IS, they may not be able to maintain 
a sufficient level of investment; thus, the areas that are most vulnerable and 
at risk, such as back-up and disaster recovery planning, should be an 
organisation’s main concern [104] [105]. The importance of training 
emerges when the element of cost effectiveness is highlighted. Some 
measures to reduce cost, such as automated user access provisioning, 
require training programs that are less costly. This demonstrates the 
relationship between budget planning and direct human factors. 
 
Culture 
Organisational culture consists of the values, beliefs, practices, attitudes, 
behaviour, reputation and ethics of an organisation and its employees. 
Dhillon believes that information security culture (ISC) provides a 
behavioural model in which organisations facilitate the protection of 
information assets [106]. On the other hand, some authors argue that ISC 
is a management problem and cannot be fully determined [107]. To 
demonstrate the ISC in organisations, the example of security policy can be 
used: Employees follow an embedded security policy as part of the ISC 
within the wider organisation culture. The support of management is 
necessary to ensure ISC is promoted to enhance the effectiveness of the 
implementation of security policy [108]. This can be achieved by increasing 
awareness, training and education programs. There are certain limitations 
to the study of ISC, however, due to the complexity and sensitive nature of 
its concepts.  
 
Communication 
Communication in an organisational context is the exchange of messages 
and ideas between people inside and outside of the organisation. 
Communication enables people to convey a message to an appropriate 
destination or person. The development of information and 
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communication technology has played an important role in computer 
security [106]. There are many forms of communication, but the most 
common are face-to-face and written, both electronically and by hand. 
Communication can be used to enhance IS awareness and motivate 
employees to comply with security policy. At the same time, if 
communication goes wrong or is misused, the outcome could damage the 
ISS. Management is required to communicate effectively with employees to 
ensure that they are aware of IS policy and understand the reasons for its 
effective implementation. The subsequent effective communication 
involves reaching all employees in an organisation at all levels of its 
hierarchy [109]. Examples of communication include security awareness 
workshops as well as email, phone and face-to-face meetings. In email 
exchanges between employees in an organisation and people in other 
organisations, for example, confidentiality plays an important role. 
Employees must be informed about the sort of information that can be 
sent to third parties without violating confidentiality.  
 
Security Policy Enforcement 
A security policy is an organisational document in which the information 
security procedures and rules are outlined. Employees at all levels of the 
organisation must understand the security policy and participate in its 
implementation according to their position [1]. Enforcing a security policy 
is a major issue for an ISS and its successful implementation should be 
supported by management [1] [110] [111]. Network security, access control, 
IT personnel job descriptions and password policy are examples of factors 
that are required to be covered by security policy. IS policy violations are 
under-researched, and there are clear gaps in this area [112].  
 
Management Support 
To enforce policies relating to the ISS in organisations, management must 
support it from the design stage through all evaluation stages. The role of 
management in an ISS is not only to advocate but also to deliver a clear 
message of IS policy to the rest of the organisation. An obvious example of 
management endorsement of an ISS in organisations is the allocation of an 
adequate budget, which is entirely under the control of senior management. 
The general perception of senior management is that an ISS is entirely the 
responsibility of an IT department, who should ensure the installation of 
appropriate and adequate software systems to preserve the security of 
information [113]. To ensure senior management is fully behind ISSs in 
organisations, they need to learn that IS has a direct relationship with the 
core of the organisation’s operation. Consequently, the budget and 
enforcement of IS policy requires the full support of senior management 
[114].  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a list of human factors based on a review of the 
literature. Human factors are extremely challenging forces for a variety of 
reasons: they are painfully difficult to test and evaluate and are a subjective 
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matter that is too difficult to separate from personal feelings and opinions 
when dealing with individuals who are different from one another, whilst 
each organisation has its own unique culture, values, and practices. We have 
categorised these human factors as direct and indirect. Since our findings 
are mainly based on the literature review, the following chapters in this 
research focus on evaluating these factors through an empirical 
investigation.   
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Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM) 
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5.1 Overview 
The main contribution of this research is the development of a Risk-Driven 
Investment Model (RIDIM) to identify, assess and manage security 
incidents and related risks due to human factors as well as the cost and 
return on investment of proposed control measures. The proposed model 
is based on a holistic concept in which more than one aspect of an incident 
is considered. This includes the consideration of risks related security 
matters in addition to purely economical and non-technical, critical human 
factors. This chapter provides a review of the set of concepts used for this 
model, including Business Domain, Security Incidents (SIs), Risk and 
Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI). These concepts 
provide critical insights and understanding into conceptualising security 
incidents and risk so that appropriate control actions can be identified 
within the investment model. 
 
 
5.2 Concepts for the Model  
The RIDIM risk-driven investment model is based upon the conceptual 
understanding of an ISS within an organisational context. The model is 
based upon several concepts such as security incident, risk and return on 
investment within an organisational setting. All of these concepts are 
necessary to determine the adequate and appropriate level of investment in 
a control mechanism required to effectively address risks to information 
assets through Security Investment. The conceptual model addresses the 
risks from four angles: nature, impact, mitigation, method and cost [136]. 
The nature reflects the business type and quality of risk, the impact indicates 
the severity and quantification of said risk and mitigation deals with the 
control mechanism itself. Finally, the cost and return on cost demonstrate 
how risks impact the organisation economically. These four elements of 
risk are most relevant to the main objective of this research. This section 
outlines the main concepts in RIDIM. 
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5.2.1 Business domain related concepts 
An effective ISS depends as much on knowledge of the business as on 
software architecture. Security professionals require the translation of 
business requirements and goals into an ISS solution capable of meeting 
those goals and requirements. Business domains and processes are varied, 
even within each sector itself. For example, retail banking, investment 
banking and insurance all lie within the ‘finance industry’ but have radically 
different domains and processes; despite being in the same industry, their 
business concepts are divergent. Without understanding business 
requirements and objectives as well as specific industry trends, it is difficult 
to design and construct any security system and leads to a lack of insight 
into risks and investment-related concepts and, ultimately, to an insufficient 
and inaccurate understanding and estimation of ROISI. This lack of 
understanding also extends to data, people, human factors and the specific 
use of processes that should be aligned with business objectives and 
security goals. An organisation’s business domain and IT strategy are two 
factors that most influence the adoption of security countermeasures [115]. 
The impact of security breaches and, consequently, their cost and that of 
appropriate countermeasures are therefore varied.  Business domains, risks 
and critical human factors all provide sources for ISS requirements (Figure 
5.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. ISS requirements dependency.  
 
Some authors suggest a link between the business domain and the IT 
domain [116]. The business domain entails processes, functions and 
objects; therefore, there is a clear link between the business domain and 
information security. In addition, the business domain maps to the ISS 
process and is decomposed into procedures, activities and tasks historically 
not defined under the business process [30]. The risks and human factors 
from the business domain are mapped to the functions and objects of the 
ISS. The business processes and functions are understood through IT, 
which aggregates one or more functions from the ISS. However, as IT and, 
consequently, security have been viewed as an agile project, they have not 
been grown into business domain. Agile projects are in contrast with 
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traditional business processes. They speed up the activities to save time and 
other resources. Based on ISS requirements and their relationship with 
business domain and risks, the identification of the business domain and its 
concepts involves: 
  
 Defining business processes and their actors. 
 The categorisation and valuation of assets. 
 Determining security requirements: vulnerabilities and threats. 
 Assessing risks.  
 The identification of countermeasures and control mechanism(s).  
 
The direct and indirect factors identified thus far include: Errors, 
Awareness, Skills, Experience, Apathy, Ignorance and Negligence, Stress, 
Budget, Culture, Communication, Security Policy Enforcement, Incentive 
and Disincentive Policy and Management Support. The direct human 
factors such as error, awareness, skills and ignorance have been mentioned 
in many academic and professional reports as the source of SIs; this is 
because they have direct and substantial impacts on SIs. It has been 
reported that human errors and other factors related to people caused two-
thirds of data breaches and SIs in 2012 [4]. According to this report, a lack 
of system controls and human mishandling of confidential data were 
implicated. The incidents are costly and as each business sector is regulated 
differently, the cost is varied from one sector to other. The financial and 
healthcare organisations are excessively regulated, therefore the incidents 
attract more regulatory fines. The same report also estimated that 64 
percent of SIs are directly related to human error. Despite the widely 
accepted human factor impact on SIs, the average cost of each incident 
varies across the globe: it is directly related to the type of threat, business 
domain and regulatory regime in different countries.  
 
The critical human factors have been discussed, but analysing the risks to 
information assets requires an understanding of issues and concerns 
surrounding those assets. The five principles considered the most 
important in the domain of information security, regarded by some as the 
‘golden rules’ discussed in the Chapter 2, are: Availability, Integrity, 
Confidentiality, Accountability and Auditability.  
 
5.2.2 Security incident related concepts 
Security Incidents (SIs) are regarded as sequences of events that undesirably 
affect the information system and assets of an organisation; therefore, SIs 
often include multiple threat events. Regardless of all the controls and 
protection mechanisms organisations build into their information system 
and applications, they still experience SIs. Information security standards 
such as ISO27001 expect that organisations be prepared for these incidents 
[20]. 
In order to respond to SIs, their general elements must be first understood 
and clarified. These elements can be defined as follows:  
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 The incident’s agent: Who’s actions impacted the system and 
assets? 
 The incident’s events: What events impacted the system and assets? 
 The incident’s object: Which part(s) of the system and assets were 
affected? 
 The incident’s features: How were the system and assets affected? 
  
Significant losses can result from various types of damage. If damage is 
inflicted, it ceases to be a threat and becomes an attack. These attacks 
originate with the vulnerabilities of information processing systems. The 
type of breach is also important in studying ROISI because their impacts 
vary. Understanding the dynamics by which threats engage with a 
company’s assets and controls allows security professionals to model 
risks.  One of the outputs of such a model is the ability to see how the risk 
varies as the control settings change.  If the company can estimate the cost 
required to turn a control setting up one or two clicks, and the model 
predicts how the risk will fall when this action is taken, then it is 
straightforward to do a ROISI calculation for each proposed change. The 
ROISI is the reduction in expected harm for the cost of the change. 
 
Security incidents and potential losses may also originate with trusted 
internal employees who fool a system or external sources, such as hackers. 
However, it is not always possible to estimate information SI losses 
accurately because many of them cannot be discovered. This is for reasons 
such as adverse publicity. In addition, SIs are greatly dependent on human 
factors. Issues such as ineffective communication, error, apathy, stress and 
lack of awareness are behind threats such as social engineering. Different 
types of breaches require different types of controls and countermeasures. 
Because impacts are varied, the quantification of such impacts is not easy 
[117]. One of the main reasons for this is the nature of controls themselves, 
as mentioned earlier. Technical aspects and controls are clearer than non-
technical forces such as human factors, people, culture and organisational 
attitudes towards security. Information security incident management also 
assists businesses in ensuring their continuity and developing their 
contingency planning processes. After understanding the general elements 
of SIs, the type of security incident itself can be defined in detail in terms 
of description, underlying threats and vulnerabilities, impact, duration and 
security controls.  
 
Most organisations do not pay considerable attention to SI response 
procedure until their first SI occurs [39]. Consequently, many organisations 
lack incident response planning and have no means of preventing an 
incident or minimising its impact when it occurs. Advance planning is vital. 
A qualified SI response team as well as a detailed document that thoroughly 
prescribes the stages to be followed when a SI occurs should be put into 
place in any organisation. They must be able to detect incidents using 
various techniques such as intrusion detection systems and application 
firewalls. This monitoring mechanism will notify the information security 
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team in case of any intrusion or attack. As soon as an attack has been 
detected and the appropriate personnel informed, action can be taken to 
terminate or contain the SI.  
 
 
5.2.3 Risk-related concepts 
Risk management principally emphasises the successful completion of 
projects through the management and control of known risks. Information 
security risk management, as part of the bigger risk management initiatives, 
focuses on ensuring the total security of assets and information systems by 
managing and controlling security risks. The speedy evolution of risks in 
information security is overtaking this approach. Information security 
resilience requires acknowledgment that organisations must prepare now to 
deal with severe impacts from SIs that are impossible to predict, detect and 
prevent. Organisations must extend risk management to include risk 
resilience in order to manage, respond to and mitigate any adverse impacts 
of information SIs.  
 
Security resilience also requires that organisations have the ability to predict, 
detect and prevent SIs by responding rapidly, efficiently and effectively to 
them as well as to their consequences. This entails understanding 
multidisciplinary units such as risk, investment and business domain and 
their functions in organisations to develop and evaluate control plans and 
settings for when SIs occur. With effective communication channels 
between all parts of the organisation, these measures can be adhered to by 
employees or contractors who might have been compromised in addition 
to shareholders, regulators and any other stakeholders who might be 
involved. Figure 5.2 depicts information security risk interdependency 
concepts in which the following core risk objectives can be defined: 
 Identify critical organisational systems and assets. 
 Assess and assign value and importance to the identified systems 
and assets.  
 Identify the threats to and vulnerabilities of the systems and 
assets.  
 Determine the known risk pattern. 
 Determine the existing control measures or other risk-mitigating 
features.  
 Identify the residual risks. 
 Develop a risk profile and align it with investment in information 
security. 
 Create a risk mitigation strategy. 
 Determine inherent risks: value the unmitigated risk exposure.   
 Obtain regular evaluation reports and update the risk profile. 
 Document risk assessment process, including the risk acceptance 
criteria and criteria for risk assessment. 
 
The core of the figure is information security risk, which is considerably 
impacted by threats and the monetary value. All risks are addressed by 
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controls and defined by information security features. In addition, risks 
influence and are defined by investment, which is in turn ultimately defined 
by the business. The business is the ultimate decision-maker for controls 
and investment because it owns the assets and is ultimately responsible for 
them. 
    
 
 
                                  Figure 5.2: Information security risk concepts. 
 
5.2.4 Return on information security investment: Related 
concepts 
Tools and strategies are essential in keeping organisations cost effective 
whilst information security professionals endeavour to demonstrate the 
value of and Return On Information Security Investment (ROISI). 
Information security systems research literature indicates that there is a 
clear relationship between investments and SIs in ISS and enhanced 
organisational performance. Available tools and methods allow 
organisations to calculate and analyse the financial impact of a specific 
security control but cannot be used to analyse the cost-benefit of other 
factors such as critical human factors. Information security management 
systems are now increasingly based on economic principles such as cost-
benefit analysis [48]. This is part of an information security financial metrics 
approach that has been developed mainly within the last 10 years. Providing 
the balance between information security cost and benefit is essential for 
organisations. However, organisations will invest to a greater extent in 
information security as long as the cost of investment is less than the cost 
of potential risk [49]. There are important variables in this measurement 
that are required to be as precise as possible. Accurate information about 
the likelihood of SIs occurring and their impacts must be acquired in order 
to assist the quantification of ROISI. However, it is important to remember 
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that there is a significant difference between quantifying and measuring 
ROI in ISSs and actually implementing new machinery systems and 
controls [50]. Before examining the ROISI-related concepts, a quick 
overview of the traditional approach to the return on investment, which is 
used in enterprises as a performance measure to assess the effectiveness of 
an investment, is presented. This involves a quantification of the aggregate 
return on an investment compared to its cost. The two most important 
concepts used in ROISI are: 
 
 Return On Investment (ROI) 
 Net Present Value (NPV)  
 
This research uses the above classic financial metrics to describe and 
define some concepts related to ROISI. 
 
Return on Investment (ROI) – Traditional Financial 
Metrics 
 
Senior executives in many organisations often demand that the return on 
information security investment be calculated and presented to them. This 
seems like a typical business practice, although for major investments such 
as those made by financial organisations, the practice becomes very 
controversial when it comes to information security. The process should 
consider the credibility of the calculation with due care as the process entails 
consideration of all resources. Investment in information security could add 
some business value by reducing the occurrence of SIs or the response time 
to such incidents, which itself could improve the business reputation but 
not necessarily generate revenue. Information security departments thus 
have less flexibility to justify security investments, unlike marketing 
departments, which can quickly point to an increase in revenue or market 
share price to justify their expenditure.  
 
Whilst much research has focused on the risk to information security and 
the economics of technical aspects of information security, far less 
attention has been given to the critical human factors and their impacts on 
the ROISI. As a result, there is a poor understanding of the economics of 
IS within organisations and inadequate formulation and measurement of 
security policies in dealing with non-technical matters, including critical 
human factors. This lack of attention has also impacted upon decision-
making in organisations, particularly around investment. This research 
presents a model that can provide a better understanding, reasoning and 
quantification of ROISI regarding risks associated with critical human 
factors. The model works by firstly providing an understanding of the 
dynamics by which threats engage with organisational assets and 
controls.  One of the outputs is the ability to see how the risk varies as the 
control settings change. If a company can estimate the cost required to turn 
a control setting up one or two clicks and the model describes how the risk 
falls when the control is turned up, then it is straightforward to perform an 
ROISI calculation for each proposed change. The ROISI is the expected 
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reduction in harm versus the cost of the change.  The classical and general 
ROI calculation looks like this [118]: 
 
ROI = 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡−𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
The traditional calculation is fairly straightforward when organisations are 
dealing with a well-defined tangible investment, where profit is evident and 
where revenue is greater than the investment. In information security, 
however, whilst we can calculate the total cost, there is no revenue to be 
made. Information security typically averts loss rather than generating 
profit from its investment. In addition, other elements such as risk exist 
within the information security field but are not traditional ROI concepts. 
A simple return on investment for information security can be calculated 
in the following way: 
 
ROISI = 
(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 ×%𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)−𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
 
Organisations tend to minimise risks that threaten information assets. The 
classical financial approach to ROISI is thus not specifically relevant in 
information security planning. The return on security investment becomes 
hard to determine when it comes to non-technical aspects of information 
security systems, including critical human factors and associated cost 
implications such as training. It is therefore extremely difficult to calculate 
and quantify all the costs associated with potential risks and damage 
resulting from SIs. In addition, it is very difficult to estimate the precise 
likelihood of the occurrence of those incidents due to the volatile, erratic, 
dynamic nature of the critical human factors and the way they fluctuate as 
well as the inconsistent nature of human behaviour. Furthermore, no 
reliable data is available to substantiate such estimations. Information 
security, cost and return on investment are all concerned with monetary 
value, whilst human factors are quite difficult to frame within financial 
metrics. As a result, human factors are not easily understood by senior 
management teams and boards of executives because they require some 
sort of quantification or metric in order to be useful in investment decision-
making and other important corporation strategies. Despite this difficulty, 
human factors can be quantified; risk concepts are first identified before 
being modelled against the changes made to the control settings, satisfying 
organisational requirements for an estimation of the financial consequences 
of information SIs. This provides organisations with a more objective cost 
versus investment comparison, which considers a variety of risks.  
 
 
Net present value (NVT)  
 
One way of computing the ROISI is via the net present value (NPV) 
method, where 𝐼𝜊 is the ‘initial investment for security’ measure [118]. 
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𝑁𝑃𝑉 =   −𝐼𝜊 +  ∑
ΔE (L𝑡)  +   ΔOCC𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑖 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐)t
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
 
 
I0  = Initial investment for security measure  
ΔE (L𝑡)= Reduction in expected loss in t 
ΔOCC𝑡 = Reduction in opportunity costs in t  
𝐶𝑡  = Cost of security measure in t 
𝑖 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐 = Discount rate 
 
Organisations receive recommendations for information security 
investments based upon the outcome of this model, depending on whether 
a positive or negative value is calculated. This model and most other 
proposals in ROISI consider a single security measure rather than an entire 
ISS [48]. It has also been noted that the NPV yields a time value for an 
investment [50] and, therefore, the ROISI performs for the time value of 
investment which, technically speaking, would be inflation and cost of 
capital, and it fails to represent all elements of ISSs conclusively. 
 
  
5.3 Risk-driven investment meta-model  
In order to develop a risk-driven investment model, it is necessary to 
understand the relationships among the actors within the organisational 
context.  In particular, we need to understand the dependencies between 
the actors and other security, risk and organisational concepts and how they 
are addressed before confirming that the dependencies we have assumed 
are in fact correct. To achieve this, the research uses elements from Secure-
Tropos modelling language and Requirements Engineering based upon risk 
analysis, actors, goals, security investment and SIs. The meta-model 
represents the underlying conceptual elements and relationships among the 
features related to ISSs and Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM). A consistency is required amongst all features when all concepts 
come together. The conceptual meta-model outlines the abstraction in 
terms of which other models are defined. The meta-model for risk-driven 
investment incorporates some models without a similar abstraction level. It 
includes meta-concepts such as goals, security investment and SIs as well 
as relationships between these concepts, such as detection and prevention. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the meta-model of the proposed risk-driven 
investment approach, embracing goals, security investment, risk, SIs and 
protection mechanisms.  
 
Actor: An actor is an entity that has strategic goals and intentions within a 
system and organisational setting. There are both human and ISS actors. In 
particular, human actors are associated with several critical factors such as 
awareness, communication and the involvement of management, which 
have been discussed previously. An ISS actor is associated with factors such 
as security policy and physical security. With respect to ISSs, it can be said 
that any security system ultimately responds to the fundamental 
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relationship between various social and technical actors and stakeholders, 
including system users and potential attackers and hackers, in an 
organisational context. Strategic actors have goals, beliefs, abilities and 
commitments and at the same time are semi-autonomous, constrained by 
their relationship and dependencies, yet not entirely manageable. In 
addition, they are dependent on each other on the basis of the fulfilment of 
goals. Initially, one must identify the stakeholders who have concerns in the 
ISS, the proposed context and the framework, whilst also considering the 
ISS’s purpose and function. This is important, as each actor would be 
affected by the proposed change to the ISS to ensure the security is served 
and how the actors’ strategic interests, main objectives and goals would be 
influenced. In this study and the proposed model, the actors are users 
(organisations, systems, people) and potential attackers such as those 
planning SEAs. The attributes of both are considered, and exactly where 
they are closely and constantly dependent upon each other is elucidated. 
The next step will look at the different ways in which the actors would be 
able to achieve their intended goals. The proposed model details how the 
various control mechanisms and their different attributes should be defined 
based on the actors whilst addressing security constraints, and it presents  
cost and the return on investment clearly. Each actor’s objectives are 
reflected in the proposed model. It is then essential to identify whether the 
actors’ different interests supplement or interfere with each other. In this 
model, the organisational interest of cutting costs whilst increasing return 
on investment precludes increased spending on security and the 
implementation of improved measures to address the weaknesses related 
to the critical human factors. Potential attackers have their own interests 
too, particularly exploiting people in order to gain access to organisations’ 
information and systems; these interests are in complete contrast with those 
of the organisation, its system and its people. It is important to identify the 
existing vulnerabilities.  
 
Goal: A strategic objective of a stakeholder (actor) for a system and its 
surrounding environment. An actor seeks to achieve that strategic 
objective, regardless of how it is achieved. The way in which a goal is to be 
achieved should be agreed upon by all actors, with formulation and 
development shared amongst the parties. The proposed model 
differentiates between security and organisational goals. Organisational 
goals represent goals that are important at an organisational level. Such 
goals include profitability, compliance, continuity, reputation and 
performance. Security goals support security needs. This means a secure 
goal serves actors’ and associated with goal [119]. Availability, Integrity, 
Confidentiality, Accountability and Auditability (AICAA) are the main 
security goals, as explained previously. An adequate balance in security can 
be obtained by exchanging security requirements with other functional or 
non-functional requirements of the security system that is equipped, 
according to the goal.   
 
Risk: Risk is the potential damage resulting from some current process or 
future SI. Incidents can arise from information processes in organisations 
being maliciously exploited: a SEA is an example of such exploitation. Risk 
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is present in every aspect of an information process. The proposed model 
considers three different consequences of attacks: financial loss, which is 
difficult to quantify and can encompass either direct monetary loss in 
financial accounts or indirect loss as a result of business being disrupted; 
legal fines, which organisations could be issued as a result of a SI that 
violates their legal obligations; and reputational loss, which can arise from 
an organisation publicly reporting the SI to a regulator. Consequences of 
reputational loss include difficulties in attracting new customers and, in 
some cases, negative effects on the company’s credit rating. For each asset 
group, risks can be calculated by measuring the asset against the threat to 
which it is vulnerable using a risk matrix with predefined values, enabling 
asset values to be compared with threat and vulnerability levels.  
 
Security incident: A SI is an event due to the threats caused by actors 
using different means and tools to compromise the system. Possible causes 
of SIs include: internal system compromise, stolen customer data, phony 
transactions, insider attacks and DDoS attacks. SIs in this research pose 
negative consequences and create risks within the organisational context.  
   
Vulnerabilities: A weakness in ISS procedures, design, implementation or 
internal controls could result in a security breach. Despite being patched by 
a control mechanism, a system always has vulnerabilities. This concept can 
be addressed by using the vulnerability assessment, which provides 
guidelines for protection mechanisms. It defines and classifies system 
resources, assigns levels of importance to the resources, identifies potential 
threats to each individual resource, develops a countermeasure strategy and 
suggests measures that can minimise the consequences of SEAs.  
 
Security investment: The capital that is made available for security 
solutions via protection mechanisms in supporting a goal. Security 
investment is, in this case, not a direct measure of profit but of the cost 
avoided in potential human-related security incidents. Security investment 
should therefore consider both technical and non-technical cost 
implications. The reason for this is that the cost of preventive measures for 
SEA SIs is varied, and the landscape of threats and risks are ever changing. 
At the same time, other attributes require attention. These include Business 
Impact Analysis (BIA), threat description, vulnerability assessment, risk 
evaluation and risk treatment.  
 
Plan: a workable long-term (strategic), mid-term (tactical) or short-term 
(operational) framework for realising goals, adopted and utilised by actors. 
A protection mechanism requires a plan to achieve ISS security and 
organisational goals by ensuring strategic security and SI improvements. 
Long-term strategy considers a human factor portfolio (involvement of 
senior management) and risk analysis. A mid-term (tactical) plan also 
concerns a human factors portfolio (awareness and communication) and 
tactical improvements such as enhanced maintenance and communication. 
The short-term (operational) phase of the plan is concerned with the 
allocation of critical IT assets, a human factors portfolio and security 
implementation practice. 
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Protection mechanism: a set of controls for addressing security strategy 
and supporting a security plan that entails a protection or defence 
mechanism. It can be detective or preventive for SEA SIs. It also protects 
information assets and assists in patching system vulnerabilities. It can be 
either technical or non-technical and is listed as part of security investment.  
 
Figure 5.3 presents the meta-model that combines all the necessary 
concepts discussed previously. These concepts are linked with each other 
to support the analysis of SIs and associated risk so that appropriate control 
action and required investment in the control are determined within an 
organisational setting. Though concepts such as SIs, security investment 
and humans as actors all play a major role, the protection mechanism is the 
core concept. A protection mechanism relies on strategic planning to 
provide detective and preventive methods for dealing with SIs. It assists in 
the patching of vulnerabilities and protecting assets, which are mainly 
information (soft-intangible) assets though tangible and physical assets can 
also be included. Once the investment is configured, the detective and 
preventive control mechanism could potentially mitigate financial, 
reputational and legal damage. The mid- and long-term strategy also 
support the protection mechanism in addressing awareness, 
communication and management support for (human) actors. An actor has 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited and influence SIs. The introduction of 
such detective and preventive controls creates negative consequences in the 
system without adequate validation. To address these impacts, the system 
requires validation against SIs to establish the leverage of the incident and 
the resilience of the actor(s) in the system. If the validation is not justified, 
then the protection mechanism must be equipped to fill the gap in planning 
and investment.  
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Figure 5.3: Risk-driven investment meta-model. 
 
The figure provides a clear relationship between the concepts and their 
attributes. 
 
5.4 Process 
This section outlines the process involved in the risk-driven investment 
model. We have combined all discussed concepts used in the risk-driven 
investment model into a meta-model using Secure-Tropos and 
Requirements Engineering (RE) by presenting business, Security Incidents 
(SI), risk and Return On Information Security Investment (ROISI) related 
concepts [119] [120]. This process assists the development of the Risk-
Driven Investment Model (RIDIM) by considering ISS concerns 
throughout the development lifecycle. Figure 5.4 shows a general form of 
the activity process that includes activity, function, step and attributes of 
RIDIM, with Figure 5.5 summarising the activities. Figure 5.6 outlines the 
steps within the process. 
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Figure 5.4: Activity process. 
 
 
 
                                            Figure 5.5:  Summary of the activities.   
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                        Figure 5.6: Risk-Driven Investment Process 
 
5.4.1 Activity 1: Identify the Business Domain 
This first activity of the process focuses on analysing organisational entities 
such as actors, key process and goals so that appropriate incident analysis 
can be performed for calculating the ROISI. The process of analysing 
internal factors within organisations includes four steps: identifying actors, 
identifying key business processes, defining organisational goals and 
defining security goals with regard to the ISS. This analysis facilitates the 
identification of factors related to the budget and the cost of security 
controls and mechanisms. Any project, including security projects in any 
public or private organisation, has to be justified for budget investment, 
whilst its success is often assessed subsequently. Organisational 
surroundings are as important as individual behaviour when an incident 
occurs [18]. Organisational analysis assists in the identification of 
information assets and leads to the development, documentation, 
implementation, evaluation and monitoring of the ISS, entailing 
procedures, standards, policies and recommendations that safeguard 
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confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and auditability of such 
information systems and assets. The identification of information assets is 
the first step in securing them. As the measurement of information security 
performance and ROISI is driven by the reasoning of organisational 
factors, the three steps for this analysis are given below. At the end of this 
activity, an organisational entity artefact is produced. This artefact includes 
actors, business processes, goals and critical assets.  
 
Step 1.1: Identify Actors 
 
In this step we identify all actors, internal and external, within the 
organisational context using Secure-Tropos and Requirements 
Engineering. ISSs and people are internal actors described by their entities 
and specific strategic goals in an organisational context. An ISS provides 
two distinctive attributes: a security and a service model. The attacker is the 
external actor, an individual with an intention of gaining financial, political 
or/and personal incentives. ISO 27001/IEC proposes the founding of an 
Information Security Management System (ISMS) [20]. We follow these 
guidelines to define the activities and tasks of RIDIM. The backbone of the 
ISO 27002/IEC guideline forms an effective basis for ISS management 
support through several activities. Organisations should define their 
approach towards risk assessment in terms of the identification and 
documentation of risks.  A uniform approach towards the evaluation, 
mitigation, transfer and/or acceptance of risks is needed. Senior 
management determines which security policies and controls are allocated 
to different sections of the business. Defining the boundaries and scope of 
an ISS is also important, as is the  establishment of a security policy that 
requires management approval. Also crucial to an ISS is the formation of 
control objectives with a primary focus on the implementation of security 
policy and control activities. Security training provision, resource allocation, 
internal audits and monitoring and security program reviews are other key 
attributes of an ISS process. All ISS requirements are achievable when 
continual improvements are validated and insufficiencies are recognised. 
Shortfalls should be identified and developments instigated in order to 
gradually reduce the risk to the organisation.  
Step 1.2: Define Goals 
 
The goals incorporate the objectives, expectations and constraints of the 
organisational mission. This study considers organisation and security goals 
within the process. Providing the Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality, 
Accountability and Auditability (AICAA) of information assets are security 
goals for an organisation and critical factors for attaining its business goals. 
Senior management teams in all organisations commonly encounter 
difficulties in achieving organisational goals, whilst limited resources are 
available to them. Organisations seek to improve security to achieve their 
goals and objectives and thus they make an investment. Organisations 
should, however, be continually investing in information security as an 
ongoing process because threats are constant evolving and advancing. 
Decisions that are made about investment create value as they are 
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effectively business projects that are worth more than they cost. A detailed 
and complete understanding of the focus and scope of the risk analysis 
within organisations is thus essential, as is identifying the organisations’ 
main assets in order to maintain and define organisational security goals 
and objectives. Assets are essential in the RIDIM model and help the entire 
risk analysis process in organisations. The assets are used to help in 
identifying risks with their value, and assessing their consequences and 
impacts in terms of pecuniary loss. A high level analysis of threats, 
vulnerabilities, incidents and mitigation process(es) should help to pinpoint 
what organisations are most concerned about and thus ensure that the 
focus of the analytical model is in line with organisational goals. It is very 
important to create a balance between organisational concerns and what is 
actually required in relation to security solutions and risk mitigation. 
Emphasis is placed on security architecture and the interplay of threat, risk 
analysis and security investment. Illustrated by practical and real-world 
examples of incidents, this discussion covers the subtle relationship 
between the exploitation of current and new mitigation methods, which 
consider human factors and investment, and the exposure to new threats, 
alongside organisational goals and objectives. Strong mitigations and 
countermeasures, which are attractive to organisations, and business 
decisions, which change the underlying assumptions in a way that 
invalidates the risk analysis, may threaten the viability of the organisational 
goals in a fundamental way.  
 
Organisational goals and objectives with regard to security, risk, critical 
human factors and investment can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Creating adequate balance between spending on information 
security and the effectiveness of security mitigation mechanism(s). 
 Implementing a sufficient Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis to 
identify and clarify the severity of the risk and consider the right 
budget for the right cost. 
 Aligning security and organisational goals to avert security 
violations, downtime and security-related costs and damages.  
 Achieving security goals through training and awareness programs, 
which must be aligned with overall organisational goals and 
objectives, with the nature of the business and the culture of that 
organisation being considered. 
 The effectiveness and adequacy of information security policies 
should be reviewed and re-measured against organisational goals to 
ensure that they are supported by the objectives of the organisation.     
The result of a soundly executed mitigation process should thus be a set of 
recommendations closely supported by organisational goals. The process 
should identify important vulnerabilities, including critical human factors 
and architectural, design and conceptual weaknesses, as well as technical 
security mechanisms and tools, whilst providing a sound clarification on 
the return of investment in light of the business process. It should prioritise 
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the learnt vulnerabilities based on their likelihood of being exploited, cost 
and impact.  
 
As security requirements are customer-oriented, it is important to 
overcome the redundancy, ambiguity and incompleteness of security goals 
by translating them into an analysis model that can be understood, defined 
and followed adequately and appropriately. The attainment of 
completeness by reducing redundancy is the main security goal. 
Furthermore, to lower complexity in subsequent organisational analysis 
activities, incident analysis, ROISI calculation and risk mitigation, the 
proposed model can be used to organise the requirements into a structure 
that reflects security goals. This study put Availability as the chief principle 
security objective for three reasons: 
 
 Financial organisations are used as case studies in this research and 
the availability of the information system is the chief principle that 
ensures that the integrity and confidentiality of information assets 
are preserved. This doesn’t mean that other information security 
goals are not important, but financial organisations cannot function 
if the system is not available and if the unauthorised access points 
and means for unauthorised modifications are not protected 
against. It would be very costly for a financial organisation if the 
system wasn’t available in the first place.  
 
 This research considers critical human factors and the role of 
people in ISSs, particularly in information SIs; therefore, availability 
is important to deter threat agents using communication means [3].  
  
 Whether or not availability is prioritised depends greatly upon its 
impact on business. This becomes even more crucial as many 
financial organisations move their services to Cloud platforms, in 
which availability creates even more momentum.  
 
Step 1.3: Identify Business Process 
 
Business process can be defined as a service covering a business operation 
from start to finish that is provided to internal and external stakeholders 
and other interested groups. In an organisational context, the business 
process is a functioning process supported by and linked with ISS practice 
with respect to goals and objectives. An ISS operation is a composition of 
a business process and a compliance-imposing mitigation and control 
mechanism. The process includes the identification of required information 
and sensitivity of information for business continuity and disaster recovery. 
The protection of sensitive information is one of the greatest concerns for 
today’s businesses; therefore, this step also identifies the critical assets that 
support the organisational missions and thus require appropriate 
protection.  
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At the end of the activity, the main outputs are actors, security and 
organisational goals, which all define the business domain of the business 
process. This gives a clear indication of the players and other concepts 
related to the process of the RIDIM model. The choice of financial 
organisation has been influenced by a number of factors, one of which is 
that financial organisations are highly appropriate for investigating the 
dynamics of evolving relationships between human factors, risk and 
investment in information security systems. 
 
 
5.4.2 Activity 2: Incident Analysis  
Once the organisational business domain entities are identified and 
analysed by the previous activity, incidents instigated by the critical human 
factors are then analysed in Activity 2. The main goal of the incident 
analysis process is to assist in remediating any loss that may have occurred 
to organisations and minimise the damage sustained by similar incidents in 
the future.  
 
 
Step 2.1: Incident Details 
 
When an incident occurs, it is crucial to know what to do, how to gather 
detailed evidence of the incident that meets legal criteria, and how to deal 
with the consequent regulatory, financial and reputational issues. It is, 
however, is imperative that incidents be reported promptly to allow the 
issue to be analysed and addressed and reduce any further risk. For this 
purpose, this first step advocates the following activities, known as 3R: 
 
 Reconstruct attacked systems, fixing any security vulnerabilities that 
may have instigated the incident.  
 Restore backup data and, if required, replace data of questionable 
integrity.  
 Reinforce current security controls and, if needed, address issues 
identified during the SI analysis.  
To fulfil the above steps, the details of incidents must be discussed in 
different sections. 
 
1. Description of the Incident: What was involved in the incident 
and what were the network capabilities and security procedures? 
What was the impact on the network and computer systems? 
2. Threats/Vulnerabilities/Risks: Identification of the incident: 
Has the situation been acknowledged as malicious? Notification 
process and interaction: Have the right people been notified and in 
a timely manner? 
3. Cost/Investment: Business impact: What services were impacted, 
how fast were they reinstated, and what did that mean for the 
organisation?  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4. Root Causes of Incidents: Technical and non-technical aspects of 
incidents: Why did the incident happen? 
5. Gap Analysis: Identification of gaps in the information security 
system, scrutinising existing controls and root causes.  
 
Description of the Incident 
 
The description of an incident provides answers to a number of related 
questions. The main issues that require an explanation are: 
 The time that taken for the organisation to find out that an incident 
had occurred; 
 The process used for the detection of the incident;  
 The sufficient identification and explicit understanding of the 
incident and its process; 
 The nature of the incident and the role of critical human factors; 
and 
 The estimation/calculation of the impact on the system. 
 
Threats/Vulnerabilities/Risks 
 
Following a description of the incident, this section assists in determining 
what vulnerabilities of the system can be exploited by such a threat and 
what risks are involved. Investigating the incident should provide 
information on how the system has been compromised despite existing 
control mechanism(s). Whilst the appropriate controls can  be subsequently 
patched, employees need to be trained in email and phone authentication 
methods to detect invalid and hoax communications. In order for further 
risk to be mitigated and vulnerabilities to be minimised, the appropriate 
person/department should be informed as soon as possible about the 
incident. Also,  a timely, accurate and adequate report to IRT should be 
made available to them. It is vital to identify the weak links and any known 
internal factors that may compromise the risk evaluation and the 
subsequent recommendations: These are the vulnerabilities in the risk 
analysis/mitigation process. Although a good knowledge of threats helps 
one in modifying the countermeasures and controls, vulnerabilities and 
consequences/impacts must be given consideration in the process before 
risks are rated. Threats are always present and risk may be higher than it 
appears; organisations need to be aware that they are vulnerable to things 
that are difficult to predict or imagine. Risk analysis is a process that 
incorporates three components: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability. These 
components should be defined on the basis of the organisations’ assets that 
need to be protected and how vulnerable the organisations are to different 
threats. The likelihood and possible impact of a threat is then considered. 
Finally, consideration is given to how the organisation can reduce the 
likelihood of threats occurring and minimise their impact.  
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Cost/Investment 
 
This step aims to identify the investment organisations are required to make 
in order to deal with SIs. Looking back at the incidents discussed 
previously, it becomes clear how extra investment in training on  
authentication methods in communication could enhance control 
mechanisms. Important issues related to cost and investment and business 
activities and objectives are listed below: 
 
 Analysing the impact of the incident on the business. 
 Identifying the services affected. 
 Identifying the role of people in the incident, which enables more 
comprehensive and tailored training to be developed.  
 Identifying if the use of different technological solutions, such as 
applying a different network topology with more redundancy in its 
server, could have lessened the impact of an incident. 
 Analysing the Business Continuity Plan (BCP) in order to find out 
how quickly the service was restored 
 Identifying the severity of the impact on the brand and customer 
satisfaction. 
 Identifying if there are any legal implications of the incident.   
Considering the above issues, it becomes apparent that providing a good 
balance between cost and security is essential. Organisations require a 
robust clarification and justification of security benefits and associated costs 
incurred. They need to consider investing in the security of their 
information assets whenever the fiscal cost is less than or equal to the 
benefit of the security measure(s) [121]. There are various tools that assist 
organisations in effectively managing information security cost and 
investment configurations, using various metrics for accurate and up-to-
date information given to management. The business dashboard, despite 
not being directly related to information security, can be used or tailored to 
fit into an organisation’s risk framework, and it can be a valuable tool that 
provides senior managers with a glimpse into the likely impacts of 
insufficient security investment.      
 
Root Causes of Incidents 
The main cause of the incident discussed above was the deception of an 
employee by an infected e-mail and hoax phone call. If the control 
mechanism had been able to detect socially engineered activities, then this 
attack could have been detected and dealt with appropriately and 
adequately. The performance of a control mechanism can be analysed using 
an incident response process, implemented by the organisation’s Incident 
Response Team (IRT). The analysis is concerned with several aspects: 
 
 The preparation of an adequate reporting procedure to inform the 
IR team. 
 The IRT’s communication procedure. 
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 Incident handling. 
 Ensuring that the IRT receives relevant and adequate information. 
 The IRT should reach out to appropriate people such as managers, 
technical specialists and legal teams and received adequate support 
from said individuals. 
 The IRT should reach out to all appropriate external organisations 
such as government agencies. 
 Sufficient and timely communication should be established 
between all stakeholders. 
 Correct diagnoses of the incident.  
 The formulation of a rapid and appropriate response.  
Establishing the root causes of an incident requires a level of understanding 
beyond that of merely detecting that a system is infected; it requires an 
understanding of precisely what allowed and facilitated the compromise of 
the security system. In addition, the difference between the root cause and 
the trajectory of the compromise must be considered. Identifying root 
causes provides an understanding of the way malicious activities succeed in 
compromising systems, whilst finding the trajectory, or path, of the attack 
assists in understanding the delivery of the attack. There is a profound 
difference between these two goals. Consider an attack scenario in which 
the server is compromised by a Command & Control attack as the result of 
the payload of a RAT. The attack path describes how an employee was 
deceived to deliver a RAT payload. If the organisation then blocks the C&C 
attack and address the specific RAT payload, there is nothing stopping 
another similar attack occurring another day. The root cause, on the other 
hand, considers the human factor vulnerabilities and the role they played in 
delivering the payload. In order to identify the root cause, the sequence of 
events must be fully understood by reconstructing exactly what happened 
in the process of the SEA. A forensic investigation into the details and a 
reconstruction of what occurred provide precise answers to queries relevant 
to the incident. The role of human factors in this regard can be identified 
and the root causes of the incident subsequently addressed.  
 
Gap Analysis 
 
The gap analysis provides an understanding of which control measures 
organisations require to ensure their conformity with regulatory bodies. 
However, there are limitations in the gap analysis process. Human factors 
are part of the gap analysis and they have a subjective nature. Addressing 
some goals related to this subjective matters is quite difficult as they may 
evolve and change during the sequence of finding solutions. The nature of 
human factors themselves brings another challenge. There may be several 
alternative solutions available, making for a highly flexible process. A well-
executed gap analysis can deliver the organisation with guidelines for 
conformity. 
 
This research considered a number of gap analysis techniques and methods 
to compare its approach to the industry benchmark. One very appealing 
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cyber security analysis tool is that used by Lockheed Martin. However, this 
analysis doesn’t provide a full and comprehensive approach to critical 
human factors and security investment. Without consideration of critical 
human factors and security investment, such analysis lacks a comprehensive 
understanding of related risks and their impacts.  
 
Step 2.2:  Identification and Analysis of Risks  
 
Organisations want to better combat complex threats and comply with 
heightened regulatory demands. They are improving security efforts by 
forming viable risk management programs that measure improvements in 
information security posture. Risk analysis combined with decision-making 
around addressing those risks forms risk management. Determining risk 
severity is part of the risk analysis process. This process allows senior 
management to determine whether they have met their due diligence 
responsibility when making a decision. This decision could be about a new 
project, capital expenditure, investment strategy or other business 
processes such as the modification and/or establishment of new 
information security control measures. Risk analysis should be used to 
maximum effect to complement risk management decisions, which aim to 
assess the extent to which due diligence is being employed and provide 
adequate information security controls. Due diligence has a number of 
different definitions based on the nature of the business. How due diligence 
is measured depends greatly upon the relative facts of each case. Risk 
analysis also addresses intangible and subjective contributing factors, such 
as the role of critical human factors or conformance.  
 
As defined above, risk is the combination of threat, probability and impact 
stated as a value in a predefined scope. A risk matrix has been introduced 
in which the probability and impact has been given a quantitative scale. The 
risks, root causes, owner of the risks and mitigating actions are defined and 
explained in this assessment. Inherent and residual risks are demonstrated 
quantitatively. At this point, the risk register session is complete with an 
overview of the risk assessment process. This process then requires a 
review of the business attributes, namely Availability, Integrity, 
Confidentiality, Accountability and Auditability (AICAA), in order to 
identify and examine the threats. It then identifies any existing controls or 
safeguarding measures in place. When that process is complete, each threat 
is examined to determine its probability of occurrence and impact to the 
business process. In this research, each threat was examined using the 
existing control as a guide to assign a relative risk level to each threat. Once 
the risk levels were established, possible controls were identified that could 
reduce the threat risk level to an acceptable range. The output of this 
activity is an incident pattern that includes the results of the ‘incident details’ 
and ‘risk analysis’ steps. Table 5.1 shows the incident pattern and describes 
its attributes. 
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Incident components Description 
Incident Name  The incident that occurred within 
the organisation   
Incident details Incident details including sequences 
of events during the attack.   
In
ci
d
en
t-
R
el
at
ed
  
C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
Asset Affected tangible and intangible 
asset(s)  
Vulnerability Weakness of the system and 
organisation. 
Risk Affected areas due to the incident, 
e.g. financial/ reputational/ legal 
A
ct
o
r/
 
ca
u
se
s 
 
Human Human factors related to the 
incident such as awareness/ 
communication/management 
involvement. 
ISS Related organisation issues such as  
security policy, physical security etc. 
In
v
es
tm
en
t-
R
el
at
ed
 C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
Protection Mechanism Existing protection mechanism  
Business Impact Analysis 
(BIA) 
Understanding impact criticality, 
identifying business functions, 
gathering impact data, determining 
impact, BIA data points.  
Gap Considers the effectiveness of 
control measures and the gap in 
existing control that facilitated the 
incident. Looks at the risks, 
vulnerabilities and control measures. 
Risk Evaluation Level of risk due to the incident, i.e., 
high, medium or low. 
Risk Treatment Refers to the plans to mitigate the 
risk. 
G
o
al
 
Security Goal Security goal needed to be achieved 
to overcome the incident, e.g. 
Availability, Integrity, 
Confidentiality, Accountability and 
Auditability (AICAA). 
Organisational 
Goal 
Organisational  goal needed to be 
achieved to overcome the incident, 
e.g. profitability, compliance, 
continuity, reputation, performance. 
Table 5.1: Security Investment-Incident Pattern (SIIP) 
 
SEA security incidents have now been defined, categorised and determined. 
Their pattern behaviour, their related concepts such as vulnerability and 
threat and, more importantly, the risk concepts and consequent risk 
assessment, analysis and treatment have also been identified and defined. 
 68       
 
The next activity in this research involves analysing the gap in existing 
controls and defining the control measure elements for the economic 
analysis.      
 
5.4.3 Activity 3: Calculation of ROISI 
Once the incident is properly analysed, this final activity calculates the 
return on any security investment and contributes to the enhancement of 
existing ISS practice, mainly in terms of human issues.  It is therefore 
important to justify whether greater security investment is necessary in light 
of an incident occurring. This activity consists of four steps.  
 
Step 3.1: Analysing existing control measures 
 
This step analyses the existing control mechanisms within an organisation 
and evaluates their effectiveness at repelling SIs. In particular, the measured 
effectiveness determines the gap in existing controls and missing necessary 
practice. This gap is briefly identified in Activity 2. The control measures 
considering human factors are varied and change from one organisation to 
another, depending on  organisational culture. However, there are common 
controls that can be shared in any organisation. One of the major 
contributing factors for setting up the human factor-related controls is a 
culture of security. This is followed by security policy, security awareness, 
contracts of employment, service contracts, end-user codes of conduct, 
segregation of duties and third-part and contractors’ obligations.  
 
It is also necessary to estimate the loss incurred by an incident. Each loss is 
accompanied by a cost. The loss is associated with the details of the  
incidents’ transactions, such as assets used in business or lawsuit 
settlements, whilst cost affiliates with the expenses to provide security 
control measures. The loss of assets includes tangible and intangible assets 
[122]. Losses in a SEA can therefore be tangible and intangible, both of 
which have financial impacts on any organisation, depending the service 
they provide. Losses can occur in: 
 
 Access to the system 
 Revenue  
 Data availability 
 Data integrity 
 Data confidentiality 
 Reputation 
 
The main costs of an incident are:   
 
 Increased insurance premiums  
 Administrative expenses (extra training, internal cost-auditing) 
 Time (availability of data and system) 
 Hardware and software costs (external cost) 
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 Implementation costs (customisation, consultation, training, testing 
and communication) 
 
The incident profile will be completed when the control mechanisms are 
identified and introduced. However, the exiting control measures must first 
be identified and then categorised against the valuation criteria. The 
different types of control measure are given below: 
 
 Security policy 
 Security awareness 
 Contracts of employment 
 Service contracts 
 End-users’ codes of conduct 
 Segregation of duties 
 Third-party and contractors’ obligations.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to determine the effectiveness of a control measure 
based on the following scales:  
 
 Effective   
 Ineffective 
 Adequate 
 Inadequate 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of controls is challenging. The above scale can 
be measured against established guidelines and current controls.  
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the details of the security control measures: 
 
Incident 
(In) 
Causes 
(Cn) 
Frequency 
(Fn) 
Severity 
(Sn) 
Loss 
(Ln) 
Cost 
(Con) 
Control 
Mechanism 
(Mn) 
I1 Cn+1 F1 S1 Ln+1 CO1 Mn+1 
I2 Cn+2 F2 S2 Ln+2 CO2 Mn+2 
I3 Cn+3 F3 S3 Ln+3 CO3 Mn+3 
I4 Cn+4 F4 S4 Ln+4 CO4 Mn+4 
I5 Cn+5 F5 S5 Ln+5 CO5 Mn+5 
Table 5.2: Existing control measure.  
 
The table provides information about an incident, providing information 
that will later be used in the return on investment calculation. It shows the 
cause, frequency and severity of an incident and the subsequent loss 
expected, leading to the introduction of a control with a specified cost.   
 
Step 3.2: Identify the potential control measures 
 
Once the existing control measures are analysed, it is then necessary to 
identify the possible actions based on the risks and review of the control 
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measures. This step identifies one technique that can be used to identify 
potential countermeasures for addressing the causes of incidents and the 
damage done to the existing defence mechanism. It is clear that the existing 
control measures do not work and that the system requires a review or the 
introduction of new control measures. The value of reviewing a system or 
providing new controls is directly related to the loss caused by the incident. 
Technically speaking, how much money is at stake? In addition, the review 
strategy should reside within a regulatory framework and be appropriate for 
the size and business nature of the organisation. It should also consider the 
business continuity and disaster recovery plans as well as the frequency and 
severity of incidents. Potential control measures should therefore 
determine potential problems in the implementation of the current risk 
management structure. This can be followed by the identification of any 
shortfalls in the information security system. It is also important to 
understand the risk mitigation process and the necessity of adequate 
investment in security. In addition, the reputation of organisations is 
important, and potential control measures should consider it. Reputation 
has the potential to be very badly compromised in security incidents.  
 
Existing Control Measures  
 
Current protection mechanisms rely mainly upon various security standards 
such as ISO27001, in which training and awareness programs are 
considered [20]. However, there are two important avenues that have not 
been considered thus far. Firstly, the nature of attacks are changing in line 
with changes in the type of technological devices and online services 
commonly used, e.g. mobile devices and the move from local data storage 
to the Cloud. Secondly, some elements of human factors become more 
important than others due to the remodelling of communication 
technology. Factors such as communication and support for management 
teams in the context of ISSs in organisations are as vital as training and 
awareness programs. 
 
Step 3.3: Calculate the cost of a control and ROISI 
 
This step calculates the cost of proposed controls so that management can 
determine the benefits of the investment.  It aims to optimise the trade-off 
between the expected attack losses EA(L) and the cost of  economical 
capital CE(C) on the one hand and the investment in information security 
controls IS(C) and investment in insurance I(I) on the other. Thereby the 
suggested capital to be invested in information security control mechanisms 
will be optimal. Based on this, the total negative liquidity can be shown as: 
 
NL(T) =EA(L) + CE(C) + IS(C) + I(I) 
 
In order for the ROISI to be accurate, the above concepts should be 
expanded to provide more detail into the losses and costs involved. To 
calculate the return on investment in information security, the following 
must be considered across three different stages: stage one involves the 
calculation of the cost of a single expected attack in an incident; stage two 
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involves the calculation of the risk exposure factor and risk reduction, 
taking into account security control measures and insurance  and assuming 
that that security controls and investment in an insurance policy reduce loss; 
stage three involves the calculation of the ROISI in an absolute quantity, 
based on the annual cost of protection, insurance and other costs.    
 
Prior to stage one, the preliminary expected cost should be computed from 
the following parameters:  
 
 External Services Cost ES(C)  
 Purchasing Cost P(C) 
 Employee Cost E(C) 
 Administrative Cost A(C)  
 Legal Costs L(C) 
 Other Costs O(C) 
 
Therefore, the total expected cost of an attack TEC(T) would be: 
 
TEC(T) = ES(C) + P(C) + E(C) + A(C) + L(C) + O(C) 
 
It is also the loss of the revenue from both existing (L1) and potential 
customers (L2). The Total Revenue Loss RL(T) can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
RL(T) = L1 + L2 
 
One can now begin stage one, in which the following parameters are 
considered: 
 
 Single Expected Attack Loss (SLE) 
 Total Expected Cost of an Attack TEC(T) 
 Insurance Claim IC(I) 
 Revenue Loss from existing/potential clients RL(T) 
 Average Margin AM(A) 
 
SLE= TEC(T) – IC(I) + (RL(T)) * AM(A) 
 
After the single expected attack loss has been calculated, one is then able to 
calculate the annual expected attack loss based on the likelihood (L) of the 
SEA occurring. This can be performed using the following formula:  
 
ALE = SLE * L 
 
 
Step 3.4: Monitor the control  
 
This final step is uses to evaluate whether the revision or establishment of 
new countermeasures can reduce the risks and prevent the causes of the 
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attack. Therefore, if the new countermeasures weren’t able to prevent the 
causes of incident then we require introducing another set of 
countermeasures.  
 
Technical and non-technical costs of incidents 
 
SEAs have both technical and non-technical cost implications for 
organisations. The technical costs of SEAs are varied, and they inspire such 
inconveniences as having to update all current network patches and dealing 
with phishing emails, insecure mobile devices and cloud security issues. 
Non-technical costs of incidents include the need for re-training and re-
programming awareness materials, amongst other training-related matters. 
The link between the cost of an incident and new investment becomes clear 
after the loss due to a single expected attack is analysed. However, the 
dependency between the cost of an incident and new investment relies on 
there being a high likelihood of the attack, whilst the possible attacks could 
be even more financially damaging and disruptive to the organisation. This 
will push the cost of new investment much higher than cost of an incident. 
It is proposed that this should be monitored and controlled by the incident 
response team, who have the capacity to deal with it to contain financial 
burdens.   
   
Determine benefit 
 
Clearly the benefits of preventing SEAs become apparent for any 
organisation of any size. Identifying the explicit benefits of a preventive 
model for SEAs, which needs to be deployed, are essential. Considering the 
discussed RAT incident above, the benefit of providing an adequate 
understanding of the complexity of SEA attempts become very evident. 
The key benefits of SIRM are: fast and quick preventive measures for SEAs 
attempts, more efficient user experiences when dealing with e-mail and 
phone communications and reduced support needs.    
 
Investment 
 
Organisations must invest in all aspects of IT to deal efficiently and 
adequately with SEAs. The key investment points are: training, upgrades 
and more detailed classifications of data and information.  
 
Conclusions and Key Findings  
The most challenging objective of an ISS is to support the organisation in 
meeting its business objectives. The ability of an ISS to achieve this is 
dependent upon the usefulness of its metrics in delivering the effectiveness 
of security projects and controls in fulfilling their business requirements. In 
addition, an effective justification of the return on investment with a 
measurement of cost for achieving the security level being validated was 
presented. The calculation of ROISI is an important metric to track. Such 
security metrics can assist in monitoring the controls by translating them in 
terms of direct and indirect effects on the organisation in various capacities. 
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These effects include the interruption of critical systems, regulatory 
conformity and reputational impacts. In addition, the ROISI metric helps 
to improve the organisation’s effectiveness at dealing with mature threats 
as well as enhancing security controls against emerging threats such as 
SEAs and other SIs. Apart from meaningful ISS metrics and ROISI 
calculations, monitoring the control measures assist in the monitoring of 
vulnerabilities and the reduction of them in a timely manner. It also 
considers how the organisation’s assets are impacted by SIs. ROISI 
calculation can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the security controls, 
though because organisations have different objectives and strategies it is 
quite hard to use such an approach. One of the key objective of an ISS is 
to determine the value of the assets that they are protecting. Without ROISI 
metrics, organisations would risk spending more on protecting assets than 
the value of the assets themselves, which would effectively yield a negative 
return on security investment.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM) uses security incidents and 
their related risks as well as the cost and return on investment of such a 
cost to propose adequate control measures. The underlying process of 
holistically modelling risk, SIs and investment is provided in detail by this 
research. This approach systematically uses SIs with a combination of risks, 
critical human factors and security investment consideration and integrates 
such activities into Requirements Engineering. Compared other studies, 
this is a unique method. The business-related domain was identified before 
SI concepts were analysed. The risks and security investment concepts were 
then defined and a process in which the existing and potential control 
measures are considered using gap analysis was proposed. The outcome of 
the gap analysis was an identification of the security incident pattern.  
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CHAPTER 6 
_______________________________ 
Evaluation and Discussion 
 
Contents 
6.1  Overview 
6.2 Empirical Evaluation and Data Collection 
6.3 Challenges of empirical Study in information security 
6.4 Study Setup  
6.5 Case Study 1:  Identification of Human Factors  
6.6 Survey Study: Identifying Critical Human Factors  
6.7 Case Study 2: Implementation of Risk-Driven Investment 
(RIDIM) Model 
6.8 Study Limitation 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of the proposed risk-driven 
investment model, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the RIDIM 
and its applicability to the ROISI. The evaluation uses an empirical 
investigation method involving case and survey studies as shown in Figure 
6.1.  Data is collected and analysed systematically through two case studies 
and a survey. A calculation of the ROISI is provided to analyse the 
effectiveness, scalability and usability of the RIDIM, in addition to gauging 
its practical applicability. Finally, the evaluation appraises the ability of the 
research contributions to answer the research questions. 
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Figure 6.1: Evaluation of the research using an empirical investigation. 
 
6.2 Empirical Evaluation and Data Collection 
This research selected an empirical approach for its evaluation of the main 
contributions of the study. There is increasing demand within the 
information security field for the contribution of empirical studies, as they 
are thought to be effective in enhancing knowledge [123]. In the 
information security domain, it is hard to choose a suitable empirical 
method that is well qualified for a specific research context. Information 
security concerns a number of disciplines and grapples with the ever 
changing nature of technology, information system knowledge, the 
rigorous and subjective nature of human factors, security incident 
ramifications and many other ambivalences and social and organisational 
constraints [124]. The empirical study has been confirmed to be an efficient 
research method for collecting relevant data to examine issues such as 
security incidents in the information security domain, in which it supports 
the benchmarking of information security investment and analysis of 
human factors [125].  
 
The combination of survey and case study research methods was 
nominated for the evaluation of the proposed approach in this research. In 
the domain of information security, these methods have been commonly 
used [126]. The techniques enable one to obtain data on the impact of 
critical human factors, risk and ROISI in relation to RIDIM. This method 
of collection relies on parameters such as business domain, risk 
management information and control over the variables of interest such as 
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risk assessment, risk register and risk control [127]. This study confirms the 
applicability of these parameters and provides a fairly accurate 
understanding of the role of human factors and their related risks. 
Qualitative data from participant questionnaires, interviews and 
brainstorming sessions has been analysed to comprehend the study result.  
 
The data collected mainly comprises the answers of participants to the open 
and closed questions posed in the survey and case study. In particular, a set 
of closed questionnaire and semi-open interview questions are used for the 
data collection. The closed questions are concerned with the critical human 
factors, and are used to analyse SIs. The semi-open questions are mainly 
descriptive and comparative and are used to identify the participants’ 
perceptions of the ISS and related concepts such as cost and investment 
and critical human factors as well as the advantages and disadvantages of 
the risk-driven investment approach. A letter of consent was provided, 
which required the signatures of the participants. The SI case studies 
explore the role of critical human factors and assist in the calculation of the 
return on the information security investment. Figure 6.2 shows a process 
for implementing and evaluating the RIDIM model; this process is the 
output of the activities described in Chapter 5.  
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Figure 6.2: Evaluation details. 
 
 
6.3 Challenges of empirical studies in information 
security 
As the research findings indicate, there are difficulties in applying a 
comprehensive risk-driven investment process to an information security 
project. For instance, a recent survey study showed that one of the main 
reasons why ISSs are not always employed is cost [48]. Some information 
security practitioners do not consider ISSs process attentively, whilst others 
lack adequate knowledge and experience to perform ISS activities [10]. This 
research has identified some challenges in conducting an empirical study in 
the information security domain:  
 
 Information security assignments have a fixed-period development 
lifecycle due to constant pressure being applied from the organisations’ 
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boards of directors, who are concerned with time, cost, regulatory regimes 
and quality control. A full and wide-ranging ISS is not achievable on all 
occasions and in all organisations. During the development process, it is 
not always possible to identify and monitor all activities such as risk 
detection, planning and threat assessment. In addition, critical 
characteristics of human factors and difficulties associated with presenting 
a figure-based report to the board within a running project create more 
challenges and difficulties. This leads to limitations in the availability of data 
for the validation of the empirical study.   
 
 Many organisations and their employees lack the motivation to 
understand and perform information security risk management. They view 
security as a hindrance, rather than an enabler, that creates extra and 
unnecessary activities. The absence of such drive and understanding 
threatens the validity and reliability of the result of an empirical study 
because the data gleaned is consequently less reliable.  
 
 Because human factors, which greatly affect ISSs, are very subjective 
matters then, by nature, information security risks become subjective issues 
too. There are many uncertain variables in the security risk-driven process 
that can be either undervalued or overvalued. Furthermore, organisations 
have different cultures and expectations, which makes each individual 
information security project unique. Such uncertainty and ambiguity 
impacts the data, restricting the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
security risk-driven method.  
 
Only a handful of research focuses on the use of risk and security 
investment management methods in ISS projects.   
 
 
6.4 Study Setup  
In order to present the extent of the validity of the proposed approach and 
its relevance in the context of this study, four study setup stages are 
provided. In any empirical research method, it is necessary to present a 
detailed overview of the study and affiliated measurements to be defined 
[128]. This offers an accurate conceptual characterisation of the facts that, 
if absent, could prompt an incorrect conclusion about the framework. In 
addition, many studies in the field of information security attempt to 
quantify facts and situations that are inadequately understood. This can 
impact significantly upon the soundness of the study result and quality of 
the whole study; therefore, to ensure clear and unequivocal findings, the 
study setup must be precise enough to allow the study to be analysed in a 
thorough and orderly manner.  
 
The main focus of this evaluation is to identify the impact of the risk-driven 
security investment model on the effectiveness of an ISS project, 
particularly the effectiveness of an approach in attaining overall project 
goals and negating the impact of critical human factors. However, 
presenting a precise quantification of the study setup is a fairly challenging 
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task because of the difficulties involved in implementing comprehensive 
RIDIM activities into the ISS project. It is important to mention that the 
shortage of empirical data in the IS field also contributes to this. This 
research considers four main study setups, which are appropriate for the 
proposed approach. This ensures a more accurate output of the empirical 
evaluation.  
 
• SWOT techniques for identifying main human factors: The 
first study evaluates the characteristics of the main human factors. It 
focuses on the input used and the interviews conducted in the approach. 
The scalability of using a SWOT technique is analysed. The initial survey 
and interviews in this empirical study identified the main direct and indirect 
human factors associated with an ISS project. The case study results 
specified the subjectivity associated with the main human factors.  
 
• Delphi expert panel technique for prioritising critical 
human factors: The second study focuses on the prioritisation of the 
main human factors by analysing the result of the Delphi technique. The 
main incentive of the proposed method is to develop an accurate account 
of the critical human factors in an ISS project. It specifies the 
characteristics-related factors.  
 
• Calculating the ROISI: The third study emphasises the use of a 
case study to calculate the return on information security investment. The 
main benefit of this approach is that it allows a correct estimation of the 
return on an investment to be calculated and its association with the 
financial impact of the critical human factors in an ISS project to be 
determined.    
 
• Overall RIDIM activities: The fourth study focuses on the 
integration of the risk-driven security approach into ISS development. It 
focuses on several concepts such as risk, threat, investment and business 
and security goals.  
 
6.5 Case Study 1:  Identification of Human 
Factors  
This section presents a case study and its result: the identification of human 
factors.  We use two real incidents that occurred in two organisations. A 
confidentiality agreement was required in order to present the incidents 
anonymously. The main goal of this study is to: 
 
 Identify a list of human factors that impact on information 
security management systems. 
 Analyse the incident based on human factors using SWOT. 
 
To achieve these goals, two assumptions were formulated: 
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 Human factors (direct and indirect) are one of the main causes of 
information security incidents.  
 Information security incidents undermine the effectiveness of an 
ISS. 
 
 
6.5.1 Incident Context  
As stated previously, two incidents are considered for the case study. This 
section presents the incidents.  
 
Incident 1 
 
This incident concerns a financial organisation. It was one of the most 
consequential security breaches with regard to data protection. It attracted the 
attention of all information security professionals. The security breach highlighted 
the issue of organisational failings in handling very complex issues where people 
and technology are concerned. In this particular case, customers’ confidential 
information was transferred from the organisation’s headquarters to another centre 
on portable devices, and the information was not encrypted. The devices went 
missing and all the information was lost. This method of data transfer had been a 
regular practice in the organisation. The organisation’s information security policy 
required portable devices carrying information to be encrypted. Despite the policy 
being in place, most of the portable devices, including CDs and USB memory 
devices, contained unencrypted information. This failure to conform to policy had 
not been picked up in any auditing and risk assessment sessions.  
 
Incident 2 
 
This incident also occurred in a financial organisation, and it involved the exposure 
of system vulnerability. Once again, the combination of people and technology failed 
to match up, leading to a situation similar to that in the first incident. Unencrypted 
information was sent by post to a third party and all the backup information was 
corrupted due to a hardware failure. According to the Financial Conduct 
Authority – the FCA (Formerly Financial Services Authority - FSA)- due to a 
lack of training staff were unable to identify the potential risks. In this incident, 
there were two important factors that lead to the exposure of the system and a 
security breach. First, encryption had not been carried out and information 
handling breached security policy and procedures. Poor training and awareness 
programs were blamed for the incident, as well as a lack of enforcement of the 
security policy. Secondly, the hardware failure led to the temporary loss of backup. 
The security policy was responsible for the absence of a contingency plan for disaster 
recovery and a business continuity plan. Both organisations were fined heavily by 
the regulatory authority, and their business and professional reputations were 
significantly damaged. For many organisations, the reputation of the business plays 
a more important role than the financial penalties in the wake of information 
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security breaches. The stock markets react to IS incidents particularly when 
confidential data are exposed due to unauthorised access [23].  
 
6.5.2 Identification of human factors  
To review and analyse the incidents, interviews were conducted in the two 
organisations where they occurred. Interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured and in-depth manner and followed up with informal discussions. 
All interviews were carried out in the organisations’ premises in pre-booked 
appointments. Interviews were recorded with digital audio recorders and 
notes were taken. Figure 6.3 shows the SWOT process for analysing the 
incidents; this contributes towards the construction of an ISS strategy 
development framework. The incidents, together with direct and indirect 
human factors (identified in Chapter 4), feed into the SWOT analysis, whilst 
the strengths and weaknesses work to provide an environment where 
opportunities and threats emerge. This is happening on the basis of what 
SWOT defines as strengths that create opportunities for effective ISSs, 
whilst weaknesses create threats that undermine the effectiveness of ISS. 
The outcome is the development of an ISS strategy based on the 
opportunities and threats that the ISS faces. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. SWOT Analysis for this study. 
 
 
6.5.2.1 Result  
For the purpose of evaluation, the survey and interview responses relating 
to human factors were first identified. They were matched to the analysing 
tools. The irrelevant information was isolated, and the relevant information 
was broken down into small compartments. These compartments served 
as categories to reflect the SWOT factors in the analysis tool. The categories 
pertained to the direct and indirect human factors involved in ISSs, which 
were already identified early on. The category responses were mapped to 
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SWOT factors to provide a model for improving the role of humans in 
ISSs. The questions were identified and structured based on the issues 
relating to the incidents and humans. The human factors were also divided 
into two sub-categories: direct and indirect factors. A total of 24 questions 
were asked of each participant and each interview, held over 2 sessions, 
took more than 3 hours to complete. The questions were designed to form 
a consistent rationale from responses whilst preserving confidentiality. 
Table 6.1 shows the outcome of the responses based on SWOT elements, 
which were identified from the literature and the organisations’ documents, 
shown in Table 1. For the purpose of quantifying data, the percentage of 
responses was allocated to each element of SWOT analysis based on the 
result of the interviews. This portion was calculated based on the number 
of people who were interviewed and the number of people who responded 
to the specific issues. For instance, out of 25 interviewees, all mentioned 
“errors” as one of the ISS weak points. Detailed interviews were conducted 
to gather in-depth qualitative data on human factors based on a conceptual 
framework adopted from the literature exploring organisational contexts, 
socio-technical elements and ISS concepts. A sample of Chief Information 
Security Officers (CISO), Chief Information Officers (CIO), IT Managers, 
Senior Managers, Middle Managers and employees from different 
departments as well as academics was collected for the in-depth interviews. 
The interviews and data collected from them reflected the reality of the 
interpretations. This is an opportunity to follow the research investigation 
path [23].  
 
 
Factors Indirect/ 
Direct 
factor 
Human factors SWOT 
factors 
% Of 
response 
Errors D Adequate training 
programs, but not effective 
W1 100 
Awareness D Awareness programs 
reduced confusion 
S1 100 
Skills D Ineffective IS training hits 
people’s skills 
W2 40 
Experience D Most people have 
inadequate practical 
knowledge in the field of 
IS 
W3 60 
Apathy D Many people show a lack 
of interest in the issues 
surrounding IS 
W4 60 
Incentive/Disi
ncentive 
D Policy in place, but lack of 
implementation 
W5 40 
Ignorance/Ne
gligence 
D Not all breaches are 
intentionally planned 
W6 50 
Stress D Too many policies and 
regulations put extra 
pressure on people and 
impact IS 
W7 70 
Budget In Adequate budget planning 
for IS expenditures  
S2 60 
Culture In Security culture was 
adequate  
S3 100 
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Communicatio
n 
In Inadequate communication 
was in place 
W8 60 
Security Policy 
Enforcement  
In IS policy adequate, but 
ineffective for various 
reasons such as lack of 
communication 
W9 50 
Management 
Support 
In Fully in place S4 100 
 
Table 6.1: Human factors. 
 
6.5.2.2 Review of the incidents  
 
Strengths 
 
Awareness (S1) was considered by all interviewees as one of the important 
aspects of strength that influenced people in both organisations. However, 
they asserted that there are certain areas that require attention in order to 
enhance awareness, such as training in security practice. Based on the 
account given by managers at all levels in both case studies, organisations 
received an adequate budget allocation (S2). This relates to the support and 
effort of management in fulfilling security. All interview participants felt 
strongly about the security culture, and all approved of it (S3). One of the 
participants believed that the SI in their organisation was partly due to the 
lack of communication between the security policy enforcement process 
and employees. All participants declared that in their organisations they 
received an adequate level of support from management (S4). One of the 
senior managers pointed out that in his organisation, the board of 
executives understood the importance of ISSs and always supported 
investment in that area. This leads to an adequate allocation of budget, 
which in turn plays an important role in the preparation of security policy. 
Non-managerial employees also said that they enjoy a very good level of 
support from their managers. 
 
Weaknesses 
 
All interview participants singled out ineffective training programs, which 
led to errors and omissions being made by people (W1). They highlighted 
human error as the greatest factor in the category of weakness. However, 
individual behaviour and attitudes towards ISSs greatly influenced IS. One 
senior manager said that training is the most important factor in his 
organisation and he has put in place mandatory training sessions for all 
staff. He also expressed that his organisation uses access control techniques 
with identification, authentication, and authorisation processes. This clearly 
demonstrates that his organisation uses all available technology to fulfil the 
requirements of the ISS. However, most interviewees in both studies said 
that the training they received had long been unfit for the purpose of the 
work. They maintained that training did not cover all aspects of the security 
policy and that employees had to follow a policy that had not been covered 
fully in training. It can thus be concluded that training programs were 
inadequate and ineffective and that appropriate training to support the real 
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needs was necessary. This conclusion is in line with the outcomes of other 
research such that of Adams and Sasses (1999), who found that people 
(users) were not sufficiently informed about IS matters [84]. All 
interviewees highlighted human error as the greatest weakness, and this has 
a direct relationship with the lack of appropriate training. This was followed 
by a lack of awareness, observed by a number of interviewees. They 
believed this deficiency was because of the relationship between human 
error and security breaches in their organisations. However, these 
observations should not distract from the great influence of issues such as 
apathy and stress, which some respondents claimed were equally as 
important. All respondents identified people’s skills as inadequate because 
training programs were ineffective (W2). However, lack of skill was not 
solely responsible for the SIs. Interviewees generally agreed that skills play 
a role in the effectiveness of an ISS. Interviewees were adamant that having 
relevant experience in the IS field plays a significant role in dealing with ISS 
requirements (W3). They believed that if the people who were involved in 
the SIs had had adequate experience, they would have dealt with the 
incidents more efficiently. There was a contrast of opinions amongst the 
interviewees in response to the question about apathy (W4). Whilst senior 
managers criticised some individuals for their lack of interest in following 
security policy, people in the lower hierarchy blamed other elements as the 
cause of the apathy, such as the lack of incentive policy implementation, 
breakdown in communication and ineffective training.  
 
Some respondents, in particular those lower in the hierarchy, believed that 
human apathy did not affect the recent incidents in their organisations at 
all. Conversely, senior managers stressed that the lack of enthusiasm in 
some people was partly responsible for security breaches. Incentive policy 
received support from all participants (W5). Having said that, there were 
disagreements about the incentive policy as this is directly related to the 
issue of cost and has a monetary impact on both the organisations and 
individuals. All interviewees felt that an incentive policy could conceivably 
create opportunities to enhance security policy implementation, but overall 
they claimed that the policy is only written and not implemented. Most of 
the respondents recognised the issue of ignorance as a weakness, but they 
believed that recent SIs could not be entirely blamed on ignorance (W6). 
Stress as a cause received the total support of all participants (W7). They 
mentioned that workload causes stress and that this has played an important 
role for people who were involved in the SIs. Senior managers blamed 
ignorance, attributing it as the cause of incidents where data encryption was 
not implemented. In despite of this, some interviewees in the lower ranks 
of organisations stated that encryption applies to some data but not all. 
Three interviewees blamed the recent incidents on people’s behaviour. 
They pointed out that people sometimes behave irrationally when faced 
with security restrictions. However, the rest of the interviewees were 
complacent about the behaviour of their teams in relation to security policy 
enforcement. Interviewees responded to the communication factor with 
great concern (W8). All respondents felt that there was a lack of 
communication between people and departments in their organisations. 
The breakdown of communication was one of the major causes of SIs. All 
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respondents identified security policy enforcement as one of the major 
factors in ISSs (W9). They stressed that whilst security policies were in 
place, the effectiveness of their enforcement could be disputed. 
 
Opportunities 
 
Most of the participants acknowledged the strength through opportunity 
that current ISSs in the studied incidents provide. They pointed out that 
security-training programs provide a basis for both organisations to 
promote a security culture built deep into the work environment. Senior 
managers in both incidents expressed their views on opportunities for their 
organisations to reduce costs by updating security policy. This would be the 
result of senior management support and involvement in the security policy 
preparation, implementation, and evaluation process. Providing adequate 
communication and a systematic approach within an organisation creates 
an environment in which a proposed ISS can be implemented effectively 
and efficiently.  
 
Threats 
 
Respondents at all levels of organisational hierarchies and in both case 
studies identified a number of threats. They believe that the threats are 
related to the security policy and the current ISS practices. However, people 
in various departments perceived threats quite differently. Whilst senior 
managers were concerned about the reputation and cost implications, 
others were anxious about extra pressure and stress. Management believed 
that to combat threats such as malicious activities, industrial espionage, 
hardware failure and compromises in the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information, they would require new policies and more 
training and awareness programs. Senior managers associated threats 
mainly with reputation and staggering cost. At the same time, they were 
concerned about the burden of cost in investing in an ISS. On the other 
hand, the rest of the team was anxious about other issues such as increased 
workload, stress and performance. Organisations, however, were rightly 
concerned about the greater threats that could significantly compromise the 
accessibility and reliability of their critical information system 
infrastructure.  
 
6.5.3 Overall Observation  
The outcome of this study presents a general account of the SIs being 
investigated. All SWOT factor themes were identified and discussed. With 
respect to the strengths and weaknesses, the outcome indicates that both 
the strengths and weaknesses depended on specific human factor attributes 
such as culture, employees’ relationships and communication. Strengths 
such as training and awareness programs were also identified as weaknesses 
because they were not sufficient in eliminating errors, which caused the 
biggest blow to confidence in the security policy. The elements of 
opportunity concentrated on the constant review of the security policy, and 
updating and providing comprehensive training and awareness programs 
 86       
 
whilst taking measures to deepen security culture. The theme of threats 
focused on improvement in employee emotions and feelings related to 
stress and workload, which would lead them to behave as expected in any 
information security decision-making.  
 
Based on the findings and analysis of the data, it is concluded that the 
research goals were achieved and can be justified. The assumptions of the 
study were accurate and relevant. With respect to the first assumption, it 
was concluded that direct and indirect human factors were the main cause 
of the incidents. These factors were demonstrated in interviews, reviews of 
literature and organisation documents. Participants clearly mapped a strong 
relationship between human factors and security breaches in their 
organisations. Both of the incidents impacted negatively on the 
organisations and undermined the effectiveness of their information 
security practices. Indeed, the SIs were due to human problems rather than 
any technical fault. Organisations often ignore human-related factors in 
developing effective information security. The observation is that 
awareness and training are necessary for positive security behaviour and 
create strengths and opportunities that enhance organisational security 
posture. Also necessary is effective communication, the support of senior 
management and adequate investment. Inadequate skills, lack of awareness, 
lack of investment and intentional or unintentional error can contribute to 
virtually any potential risk to information security. SIs can severely threaten 
an organisation by damaging its reputation and attracting financial penalties. 
However, it is very difficult to explain the dynamics of how individuals 
interact with computers and surrounding systems and how this affects the 
decisions made around information security.  
 
6.5.4 Threats to the validity of the analysis 
General threats to studies such as this one relate to the difficulties of 
collecting data for reliable results and to the generalisability of the findings. 
To counter such threats, a validity examination of possible threats was 
carried out at the very beginning of the study. For example, data was 
collected not only from interview responses but also from documents 
available in the public domain; therefore, the reliability of the data collection 
was improved by using multiple data sources and by analysing the interview 
responses. All interviews were systematically planned and responses were 
auditable because they were recorded.  
 
The study is based on two SIs; therefore, the generalisation of the findings 
about human factors is limited. However, the research followed existing 
literature and formulated a list of direct and indirect factors, mapping the 
identified factors with SWOT analysis before performing the study. The 
interview participants had adequate knowledge to respond to the questions 
with relevant answers and actively participate in the informal discussion. 
They also appreciated our research effort and its link with real incidents. 
Informal discussion sessions were an effective technique for understanding 
the participants’ views on the incidents. However, the research has not 
covered the roles of external consultants and contractors, who have no 
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obligation to receive internal training. This weakness in the system must be 
dealt with before organisations agree to the terms of consultancy firms. 
 
6.6 Survey Study: Identifying Critical Human 
Factors  
In Section 6.2, the main direct and indirect human factors were identified. 
However, because an empirical study demands more specific and clear 
analysis, those factors must be prioritised so that the critical human factors 
can be elucidated. The main goal of the survey is to prioritise the human 
factors based on the observations of the survey participants. 
 
6.6.1 Delphi Survey  
In order to define critical human factors, the Delphi expert panel technique 
is used. The Delphi method is seen as a popular and established tool in the 
field of information security [71] [129] [130]. The factor analysis process 
was also considered initially but ruled out in favour of the Delphi technique 
for a number of reasons. In Delphi, participants could disclose their 
reasoning and confidentiality is easier to maintain [71]. In addition, Delphi 
provides a quicker analysis and thus is more useful when cost and return 
on investment matters are involved [130]. The main problem with factor 
analysis is its reliance on data, and it is less reliable when it comes to matters 
such as human factors, which have social and psychological dimensions. 
The Delphi method is a stable and consistent method that can be used to 
achieve the consensus of a group of experts [129]. The Delphi technique 
was incorporated in three stages, as shown in Figure 6.4.  
 
1. Brainstorming sessions to identify human factors. 
2. Narrowing down main human factors.  
3. Prioritising and ranking human factors.  
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                          Figure 6.4:  An overview of the phases of Delphi expert panel 
Phase 1: Brainstorming  
In this phase, a group-brainstorming session with structured questions was 
conducted to stimulate main human factors, which have a subjective nature 
and are thus qualitative data. A survey involving 62 respondents belonging 
to 7 organisations was performed. The brainstorming sessions were run 
separately in all seven organisations, and all participants agreed upon a set 
of factors influential in their ISS project experiences. Table 6.2 provides an 
overview of the organisations, ISS projects and survey participants.   
 
Participant  Organisations Info 
Organisation outline Respondents were experts 
belonging to industry and academia. 
ISS projects Main human and people issues 
related to security projects.  
Participant details.  The total number of participants 
was 62. They came from multiple 
levels of their organisations, 
including Chief Information 
Security officers (CISO), Chief 
Information Officers (CIO), IT 
managers and participants from 
academia.   
Table 6.2: Overview of the participants’ organisations. 
The participants were also asked to justify the reasons for their selection 
and ranking of the factors. They were given two weeks for their responses. 
In the first phase, 34 of the 62 experts (52%) offered their assistance, 
generating a list of 13 human factors for ISSs that were similar to the factors 
identified in this research through multiple methods. The outcome of this 
process was the identification of the 13 human factors listed in Table 6.3; 
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those ranked 1-5 are very significant, whilst 5-13 indicates varied 
significance.  
Phase 2: Narrowing down main human factors 
 
Phase two of the survey study comprised 18 open-ended questions and 24 
closed questions in the form of a questionnaire presented to the 
participants. The feedback received from the brainstorming sessions was 
incorporated into the questions to ensure the refinement of the human 
factors. In order to reduce any possible bias by neglecting factors or by 
factors that were not present, the participants were given an opportunity to 
offer feedback on the factors they wished to share.  
 
 
Phase 3: Ranking main human factors 
 
The third phase of the process involved sending questionnaires to the entire 
group that included 13 main human factors identified in the previous two 
phases and the average importance and rating determined in Phase 2. Figure 
6.5 illustrates the participant composition in Phase 3. This was included 
with a set of justifications and a reasoning of the selections. Tables 6.4 and 
6.5 depict the number of respondents in this stage by percentage. Figure 
6.6 shows the three main factors with their sub-factors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Composition of participants in Phase 3. 
 
The participants in Phase 3 were experts, selected to ensure that expert 
opinions were considered. Through the use of the above expert panel, an 
opportunity was created to investigate and prioritise critical human factors 
in the case study organisations.  
  
 
 
37%
13%
25%
25%
PERCENTAGE OF PHASE 3 PARTICIPANTS 
CISO CIO IT Managers Aacademics
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Figure 6.6: The three top-ranking human factors and their associated sub-factors. 
 
 
 
 
Factors Phase 1 
(Mean) 
Phase 2 
(Mean) 
Priority 
F1 6.5 6.5 1 
F2 6.0 4.5 2 
F3 4.5 4.0 3 
F4 2.5 2.0 8 
F5 2.0 2.0 9 
F6 3.0 3.0 5 
F7 2.5 2.5 7 
F8 3.5 3.5 4 
F9 3.0 2.5 6 
F10 1.5 1.5 11 
F11 2.5 1.0 10 
F12 1.0 1.5 12 
F13 1 1 13 
 
Table 6.3: Ranking of factors by prioritisation. 
 
Factors 
Ranking 
Human Factor Description  
1 Communication (F1) Concerning the 
exchange of messages 
and ideas between 
people inside and 
outside the 
organisation. 
2 Awareness (F2) People’s understanding 
of their 
responsibilities.  
3 Management support (F3) Management to 
advocate and deliver a 
clear message of ISS 
policy to the rest of the 
organisation. 
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4 Budget (F4) Concerned with 
adequate budget 
planning. 
5 Errors (F5) Can be described as a 
divergence in a system 
that works accurately. 
6 Skills (F6) Skills facilitate the 
function of a role.  
7 Experience (F7) Concerns people’s 
backgrounds. 
8 Incentives/Disincentives 
(F8) 
Reward good 
behaviour and punish 
bad attitude. 
9 Security Policy Enforcement 
(F9) 
A document in which 
the information 
security procedures 
and rules are outlined 
10 Culture (F10) Values, beliefs, 
practices, attitudes, 
behaviour, reputation, 
and ethics.  
11 Stress (F11) Individuals’ stress in 
corporations can be 
caused by heavy 
workloads and tight 
project deadlines. 
12 Apathy (F12) Employees’ 
unwillingness and 
complacent attitude 
toward the goals and 
objectives of the 
organisation.  
13 Ignorance and Negligence (F13) Not paying enough 
attention to security 
policy. 
Table 6.4: Ranking of human factors by importance. 
 
6.6.2 Discussion  
For the purpose of this research, it was essential that the main direct and 
indirect human factors be prioritised in a process through which critical 
human factors could be identified. Narrowing down the main factors allows 
the study to concentrate on critical factors, to minimise errors and gain 
maximal scalability from the proposed approach.  Communication, 
awareness and management support are ranked as the top three critical and 
important human factors by the survey participants. They are also 
interlinked, because without management support it is difficult to raise 
awareness among an organisation’s staff. Communication is vital in any 
organisation. In particular, ineffective communication pose any potential 
risks within organisation. Whilst budget allocation, human errors and 
individual skills are positioned below the top three factors, their importance 
is evident. The strong relationship between management support for 
information security initiatives and budget allocation for such projects puts 
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these two in a unique position. This relationship between management 
support and budget are mostly concerned with the capacities and qualities 
of individuals relevant to the position they occupy in the organisation 
hierarchy. The examination of participants’ responses also reveals the 
importance of culture in each organisation, which is mainly fed by senior 
management team(s). Such an approach by senior management to amplify 
security culture has a distinct impact on the specific security culture. It also 
affects individuals’ stress and willingness to following security system 
objectives. Furthermore, the study confirms that the choice of theoretical 
basis for this research was a correct and relevant choice. The socio-technical 
environment has a significant impact and relevancy to many areas of 
technological advances, including information security and its challenges 
and opportunities.      
 
6.7 Case Study 2: Implementation of the Risk-
Driven Investment (RIDIM) Model 
The previous case and survey studies are mainly focused upon 
understanding the critical human factors within the information security 
system context [137]. Several observations have been made from the case 
studies, and human factors were prioritised for use in the second study. 
This study implements the proposed risk-driven investment model in a real 
world scenario.  
 
6.7.1 Study Constructs 
The main study construct is: 
 
 To demonstrate the applicability of the risk-driven investment model in a real 
world scenario  
 To understand the issues around managing human factors for the overall 
information security management system.  
 
6.7.2 Scenario Context 
The scenario used for this study is based on real and successful SEA 
incident that occurred in a financial institution within the UK. It was a very 
well-targeted phishing attack.  
 
An employee received an email from one of the managers referencing an invoice 
hosted on a cloud file sharing service. A few minutes later, the same employee 
received a phone call from another manager within the organisation, instructing her 
to examine and process the invoice. However, the invoice was a fake and the 
manager who called the employee was an attacker. The apparent invoice was in 
fact a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that was designed to contact and command-
and-control (C&C) the server. By using the RAT, the attacker took control of 
the employee’s computer instantly. The attacker only managed to breach a part of 
the server as the multi-layered encrypted server prevented him from gaining access 
 93       
 
to all the other servers. This attacker used a socially engineered attack for financial 
gain. Before the attack was stopped, they succeeded in stealing assets worth around 
£50,000.00.  
 
6.7.3 Introduction to the RIDIM process  
 
Activity 1: Identifying Business Domain  
 
The main focus of this activity is to provide an understanding of 
organisational actors, goals and business processes. The scenario concerns 
a financial organisation.  
 
Step 1.1: Identify Actors 
 
As described in Section 5.4.1, ISSs and people are internal actors that are 
defined by their entities and specific strategic goals in an organisational 
context. The attacker is an external actor who intends to gain a financial 
incentive. In this scenario, the false financial transaction initiated by the 
attacker is an SEA. The first and most critical asset compromised was part 
of the server of this company. Financial information was another important 
asset that was compromised. Both can be categorised as high value assets. 
We have listed critical human factors based on the results of previous 
studies. In particular, it is clear that a lack of security awareness contributed 
to the successful planned SEA. The absence of an adequate authentication 
process also assisted the attacker in establishing a false communication 
channel. Finally, if senior management had had adequate skills and 
awareness, then it would have been able to offer support and put 
appropriate control measures in place.    
 
Step 1.2: Define Goals 
 
The Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality, Accountability and Auditability 
(AICAA) of information assets are considered as security goals and part of 
business goals. The main threat in this case study was the installation of 
malware that assisted the attacker in gaining access to the server. The user’s 
carelessness, due to lack of adequate training, was a vulnerability that the 
server exploited. A potential risk of loss arose as the result of the threat 
exploiting the vulnerability. This clearly demonstrates the lack of a proper 
firewall and software security protection. Considering the nature of the 
incident, this company should define an adequate risk mitigation strategy 
whilst considering the cost of implementing controls and the potential costs 
of not doing so. In addition, the company should prioritise, evaluate and 
implement appropriate risk-reducing activities to address the specific risk it 
faces and estimate its degree of risk exposure.   
 
Step 1.3: Identify Business Process 
 
The business activity is invoice processing. The technology used was cloud-
based and the attack was a form of SEA in which malware was installed to 
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control part of a server and process a malicious financial activity. The 
stakeholders in this process are the firm, the employee who processed the 
invoice, the attacker and the information system and security system. As 
the incident had very little effect on the continuity of the corporation’s 
routine business, a business continuity plan plays a lesser role than that of 
a disaster recovery plan. A disaster recovery plan identifies the affected 
parts of the system to ensure that future operations and, specifically, 
backups will not be affected. In addition, the  compromised part of the 
server requires the attention of the ISS with regard to maintenance and 
improvement with adequate investment.  
 
Activity 2: Incident analysis  
 
Step 2.1 Description of the Incident 
 
This activity provides an analysis of the incident, looking at the details of 
the incident and identifying risks. The researcher were informed that the 
incident had been reported promptly after it had occurred, though the 
extent to which is has been reported to the regulatory bodies is not certain. 
All of these issues are important in analysing the risks involved. The 
incident was rooted mainly in the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the 
server, although critical human factors, as described in Activity 1, were also 
actively involved. The exposure has directly impacted the company. The 
incident was a SEA, in which malware called (RAT) that was designed to 
contact and command-and-control (C&C) the server was installed. In short, 
human factors and an inadequate security detection and prevention system 
contributed to the incident. As a result: 
 
 The organisation found out quite quickly that an incident had 
occurred. 
 Senior management team confirmed and agreed upon the incident 
respond policy. The detection of the incident was monitored with 
the guideline of the incident response policy.  
 The identification of the incident was carried out sufficiently, 
thanks to malware detection software. 
 The attack was in the form of a SEA and facilitated by a lack of 
clear communication policy regarding authentication as well as an 
inadequate level of awareness.  
 The immediate loss was around 50K, the amount that has been 
compromised. The potential fines imposable by the regulator and 
insurance and mitigation costs require a calculation.   
Threats/Vulnerabilities/Risks 
 
A vulnerability in the network and critical human factors were exploited, 
causing financial risk. The compromised part of the system requires new 
detection and prevention controls; a better awareness program is also 
needed. Whilst new network patches are needed, employees are also 
required to be trained in a more effective way to deal with email and phone 
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authentication methods and thus detect invalid and hoax communications. 
The risk and vulnerability mitigation process requires that action be taken 
by the information security team. It is vital to identify the weak links and 
any known internal factors that may compromise the appropriate risk 
evaluation and subsequent recommendations.  
 
 
Cost/Investment 
 
The costs to the firm following the incident as well as the critical issues that 
need to be addressed through investment are outlined below. 
 
 An immediate loss of 50K was sustained. 
 The cost of patches for the network and server should be clarified. 
 The possible cost of modifying training program(s). 
 The possible cost of authentication of communication.  
 The possible cost of disruption to services and the BCP process. 
 Identifying the severity of the impact on the firm. 
 Identifying if there are any legal implications of the incident.   
The sSenior management team should clearly consider the implications of 
the above issues and their cost to the organisation.      
 
Root Causes of Incidents 
Identifying the root causes helps to determine the exact causes of incidents 
from a risk point of view. In risk management, root cause analysis is an 
important tool in identifying the factors that drive risks. The root cause 
analysis asks the question of why a given set of risks occurred and not how. 
Consider the attack scenario in which the server was compromised using 
Command & Control, the result of the payload of a RAT. The attack path 
describes how the employee was deceived into delivering a RAT payload. 
If the organisation therefore blocks the particular C&C attack and 
addresses the specific RAT payload, this does not prevent others from 
occurring. The root cause, on the other hand, defines the human 
vulnerabilities and the role they played in delivering the payload. In order 
to identify the root cause, the sequence of the events must be fully 
understood by re-constructing exactly why the incident happened. A 
forensic examination of what occurred provides precise answers to queries 
relevant to the incident. The role of human factors in the sequence of 
events should be identified and, subsequently, the root causes of the 
incident addressed.  
 
Step 2.2 Identifying and analysing the risks 
 
At this point, the register session, an overview of the risk assessment 
process, is complete. This process then requires a review of the business 
attributes Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality, Accountability and 
Auditability (AICAA) to identify and examine the threats. It then identifies 
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any existing controls or safeguarding measures in place. When that process 
was completed, the team examined the probability of each threat occurring 
and their impact on the business process. Each threat is examined using the 
existing control as a guide to assign a relative risk level to it. Once the risk 
levels are established, possible controls can be identified that could reduce 
the threat risk level to an acceptable range (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). These two 
figures provide an example of the risk registry of a company, called 
Company X in this research to maintain anonymity. The process can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 Threats were identified 
 Risk levels were established 
 Controls were selected 
Identifying the threats and choosing controls is essential, but the most 
important element in an effective risk assessment process is determining 
the risk levels. Organisations need to know where problems lie before 
making any decisions about how to deal with them. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Risk impacts analysis. 
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Figure 6.8: Risk analysis matrix. 
 
Considering the outcome of the risk analysis, the severity of this incident 
had a moderate impact and cost in relation to Company X’s objectives. It 
revealed a major failure with regard to critical human factors and awareness 
and training programs there. In the risk analysis register, a number of 
mitigating actions are listed and residual risks are addressed with controls. 
Table 6.5 demonstrates the additional controls and new risk levels after the 
risk analysis, which could be acceptable to the business or at least accepted 
as residual risk.  
 
Threat Existing 
Controls 
Select New 
or 
Enhanced 
Control(s) 
New 
Probability
/ 
Impacts 
New 
Risk 
Level 
Acceptab
le 
Level 
(Yes/No) 
Insecure e-
mail could be 
sent by an 
unauthorised 
sender 
E-mail 
handling 
policy in 
place and are 
being 
developed. 
Concern 
about 
employee 
awareness 
program to 
be addressed 
E-mail 
handling 
policy in 
place. 
Concern to 
be addressed 
regarding 
employee 
awareness 
program and 
new 
employee 
position  
1/2 Likely Yes 
Using 
consumer 
online file-
sharing 
services on 
work devices 
to store and 
Limitation 
placed on 
access to 
data  
Limitation on 
access to data 
and on what 
users can do 
with those 
files (read, 
write, modify 
2 Unlikel
y 
Yes 
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share sensitive 
data. 
and/or 
share). 
System 
compromise 
Authenticati
on 
Encryption 
in place  
To develop 
and upgrade 
current 
authenticatio
n and 
encryption 
and enhance 
employee 
awareness 
training 
1 Unlikel
y 
Yes 
Communicati
on failure   
Authenticati
on in place  
To develop 
better and 
stronger 
authenticatio
n for 
communicati
on channels 
and update 
the employee 
awareness 
program 
2 Unlikel
y 
Yes 
 
Table 6.5: Additional control and new risk levels.  
 
Considering the outcome of the risk analysis, the Security Investment-
Incident Pattern (SIIP) artefact, which suggests the security-investment 
needs of organisations, is given here. This pattern describes an integrated 
security solution in which all pattern requirements and attributes (provided 
in Table 5.1) have been employed to give the core elements of ISS security 
properties. This includes critical human factors and investment 
requirements, and it considers most other elements of business functions.   
 
 
 
                 Figure 6.9: Security Investment-Incident Pattern (SIIP) Artefact 
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Activity 3: Calculation of the ROISI  
 
Step 3.1: Analysing existing control measures 
 
Existing control measures include security awareness training, 
authentication, firewalls and encryption. However, the training manuals 
require an update, encryption mechanisms must be reviewed, an 
authentication processes should be established for all types of 
communication and the firewalls should be updated. All of these can 
address the vulnerabilities and residual risks. Column 2 in Table 6.5 
provides a list of existing control measures.  
 
Step 3.2: Identify the potential control measures 
 
Once the existing control measures are analysed, it is then necessary to 
identify possible actions based on the risks and review the control measures. 
The effectiveness of identified potential control measures determines the 
gap between existing and missing controls. This gap is briefly identified in 
Activity 2. This step identifies the possible techniques that can be used to 
identify potential countermeasures for addressing the causes of incidents 
and damage done to existing defence mechanisms. It is clear that they do 
not work and that the system requires a review, possibly accompanied by 
the introduction of new control measures. The value of reviewing or 
providing new controls is directly related to the loss incurred because of an 
incident. Table 9 provides a list of potential control measures.  
 
 
 
Step 3.3: Calculate the cost of a control and the ROISI 
 
This section provides an estimation of the losses incurred and the 
calculation of the ROISI. A positive outcome would shows that investment 
in new control measures is justified and a negative outcome indicates a lack 
of financial justification for the new control measures.  
 
Estimation of the losses and Return on Information Security 
Investment (ROISI) 
 
For the purpose of this study, a preliminary calculation of the expected cost 
of preventing loss arising from incidents is presented, using the following 
parameters: External Services Cost ES(C), Purchasing Cost-P(C), 
Employee Cost-E(C), Administrative Cost-A(C), Legal Costs-L(C) and 
Other Cost-O(C); therefore, the total expected cost of a new and updated 
control mechanism would be:  
 
TEC(T) = ES(C) + P(C) + E(C) + A(C) + L(C) + O(C) 
TEC(T) = 10K+5K+2K+0+1K= £18,000.00 
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The next step is to calculate the Total Revenue Loss RL(T) from both 
existing (L1) and potential customers (L2). The estimation for Company X, 
based on its business and revenue, is given as: 
 
RL(T) = L1 + L2 
RL(T) = £50,000 + 0 = £50,000 
 
One can now examine the following parameters, mentioned earlier: 
 
 Single Expected Attack Loss SLE 
 Total Expected Cost of an Attack TEC(T) 
 Insurance Claim IC(I) 
 Revenue Loss from existing/potential clients RL(T) 
 Average Margin AM(A) 
 
SLE= ((TEC(T) – IC(I)) + (RL(T))) * AM(A) 
SLE = ((23K – 5K) + (50K) * 15% 
SLE = £30,500.00 
 
This figure is the total Single Expected Attack Loss (SLE), which is based 
upon the risk exposure just indicated and the probability of the incident 
happening only “once a year”, and it takes into consideration the threats, 
vulnerabilities and existing control mechanism. If a training program is run 
every three months, costing £2,000 internally and £2,000 externally and 
results in an 80% reduction in SIs for this company and its 15 employees, 
assuming an average cost of £22,000 per employee, then the annual cost of 
the new control protection will be £5,320.00.  
 
The total New Single Expected Attack Loss (NSLE)  after the new 
control mechanism has been implemented would be: 
 
NSLE = SLE * (100- % reduction of SLE) = £6,100.00 
 
Thus the Annual Lost Expectancy (ALE) based on one-year risk exposure 
would be:  
 
ALE = NSLE * Frequency (annually) = £24,400.00 
 
The Risk Reduction, R(r), can therefore be calculated as:  
 
ALE = SLE – NSLE = £6,100.00 
 
If the ROISI is positive, the investment is justified; if it is negative, then 
investment cannot be justified.  
 
ROISI = R(r) – Annual cost of protection (£5,320.00) = £780.00 
ROISI = R(r) / (£5,320.00) * 100% = 14.66% 
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Step 3.4: Monitor the control  
 
We can conclude that the establishment of new countermeasures can 
reduce the risks and prevent the causes of the attack. They are also justified 
economically and this organisation is able to rationalise its decision to invest 
in new control measures, which ultimately minimises its risk exposure.   
 
Technical and non-technical cost of incidents 
 
SEAs create both technical and non-technical cost implications for 
organisations. Technical costs of SEAs are varied and they include having 
to update all current network patches and dealing with phishing emails, 
insecure mobile devices and cloud security issues. Non-technical costs of 
incidents include re-training, re-programing awareness materials and other 
training-related matters. 
   
Determine benefit 
 
Clearly the benefits of preventing SEAs are apparent for any organisations 
of any size. The benefits of deploying a preventive model for SEAs are 
explicit. In the RAT incident discussed above, the benefit of providing an 
adequate understanding of the complexity of SEA attempts becomes 
evident.  The key benefits of SIRM are: fast and quick preventive measures 
against SEA attempts, more efficient user experiences when dealing with e-
mail and phone communications and reduced support needs.    
 
Investment 
 
Organisations need to invest in all aspects of IT to deal efficiently and 
adequately with SEAs. The key areas that require investment are: training, 
upgrades and more detailed classifications of data and information. Further 
investment in improving network capabilities may also be beneficial. In 
addition, a penetration test is required as well as further capacity to assess 
vulnerabilities. The development of employees’ technical skills through a 
new training program is advised.  
 
Justification for the Investment 
 
The new investment is justified and can be presented to the executive board 
to be actioned. Investment should be considered in the initial stages of ISS 
development just like any other critical enterprise objective. Only with an 
adequate resources and appropriate awareness and IS-related training can 
SIs be addressed. An in increase security investment initiatives in 
organisations with consideration of a clear action plan, alongside a range of 
improvement strategies that give them a real return on any security 
investment, is required. Insignificant investment in information security can 
have dire consequences for organisations. Proactive security investment 
decisions are therefore vital for organisations and should be incorporated 
into an enterprise security architecture that enables security capabilities 
across all business activities in a consistent manner.  
 102       
 
 
6.7.4 Discussion 
Applying the RIDIM model in a real case study demonstrates that the 
model is useful for other incidents, including those in which critical human 
factors are a grave concern. Based on the consensus of the experts, the use 
of general concepts of risk, cost and investment and human and 
organisational contexts, the applicability of the model can be extended to 
other incidents. It has been highlighted that seeking new investment in 
security, requires a clear financial justification. The RIDIM can be used in 
any organisation, regardless of size or business nature. Although there are 
a number of information security standards and regulations that are quite 
helpful in providing security metrics, the nature of organisations, their 
culture and critical human factor specifications differ, and these new 
dimensions are better treated by a comprehensive model such as RIDIM. 
As the nature and impacts of risks differ due to the factors listed above, 
security solutions are consequently varied. Organisations seem generally 
overwhelmed by the number of incidents they experience and from the ever 
increasing requests from IT and/or information security professionals for 
yet more investment. Senior management teams were confused by requests 
for more investment due to their belief that current investment in IS was 
adequate. They asked why SIs still occurred despite existing 
investment?What risks do organisations face and what sort of investment 
in improved defence capabilities is required? The answers to these 
questions are demanded by many organisations, and the researcher believe 
that RIDIM provides part of the solution.  
 
6.8 Study Limitation 
The model presented in this research overcomes some of the limitations in 
respect to reasoning critical human factors on the return of security 
investment. However, this study also has its own limitations. One of the 
major limitations of this model is that it only supports incidents based on 
an investment context. This could make the model less attractive to an 
executive board. Secondly, due to the nature of human factors, 
quantification does not reflect the monetary value of the factors precisely. 
Subjective concepts such as human factors are difficult to be applied and 
used practically. Human and socio-technical forces are quite hard to be 
quantified. The research design has in its own limitation in respect to the 
possible bias by the researcher. Some of the qualitative data collected by the 
researcher may have been influenced by their subjective interpretations. 
Although detailed data on the role of human factors and their 
characteristics were gathered, the subjective views of the researcher 
provided an opportunity for bias to creep into the approach. The case 
studies were chosen due to the large organisations involved.    
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This research introduces a risk-driven investment model in information 
security that enables organisations to analyse the risks and return on 
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investment in security controls and deal with SIs. The process makes use 
of secure-tropos, requirements engineering and risk management concepts. 
Using security, risk, business and SEA concepts allows us to model and 
explain the role of critical human factors quantitatively and in relation to 
risk and investment. Risks, business domain, SIs and investment concepts 
in an organisational perspective are not left unexamined by using our 
model. The proposed process leads to a clear definition of risks, incidents 
and investment in relation to human factors. Nevertheless, this model does 
not guarantee that organisations will fully be capable of calculating the 
return on their investment in security controls. This is because most 
incidents are related to critical human factors, which are notoriously hard 
to put figures to or value quantitatively. However, RIDIM supports 
organisations in obtaining numerical figures for all relevant costs relating to 
incidents. Additionally, the researcher intend to propose methods in their 
future work that will further support organisations in validating the control 
mechanisms yet more accurately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104       
 
CHAPTER 7 
_______________________________ 
Conclusion 
 
Contents 
7.1 Overview 
7.2 Outcome of the Research 
7.3 Research Questions: Outcome 
7.4 Conclusions about Empirical Study Results 
7.5 Limitations of the RIDIM 
7.6 Future Research 
7.7 General Conclusions 
 
  
7.1 Overview 
Effective risk management practice forms the core of an organisation’s 
Information Security Management System (ISS). The risk management 
process is about identifying, analysing, evaluating and treating risks and sets 
the stage for protecting organisations’ assets. An ISS project combines 
business, socio-technical and technology concepts, including critical human 
factors, risks and investment, at every phase of development. Such concepts 
have an extremely high influence on the success of such projects. Thus, ISS 
projects are affected by multidimensional factors during the course of their 
design, implementation and evaluation. Consideration of the influence of 
critical human factors, risks and security investment in meeting the project 
goals should be given to construct a more consistent and reliable risk 
assessment methodology. The literature review concluded that a 
comprehensive ISS risk assessment methodology focusing on the critical 
human factors in conjunction with the cost of adequate controls is hardly 
ever considered in practice. Information security projects are often analysed 
from the technical perspective, with a great emphasis placed on minimising 
costs. Such projects are almost never analysed from a non-technical 
standpoint and the return on investment concept is overlooked, without 
objective and holistic consideration; therefore, a holistic and 
comprehensive risk assessment methodology that adequately considers 
critical human factors and the return on security investment is required to 
ensure an effective ISS. This thesis contributes towards this. The 
researcher’s personal involvement in ISS projects and literature reviews 
contributed to the motivation for this study.   
 
7.2 Outcome of the Research  
Based upon the substantial scrutiny that the current literature and practices 
reviewed by this research have been given, it is apparent that the security 
industry, businesses and academics all underline the importance of human 
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factors in ISSs. This research contributes by explicitly reasoning and 
analysing the main human factors in ISSs, linking them to project-specific 
goals, risk and security investment. Hence, the research proposes a risk-
driven security investment model for analysing the risks and security 
investment based on human factors. The final contribution of this research 
is to empirically and experimentally analyse the proposed approach for its 
applicability and to reason the impact of those factors on an ISS project. 
The research delivers a reasoning of main human factors and their ISS-
related complications in a structured form. The study contemplates a 
requirements engineering approach and Secure-Tropos modelling concepts 
for the information security project. The approach assists in the reasoning 
and analysis of the role of main human factors in ISSs and their relation 
with the concepts of risk, security investment and return on investment. 
Secure-Tropos language is used to characterise all relevant concepts, such 
as actors, risk, threat, investment and controls.  
 
The RIDIM model and its concepts provide a comprehensive view of all 
relevant elements of ISSs from a holistic point of view and support the 
analysis of risks due to security incidents as well as the return of security 
investment. The RIDIM enables ISS in the design process in which all 
project components and indicators of the effectiveness of the project, such 
as main and critical human factors, risk, investment and controls, are 
considered in a synchronised fashion. It also calculates the risk resulting 
from critical human factors and their impacts on the investment on the 
control measures and the return of that investment as result of the 
mitigation. The research elaborates upon and integrates the underlying 
activities of the RIDIM into the methods and roles of the Requirements 
Engineering and Secure-Tropos process models. The artefact-oriented 
model is used to construct the risk-investment specification and its 
associated concepts such as goals, risk, investment, vulnerabilities and 
actors. All critical human factor-related concepts and attributes are 
illustrated by the RIDIM, as are the risk-investment descriptions. This 
research develops a risk-investment taxonomy and constructs a 
questionnaire consisting of 30 open and closed questions that are arranged 
into a requirements errors checklist.  
 
The purpose of the closed questions and checklist was to determine the 
risks related to critical human factors and requirements errors. The result 
of the empirical examination of this study indicated that the risk-investment 
approach had a positive impact on the success of an ISS. The novelty of 
the thesis arises from the following achievements:  
 
 Identifying the main features of human factors in an ISS theme 
 Introducing a risk-driven security investment approach for ISSs 
 Analysing human factors, risks and security investment in the                    
ISS process.  
 Applying the RIDIM Model to reason human factors in ISSs  
 
The study results provide a sound and clear understanding of main human 
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factors and their relation to risk and security investment. The RIDIM is a 
capable risk-investment tool that informs of the risks that exist in an ISS 
project. The focus of this research is very different from that of other 
studies due to the human, organisational and technical lenses it views 
information security through.  
 
7.3 Research Questions: Outcome 
Three research questions were posed initially. Following the development 
of the study work and empirical investigation, the summaries below provide 
an answer to those questions.  
 
7.3.1 Research Question 1  
Question 1: What are the main characteristics of human factors 
within an ISS context? 
This question mainly requires an analysis and reasoning of human factors 
in addition to the identification of the main and critical factors. The 
outcome discussion of this question provides a clear understanding of the 
role of human factors in ISSs and well-defined main and critical factors as 
a set of prioritised human factors. This process is well-suited to the 
development of ISS projects. The research considers SWOT, survey and 
Force Field methodologies for the purpose of this question. These methods 
and techniques have been used for the reasoning and elicitation of 
subjective matters such as human factors in research similar to this. Such 
survey and brainstorming processes with key actors and stakeholders help 
significantly in providing an understanding of the highly subjective and 
difficult issue of human factors. The organisations featured in this research 
seem have little knowledge of the severity and importance of human 
factors, as well as of their varieties and classifications. The analysis of 
human factors were performed under a practical theory that is affiliated 
with the investigation of the multifaceted and prejudiced nature of human 
factors. The RIDIM model drew from this analysis and identification of 
critical human factors to define a model that could address the risk-
investment issues relating to control mechanisms and ensure the 
effectiveness of the defences provided by an ISS.  
 
7.3.2 Research Question 2  
Question 2: How do we analyse and reason human factors, risks and 
security investment in the development process of an ISS?  
 
This research question focuses on identifying and reasoning the 
relationships between human factors, risks and security investment in the 
process of developing an ISS. The proposed RIDIM approach supports 
this analysis. The study conducted survey and case studies that included real 
world security incidents. The main human factors were split into two 
categories: direct and indirect. Direct factors are intimately related to 
individuals, whilst indirect factors connect individuals with organisational 
factors and contexts. The research then defined the dependencies between 
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risks, business domain and critical human factors in the ISS process. This 
research continued to embrace the security investment concepts and the 
return on such investments to address risks resulting from untreated critical 
human factors. The use of security incident case studies helped to provide 
an understanding of the economic impact and effect of risks that resulted 
from the critical factors.   
 
7.3.3 Research Question 3  
Question 3: How can the security risk-driven model support the 
analysis of the effect of human factors in the ISS development 
process? 
 
Research question 3 concerns the identification of risks related to critical 
human factors and investment related to control mechanisms in ISS 
projects; it also calculates the ROISI. The survey and case study results 
addressed this research question. The analysis of the case study yielded a 
quantification of the ROISI, which allowed for a justification of the 
introduction of new control measures to address the risk resulting from 
critical human factors. The research utilised project specifications, real 
security incidents, survey questions and brainstorming sessions to identify 
and assess risk factors and critical human factors. The recommendations 
provide a link between human factors, risk, incidents and the impact of an 
individual risk on the control measures depending on the influence of the 
risk and the cost of the mitigation. The research aimed to establish the level 
of risk posed by critical human factors to an ISS project so that risk 
management can effectively address this vulnerability and ensure a 
successful project outcome. 
  
7.4 Empirical Study Results: Conclusion 
A survey was conducted to identify the critical human factors in ISS 
projects. The survey participants comprised practitioners of various ranks 
across 7 organisations as well as a number of academics. All participants 
had had at least 2 years’ work experience within the organisations. The 
details of their roles and the number of participants are provided in the 
previous chapters. The result showed that the top three prioritised and 
critical human factors were: 1) Communication, consisting of four sub-
factors: Documentation, Authenticity, Collaboration and Consistency; 2) 
Security Awareness, comprising four sub-factors: Motivation, Involvement, 
Individual Roles and Training; and 3) Management Support, comprising 
four sub-factors: Skills, Leadership, Commitment and Awareness. It was 
determined that the absence of clear communication, unstable and 
ambiguous security awareness programs and a lack of commitment and 
capability among senior management teams were the most important risk 
factors. Some of these risk factors were also highlighted in the reviewed 
literature, although not as the result of such a clear and consistent method.  
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7.4.1 Case Studies 
Two real security incidents were used as case studies for the purpose of 
analysing and identifying the main human factors. Case Study 1 was 
performed using SWOT analysis and discussed in the interview sessions 
with participants. Case Study 2 used a SEA incident for the quantification 
of risks and investment. The purpose of this case study was to demonstrate 
the applicability of the RIDIM approach. The research has made several 
observations from the case studies. Understanding the subjective nature of 
human factors before implementing risk management activities is very 
useful as it ensures that those involved in the project are conscious of the 
impressionistic nature of the human factors from the outset. This 
characteristic then shapes the plan and scope of the RIDIM activities. Risk 
identification and analysis is the most critical part of the information 
security management system. Risks need speedy care and RIDIM allows 
handling these risks from the early development. The study concludes that 
it is always necessary to prioritise human and risk factors most highly in 
order to manage and mitigate potential threats. ISS specifications demand 
sufficient attentiveness to human and risk factors as well as investment in 
security controls.  
 
7.5 Limitations of the RIDIM  
Several limitations of the proposed approach were noted. Firstly, this model 
only focuses on investment for security incidents. It would therefore be 
somewhat challenging to present such an investment to an executive board 
or senior management team in any company as any such security-related 
projects are hard to sell. In addition, due to the nature of human factors, 
quantification does not reflect the monetary value of these factors exactly. 
The limitation on the availability of data for the validation of the empirical 
study provided another challenge. In regard to scalability, the RIDIM 
encountered difficulties within a large organisational context. A large 
organisation requires a large scale ISS development project, which attracts 
a large amount of risk derived from major and critical human factors, 
leading to an intensification of the complexity of the risk-driven model. 
ISSs have many requirements that need to be fulfilled, and it is extremely 
hard to identify and map every single of them to human and risk factors. 
The large number of project specifications and human factors brings 
considerable challenges to constructing, maintaining and documenting the 
risk-investment specification context. It is thus not always possible to build 
the model to cover every risk event in ISS projects, which are themselves 
continuously evolving and under time and budgetary pressure. 
Consequently, the opportunity to use the RIDIM to detect and resolve 
every risk with an adequate cost and control mechanism may not be 
available in every ISS project. . In order to make the RIDIM project-
specific, it must be customised and bespoke. This can be advocated for 
through the involvement of stakeholders in the organisation, and the 
RIDIM can be configured fully with organisational risk management 
policies and processes.  
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The empirical investigation found that risks should be defined at a very 
early stage during ISS project planning. To better establish a link between 
the RIDIM and risks, further research is required. These risks include the 
residual and inherited risks present within organisations. The process of 
mitigating risks will benefit from this investigation, whilst more investment 
should go to more effective security control measures.  
 
The model was applied successfully to an ISS development process in 
regard to the adaptability of the RIDIM. This was a complete 
implementation based on a SEA security incident. To generalise the 
findings of this research, they were compared with those of other studies 
in the literature. This comparison showed constructive resemblances and 
some distinctive outcomes.  
 
7.6 Future Research  
RIDIM identifies project-specific goals, actors, costs and risks and provides 
an adequate understanding of objectives that require the mitigation of 
information security risks. One of the main benefits of the RIDIM is that 
it is quite simple. It conforms to the information security domain 
specifications with an understanding of critical human factors, risks and 
security investment in relation to ISS goals and objectives. Despite these 
benefits, the model has several limitations. Further research would help to 
link and adapt this model fully to the risk management analysis currently 
used by organisations. Automation of the process can also useful for the 
implementation of the approach. The automation can be designed and 
implemented by providing a tools such as the Security Dashboard. The 
model can be used more effectively if it is presented with a practical tool. 
Furthermore, more empirical investigation is required to generalise the 
issues relating to human factors so that organisations can take necessary 
countermeasures before any incident materialises.  
 
7.7 General Conclusions   
The role of information security is expanding each day, and though IS has 
become a core pillar of the structure of enterprises, an ever growing number 
of security breaches causing enormous financial losses are observed. This 
is due to many reasons, although the increase in the complexity of 
information security systems has contributed greatly. As the impacts of 
security incidents on organisational performance are undeniable, 
determining the role of critical human factors has become more 
challenging. Senior managers feel that these challenges need to be addressed 
urgently and in the quickest possible time to satisfy firms’ objectives, 
executive boards, business reputation and gain legal conformity to avoid 
legal penalties and fees. This also contributes to enterprise competiveness. 
Human factors bring great uncertainty and pose risks every stage. Such risks 
have adverse impacts on the achievement of ISS projects. Organisations 
should proactively make adequate, appropriate and intelligent decisions 
about controlling such risks. This research contributes a structured and 
clear method to support the analysis of human factors in the ISS 
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development process and enables ISS activities to be easily incorporated 
into the Requirements Engineering phase. The researcher believes that the 
risk-driven security investment model and its implementation has a strong 
impact on effective ISS practice in the information security domain.  
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions (Open 
Questions)  
 
Our interviewees were included the following stakeholders: 
 
1) Senior executives 
2) Senior managers 
3)  Middle managers 
4) Employees 
 
Each group interviewed with questions that were related to their positions. However, 
some questions were common. The following questions were formulated: 
   
1. How your role fits in your organization and what role do you play in design and 
implementation of ISS in your organisation and whether it reports up via the 
CIO/CTO/CISO? IS your role technology, risk or business aligned? Could you 
please elaborate your answer? 
 
2. Do you cover all the key areas of ISS and regulation in the training programmes 
in your organisation and are they current in terms of recognised threats (in your 
knowledge)? 
 
3. Do you have any IS awareness programme in your organisation and do you find 
them efficient and effective? Do they response to your needs in dealing with IS 
issues?  
1.1  
4. How would you describe the culture of your organization in terms of its 
security risk appetite? Do you find your organisation culture being in line with 
IS policies and procedures?  
 
5. How do you socialise proposed policies to ensure that employees don’t 
adversely impact the business? In the other words, how far do employees get 
involved in policy implementation? Can you give me any examples? 
 
6. How would you describe your practical knowledge in the IS field? Could you 
please give me any examples? 
 
7. Do you feel that you are encouraged to response to the IS policies or feel 
reluctant (apathy) to implement them? Could you give me an example? 
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8. Do you have any incentive policy in your organisation to reward your 
engagement for the following of ISS? Could you give me an example and 
elaborate your response?  
 
9. Do you believe there are deliberate acts in your organisation for sabotaging the 
ISS?  
 
10. Do you feel under pressure from the IS policies and procedures? If yes, how 
would you see this impacts on your IS practices? 
 
11. Are you convinced that your organisation allocates a reasonable budget to deal 
with IS issues? Could you estimate the proportion of budget or manpower 
resource given over to technical rather than people and softer areas? 
 
12. Could you provide any examples of where employees have provided feedback 
on security policies and standards? 
12.1 Have you been able to respond to these suggestions? 
12.2 Are such feedback mechanisms formal or informal and how are they 
encouraged?  
 
13. Is there a senior management led security committee and how does it interface 
to the board/executive Committee? 
13.1 Do technologists lead it and does it have appropriate business 
representation?   
14. Does the board of governance support information security initiatives? 
14.1How could IS effectiveness in this support and engagement be measured? 
 
15. What measurements has your organization considered to address the so-called 
“Enemy within” or rogue employee factor without alienating people? 
15.1 When such incidents are found and acted upon, are they publicised? Is 
there a policy? 
 
16. How do you describe the communication between senior managers and the rest 
of the people in your organisation, in regards to ISS? 
 
17. Do you think that the IS policy enforcement in your organisation is fully 
implemented and it is adequate? 
 
18. Do you feel that you receive right level of support from senior management in 
regards to ISS? Please elaborate your response and give example.  
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19. How do you demonstrate to the board that information security has value? Do 
you use the risk concepts in this process and if yes, do they help? 
 
20. How do you justify the information security budget requirements to the board? 
Do you the return of investment concept and if yes, do you use any specific 
method/s?  
 
Questions Position Senior 
Executives 
Senior 
Managers 
Middle 
Managers 
Employees 
Q1     
Q2     
Q3     
Q4     
Q5     
Q6     
Q7     
Q8     
Q9     
Q10     
Q11     
Q12     
Q13     
Q14     
Q15     
Q16     
Q17     
Q18     
Q19     
Q20     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122       
 
Appendix 3: Survey Study (Closed Questions)  
 
Survey Study 
 
 
 
1) What is the title of the person performing the Information Security Officer 
role at your institution?  
Chief Information Officer / IT Director 
Chief Information Security Officer 
Chief Security Officer 
Chief Compliance Officer 
Chief Risk Officer 
None - we don't have that role 
Other:  
2) To whom does the person performing the Information Security Officer role 
report?  
Chief Executive Officer / President 
Chief Information Officer / IT Director / Technology Manager 
Board of Directors / Audit Committee 
Chief Risk Officer 
Chief Compliance Officer 
Chief Security Officer 
Chief Auditor 
Other:  
3) What are your greatest spending priorities?  
Check all that apply:  
Regulatory Compliance Improvements 
Risk Management Improvements 
Staff 
Contractors/Third-Party Service Providers 
Training 
Customer Awareness 
New Services 
New Branch Servicing 
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Emerging Technologies 
Other:  
4) How do you grade your institution's ability to counter external and internal 
information security threats?  
 
5) How do you assess your customers' confidence in your institution's ability 
to safeguard their financial and informational assets?  
 
6) Which types of fraud have you experienced over the past year?  
Check all that apply:  
ATM 
ACH 
Credit/Debit Card 
Payments 
Insider 
Wire 
Other:  
7) Which area of fraud do you feel best prepared to prevent?  
ATM 
ACH 
Credit/Debit Card 
Payments 
Wire 
Insider 
Other:  
8) How important do you see the support of senior management on security 
related issue? 
 
 
 
 
9) What do you find most effective in information security policy? 
Check all that apply  
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Communication 
Awareness 
Management Support 
Other:  
10) Please prioritise your responses in question 9:  
 
11) How many awareness and training session you provided last year?  
 
12) How do you assess the success of your organisation's training and 
awareness plans?  
We deployed them, and it worked as expected 
We deployed them, and it did not work as expected 
We deployed them, but have not yet assessed its success 
We did not deploy them 
We do not have a defined plan 
Other:  
 
13) On a scale of 1-5 (1 low, 5 high), how do your rate your confidence in the security controls  
maintained by your institution?  
 
14) On a scale of 1-5 (1 low, 5 high), how do your rate your institution's success in dealing  
with issues related to people?  
 
15) On a scale of 1-5 (1 low, 5 high), how do you rate your institution's success in training programs?  
 
16) On a scale of 1-5 (1 low, 5 high), how do your rate your institution's success in monitoring 
 insider threats?  
 
17) How do you expect regulation to impact human factors in your organisation’s security policy?  
 
18) Does your organization use a social networking for communication?  
 
 
19) Does your organization have a social networking policy for employees?  
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20) Do you monitor your employees' social networking activity?  
 
21) Does your organisation provide separate awareness activities for employees and senior managers?  
 
22) If you answered the last question yes, how do you grade the effectiveness of your security  
training and awareness activities for employees?  
 
23) How do you grade the effectiveness of your security training and awareness activities for the  
board/senior management?  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
24) Beyond "additional resources," what one factor could have the biggest 
positive impact on information security in your organisation?  
Regulatory Compliance 
Emerging Technologies 
Policies and Procedures 
Training and Education 
Employee Awareness 
Customer Awareness 
Management Support 
Communication 
 
Other:  
25) Considering your response to question 6, how much this incident cost in 
regards to affected areas such as, data, servers or business process?  
 
 
 
26) Considering your response to question 6, how much this incident cost in 
regards to new purchases, external cost, employee, legal and insurance excess?  
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27) Considering your response to question 6, how much cost covered by 
insurance policy?  
 
 
 
28) Considering your response to question 6, how much lost of revenue 
impacted you from potential clients/customers?  
 
 
 
 
29) Considering your response to question 6, are you aware of any other cost? If 
yes, how much? 
 
 
 
 
30) Please add any comments you may have about the questions or anything 
else you’d like to add about your organisation’s security appetite and policy. 
 
 
 
If you would like to be notified of survey results, please provide your email 
address in the box below: 
 
   
 
 
